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Korean Politics (POLI 133J) , May 03 North Korea policy and the second n uclear crisis

Korean Politics (POLI 133J) , May 03 North Korea policy and the second n uclear crisis. How have South Korea’s North Korea and unification policies changed over time? Why have these changes been made? Will Sunshine policy help North Korea to reform?

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Korean Politics (POLI 133J) , May 03 North Korea policy and the second n uclear crisis

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  1. Korean Politics (POLI 133J), May 03North Korea policy and the second nuclear crisis How have South Korea’s North Korea and unification policies changed over time? Why have these changes been made? Will Sunshine policy help North Korea to reform? What are the dilemmas for Lee Myung-bak government’s new approach to North Korea? Will peaceful reunification of the peninsula be possible?

  2. Directions for constitutional & electoral reform • Parliamentary system & PR electoral system • Two-term presidency • Concurrent elections • Runoff election, if 0.5 - runner-up’s vote share < 2* (0.5-first runner’s share) • Expansion of PR seats? • Multi-representation system?

  3. ROK’s Unification Policy Rhee: Opposition to armistice, “marching North” Park: “Prevailing over communism” Roh Tae-woo: Reconciliation and cooperation Kim Dae-jung: Sunshine policy Roh Moo-hyun: Peace and prosperity Lee Myung-bak: Denuclearization, opening, and 3000

  4. ROK’s Unification Formula Park, Chun: Unification through national referendum (for constitution) and elections Roh Tae-woo: Korean national community unification • An interim stage of a loose union (Korean Commonwealth) prior to a single political entity Kim Dae-jung: Three-stage unification formula • (1) Confederation, (2) Federation, (3) Unification: A centralized gov’t or federal gov’t North Korea: Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea • One nation/state, two systems/local governments (1980) • A loose form of confederation (1991)

  5. Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik Nordpolitik (northern politics) • The term came from West Germany’s Ostpolitik • 7/7/1988: Roh’s Nordpolitik speech: -Seoul will seek improved relations with the Soviet Union, china, and other socialist countries -Seoul will cooperate with North Korea to improve its relations with the US and Japan. Achievements: • Diplomatic relations with Hungary, the Soviet Union, China • North-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation • North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

  6. Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy Three Principles: • Never tolerate armed provocation (Naval clash in June 1999) • No intention to undermine or absorb North Korea • Pursue reconciliation and cooperation building • Separation of economic cooperation from political affairs

  7. North-South Agreements July 4, 1972: North-South Joint Statement • unification through independent efforts; peaceful unification; national unity over ideological differences -in the context of US-China reconciliation December 1991: • Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation • Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula • Both Koreas joined the UN. -in the context of Soviet collapse and Roh’s Nordpolitik June 15, 2000: 1st North-South Summit October 4, 2007: 2nd Summit

  8. June 15 Joint Declaration • Acknowledging the common elements in the South’s proposal for a confederation and the North’s proposal for a federation of lower stage as the formulae for achieving reunification, the South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction. • Agreement about exchange visits by separated family members, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, and a dialogue between relevant authorities Outside of the official declaration: • Kim Dae-jung said that American troops need to stay even after unification to maintain regional balance and security, and Kim Jong-il agreed.

  9. What made the changes? International politics: End of cold war, Lessons of German unification Balance of power between NK and SK: • NK is no longer perceived as a threat to SK. Domestic politics: Democratization, Generational change • Dictatorships’ use of anti-communism (NK’s use of anti-US)

  10. Achievements of Sunshine Policy North-South Summit (June 2000) • Facilitated the Perry Process: Exchange visits by Jo Myung-rok and Albright, Kim Jong-il’s invitation of Clinton, Moratorium of missile tests • Positive effect on Pyongyang’s economic reform of 2002 Economic cooperation: Mt. Kumgang tourism (2 million people), Kaesong tourism, Kaesong Industrial Complex, Reconnection of railways and roads Reunion of separated families: • 13,768 family members (from 1990-2008) • Family Reunion Center at Mt. Kumgang (groundbreaking ceremony, Aug. 2005) Military cooperation: Removal of landmines

