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L esson 1 Course Introduction

L esson 1 Course Introduction. Overview. Course Administrivia Info Assurance Review Incident Response. IS6353 Intrusion Detection and Incident Response. 6:00-7:50 PM T/TH Robert Kaufman Background Contact information Syllabus and Class Schedule Student Background Information

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L esson 1 Course Introduction

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  1. Lesson 1Course Introduction

  2. Overview Course Administrivia Info Assurance Review Incident Response UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  3. IS6353 Intrusion DetectionandIncident Response 6:00-7:50 PM T/TH Robert Kaufman Background Contact information Syllabus and Class Schedule Student Background Information Email to robert.kaufman@utsa.edu UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  4. Student Information Name Reliable email address Email to robert.kaufman@utsa.edu UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  5. Text Books Course Text: Incident Response and Computer Forensics Mandia, Kevin and Prosise, Chris, Osborne/McGraw Hill Publishing, 2003.  ISBN 0-07-222696-X Additional References: Principles of Computer Security, Conklin, White, Cothren, Williams, and Davis Hacking Exposed, by McClure, Scambray, Kurtz Cyber crime Investigator’s Field Guide, by Bruce Middleton UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  6. Grading Grades 2 Tests Final 1 Paper 4-5 Labs UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  7. A Sampling of Malicious Activity March 1999 - EBay gets hacked March 1999 - Melissa virus hits Internet April 1999 - Chernobyl Virus hits May 1999 - Hackers shut down web sites of FBI, Senate, and DOE June 1999 - Worm.Explore.Zip virus hits July 1999 - Cult of the Dead Cow (CDC) releases Back Orifice Sept 1999 - Hacker pleads guilty to attacking NATO and Gore web sites Oct 1999 - Teenage hacker admits to breaking into AOL
  8. A Sampling of Malicious Activity Nov 1999 - BubbleBoy virus hits Dec 1999 - Babylonia virus spreads Feb 2000 - Several sites experience DOS attacks Feb 2000 - Alaska Airlines site hacked May 2000 - Love Bug virus ravages net July 2001 – Code Red Runs Rampant Sept 2001 – Nimda Explodes
  9. A Sampling of Malicious Activity Jan 2003 – Sapphire/Slammer Worm Aug 2003 – Blaster (LoveSan) Worm Jan 2004 – MyDoom Mar 2004 – Witty Worm May 2004 – Sasser Worm Dec 2006 – TJX Credit/Debit Card Theft Jan 2007 – Storm Worm Mar 2009 - Conficker June 2010 - Stuxnet http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_notable_computer_viruses_and_worms
  10. Spread of Slammer—25 Jan 05:29 UTC UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  11. Spread of Slammer—25 Jan 06:00 UTC UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  12. CSI Survey: Average Loss UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Ref: 2008 CSI Survey
  13. Internet Security Software Market 2002 - $7.4 Billion est. 1999 - $4.2 Billion 1998 - $3.1 Billion 1997 - $2 Billion ’97 & ’98 figures based on a study released by market research firm International Data Corp. in Framingham, Mass. ’99 & ’02 figures from IDC study based on a survey of 300 companies with more than $100 million in annual revenues UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  14. 988 Detected 267 Reported 24,700 Succeed 38,000 Attacks 721 Not Reported 23,712 Undetected 13,300 Blocked DISA VAAP Results P R O TECTION D E T E C T I O N REACTION UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  15. Computer Security The Prevention and/or detection of unauthorized actions by users of a computer system. In the beginning, this meant ensuring privacy on shared systems. Today, interesting aspect of security is in enabling different access levels. UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  16. What are our goals in Security? The “CIA” of security Confidentiality Integrity Data integrity Software Integrity Availability Accessible and usable on demand (authentication) (nonrepudiation) UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  17. The “root” of the problem Most security problems can be grouped into one of the following categories: Network and host misconfigurations Lack of qualified people in the field Operating system and application flaws Deficiencies in vendor quality assurance efforts Lack of qualified people in the field Lack of understanding of/concern for security UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  18. Access Controls Encryption Firewalls Intrusion Detection Incident Handling Computer Security Operational Model Protection = Prevention + (Detection + Response) UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  19. Proactive –vs- Reactive Models “Most organizations only react to security threats, and, often times, those reactions come after the damage has already been done.” “The key to a successful information security program resides in taking a pro-active stance towards security threats, and attempting to eliminate vulnerability points before they can be used against you.” UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  20. So What Happens When Computer Security Fails? Incident Response Methodology--7 Step Process Preparation: Proactive Computer Security Detection of Incidents Initial Response Formulate Response Strategy Investigate the Incident Reporting Resolution UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  21. 7 Components of Incident Response Investigate the Incident Pre-Incident Preparation Formulate Response Strategy Data Collection Data Analysis Reporting Detection of Incidents Initial Response Resolution Recovery Implement Security Measures UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Page 15, Fig 2-1, Mandia 2nd Edition