  11. Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC) Development Project • June 2003, Ground-breaking ceremony (for 1 million pyong) (1 pyong=36 sq. ft.) • February 2006. Pilot project (28 thousand pyong) completed • As of Dec. 2008, 90 enterprises, 38,000 workers

  12. Early Strains in Sunshine Policy Declining domestic support North Korea’s erratic behavior • Unilateral cancellation of inter-Korean meetings • Linking inter-Korean relations with its relationship with the US Coordination failure with the US • Bush, “axis of evil” • Roh’s occasional anti-American remarks Second nuclear crisis

  13. Temporary Adjustment in Sunshine • Stopping food aid (after missile test) • Stopping financial subsidy for Mt. Kumgang tour (after nuclear test) • UN’s resolution on NK human rights: Yes vote, for the first time • Why Roh MH government chose to stop food aid instead of Mt. Kumgang or Kaesong project? • 2nd inter-Korean summit (Oct. 2007) toward the end of Roh’s term, followed by Lee MB’s victory in Dec. 2007 presidential election

  14. 2nd Inter-Korean Summit:Oct. 4 Declaration (2007) 1. The South and the North adhere to and implement the June 15 Joint Declaration. 2. The South and the North transcend differences in ideology and institutions, thereby transforming inter-Korean relations into one of mutual respect and trust. 3. The South and the North closely cooperate in order to terminate military hostilities, ease tension and ensure peace on the Korean peninsula. • The South and the North designate the common fishery zone in order to prevent accidental clashes in the West Sea. 4. The South and the North share a view to terminate the existing armistice regime and to build a permanent peace regime, and cooperate to pursue issues related to declaring the end of the Korean War by holding on the Korean Peninsula, three- or four-party summit of directly related sides.

  15. 5. The South and the North actively promote, expand and develop economic cooperation projects for balanced development of national economy and common prosperity on the principles of common interest and prosperity. The South and the North encourage investment for economic cooperation, bolster infrastructure and develop natural resources, and provide preferential treatment and privileges concurrent with the special nature of intra-national cooperative projects. The South and the North establish "The West Sea Special Zone for Peace and Cooperation" encompassing Haejoo area and its adjoining waters, and actively seek the designation of common fishery zone and peace zone, construction of special economic zone, and utilization of the Haejoo port, direct passage of civilian vessels to Haejoo, and joint utilization of the Han River estuary. The South and the North complete the first phase construction of the Gaesong Industrial Complex as early as possible, and launch the second phase development, and begin railway cargo transportation linking Moonsan and Bongdong, and promptly undertake institutional measures to resolve problems including passage of people, communications and customs clearance.

  16. 6. The South and the North develop exchanges and cooperation in the fields of history, linguistics, education, science and technology, culture and arts, and sports in order to cherish the long history and proud culture of the Korean people. The South and the North implement the Baekdoo Mountain tour and establish a direct Baekdoo Mountain-Seoul air route. 7. The South and the North actively promote humanitarian cooperative projects. The South and the North expand the reunion of separated families and relatives and promote exchange of visual materials. 8. The South and the North strengthen cooperation for the interest of the Korean nation, and rights and interests of overseas Korean nationals in the international arena. The South and the North discuss issues of concern for Inter-Korean development through frequent holding of the inter-Korean summit.

  17. Lee Myung-bak’s hard-line policy • Criticism on the Oct. 4 summit: • GNP: “unilateral giving”, excessive costs • Lee MB: “The next president is not necessarily committed to implementing the broad agreements. --- I, (if elected), will carefully review all the proposed projects.” • Denuclearization, Opening Up, $3000 per capita income • Denuclearization first! • Reciprocity, instead of unilateral giving

  18. Dilemmas for Lee Myung-bak Government (1) NK’s increasingly confrontational attitude toward SK: • Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong tourism • Kaesong Industrial Complex • All past inter-Korean agreements “nullified.” • Adhere to the June 15 and Oct. 4 Declarations? • How to handle human rights issue? (UN, leafleting) • Humanitarian aid? (NK: too proud to ask, SK: not give without a request) (2) North Korean missile launch, nuclear test, and the halt of six-party talks • Ineffectiveness of sanctions (UN Security Council) (3) The Cheonan sinking (Mar. 2010) & the shelling of Yeonpyeong island (Nov. 2010) • DPRK’s apology as a pre-condition for dialogue?

  19. By-election results:DP victory in Bundang, Gyeonggi & Gangwon-doDLP vicotry in Suncheon, JeonnamGNP victory in Gimhae, Gyeongnam

  20. Pre-by-election survey in Bundang, by age group Generational cleavage

  21. Brief chronology of NK nuclear crisis 1994 Nuclear Crisis • NK’s withdrawal from NPT • Near war • Carter visit • 1994 Agreed Framework • Perry Process Second Nuclear Crisis • 2002: confrontation regarding HEU program & breakdown of the Agreed Framework (US stops heavy oil shipment; NK withdraws from NPT) • NK unfreezes reactor, reprocess plutonium, declares nuclear capability (Feb. 2005) Six-party talks: Joint Statement Sep. 2005 • US sanctions on BDA • October 2006: Nuclear test • February 13, 2007: Agreement on the initial actions for implementation • Oct. 3, 2007: Agreement on second-phase actions (disabling North Korea’s nuclear facilities and declaration of its nuclear programs by Dec. 31; US removal of NK from the terrorism list). • Nov. 6, 2007: U.S. team begins disabling North Korea’s nuclear facilities.

  22. June 26, 2008: North Korea submits long-awaited nuclear declaration. • June 27, 2008: North Korea demolishes a cooling tower at its Yongbyon reactor. • Aug. 11, 2008: The U.S. does not remove North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List. • Sept. 2, 2008: The IAEA reports that it was informed on Aug. 18 that North Korea had suspended disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. • Oct. 11, 2008: U.S. removes North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. • Oct. 13, 2008: North Korea lifts its ban on IAEA inspections and announces that it will continue to disable Yongbyon nuclear facilities. • Dec. 8-11, 2008: Six-Party Talks are held in Beijing, focusing on drafting an agreement on verification protocol. However, talks conclude with no written agreement. (DPRK: verification = phase 3) • Dec. 12, 2008: The DPRK threatens to slow disablement of its Yongbyon nuclear facility after the U.S. announces it will suspend fuel aid due to the DPRK’s refusal to accept a nuclear disarmament verification plan. • April 2009: Missile (Satellite) launch, UNSC Presidential Statement, Expulsion of IAEA inspectors, Withdrawal from six-party talks • May 2009: Second nuclear test, UNSC tightens sanctions • Obama administration: “Strategic patience”

  23. 1994 Agreed Framework • DPRK's graphite-moderated nuclear power plants, which could easily produce weapons grade plutonium, would be replaced with light water reactor (LWR) power plants by a target date of 2003. • Oil for heating and electricity production would be provided while DPRK's reactors were shut down, until completion of the first LWR power unit. • The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. • The U.S. would provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. • The DPRK would take steps to implement the Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Declaration. • The DPRK would remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. • IAEA ad hoc and routine inspections would resume for facilities not subject to the freeze. • Existing spent nuclear fuel stocks would be stored and ultimately disposed of without reprocessing in the DPRK. • Before delivery of key LWR nuclear components, the DPRK would come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

  24. Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, 19 September 2005 1.  The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. • The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. • The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons. • The ROK reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the KoreanPeninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory. • The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented. • The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactor to the DPRK.

  25. 2.  The Six Parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations. The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies. The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern. 3.  The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally. China, Japan, ROK, Russia and the US stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK. The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12th 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK. 4.  The Six Parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia. 5.  The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action".

  26. Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, 13 February 2007 • The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK. • The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement. • The DPRK and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.

  27. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days. The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned initial actions will be implemented within next 60 days. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups: Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Normalization of DPRK-US relations Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations Economy and Energy Cooperation Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism During the period of the initial actions phase and the next phase - which includes provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant - economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.

  28. Further Information • James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/index.htm • US-Korea Institute at SAIS http://38north.org/category/01-wmd/

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