  22. Resources in the Fight SANS CERT CC FIRST CERIAS NIST CIAS UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  23. SANS System Administration, Networking, and Security (SANS) Institute Global Incident Analysis Center Security Alerts, Updates, & Education NewsBites, Security Digest, Windows Digest Certification http://www.sans.org/ UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  24. Carnegie Mellon CERT CC Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center Started by DARPA Alerts & Response Services Training and CERT Standup Clearing House http://www.cert.org UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  25. FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams Established 1988 Govt & Private Sector Membership Over 70 Members Coordinate Global Response http://www.first.org UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  26. CERIAS Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security Home of Gene Spafford A "University Center" InfoSec Research & Education Members: Academia, Govt, & Industry http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/coast/) UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  27. NIST National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) Operares Computer Security Resource Clearinghouse (CSRC) Raising Awarenss Multiple Disciplines Main Source of Fed Govt Standards http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/ UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  28. CIAS UTSA’s Center for Infrastructure Assurance and Security (CIAS) Multidisciplinary education and development of operational capabilities in the areas of infrastructure assurance and security. National Cyber Exercises Cyber Security Training Cyber Competitions http://www.utsa.edu/cias/ UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  29. So How Many VulnerabiltiesAre Out?Lets See What the CERT CCSays. UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
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  35. History LessonThe Art of War, Sun Tzu Lesson for you Know the enemy Know yourself…and in a 100 battles you will never be defeated If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself you are certain in every battle to be in peril UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  36. History LessonThe Art of War, Sun Tzu Lesson for the Hacker Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill One able to gain victory by modifying his tactics IAW with enemy situation may be said to be divine UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  37. Hacker Attacks Intent is for you to know your enemy Not intended to make you a hacker Need to know defensive techniques Need to know where to start recovery process Need to assess extent of investigative environment UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
  38. Anatomy of a Hack FOOTPRINTING SCANNING ENUMERATION ESCALATING PRIVILEGE GAINING ACCESS PILFERING CREATING BACKDOORS COVERING TRACKS DENIAL OF SERVICE UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz
  39. Footprinting Objective Target Address Range Acquire Namespace Information Gathering Surgical Attack Don’t Miss Details Technique Open Source Search whois Web Interface to whois ARIN whois DNS Zone Transfer UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz
  40. Scanning Objective Bulk target assessment Determine Listening Services Focus attack vector Technique Ping Sweep TCP/UDP Scan OS Detection UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz
  41. Enumeration Objective Intrusive Probing Commences Identify valid accounts Identify poorly protected shares Technique List user accounts List file shares Identify applications UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz
  42. Gaining Access Objective Informed attempt to access target Typically User level access Technique Password sniffing File share brute forcing Password file grab Buffer overflows UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz
  43. Escalating Privilege Objective Gain Root level access Technique Password cracking Known exploits UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz
  44. Pilfering Objective Info gathering to access trusted systems Technique Evaluate trusts Search for cleartext passwords UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz
  45. Cover Tracks Objective Ensure highest access Hide access from system administrator or owner Technique Clear logs Hide tools UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz
  46. Creating Back Doors Objective Deploy trap doors Ensure easy return access Technique Create rogue user accounts Schedule batch jobs Infect startup files Plant remote control services Install monitors Trojanize UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz
  47. Denial of Service Objective If unable to escalate privilege then kill Build DDOS network Technique SYN Flood ICMP Attacks Identical src/dst SYN requests Out of bounds TCP options DDOS UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Source: Hacking Exposed, McClure, Sacmbray, and Kurtz
  48. Hacker Exploits per SANS RECONNAISSANCE SCANNING KEEPING ACCESS EXPLOIT SYSTEMS COVER TRACKS UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response Source: SANs Institute
  49. Hacking Summary Threat: Hacking on the rise Security posture usually reactive Losses increasing 7 Step Process Hacker Techniques UTSA IS 6353 Incident Response
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