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Support and Stability Operations and Changing Rules Governing the Use of Force. Lsn 26. Agenda. Names, Definitions, and Themes Beirut Weinberger Doctrine Changing World of the Post Cold War Powell and Aspin Doctrines Somalia 1996 National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement

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agenda
Agenda
  • Names, Definitions, and Themes
  • Beirut
  • Weinberger Doctrine
  • Changing World of the Post Cold War
  • Powell and Aspin Doctrines
  • Somalia
  • 1996 National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement
  • Bush’s Preemptive Strike Doctrine
names
Names
  • Small Wars
  • Low Intensity Conflict
  • Operations other than War
  • Military Operations other than War
  • Support and Stability Operations
support and stability operations
Stability Operations

“Promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis”

Support Operations

“Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering”

Support and Stability Operations

FM 3-0, p. 1-15-16

saso patterns and themes
SASO Patterns and Themes
  • Nontraditional environments.
  • The enemy.
  • Noncombatants.
  • The political-military dimension.
  • Changing missions and mission creep.
  • Operational constraints, including rules of engagement (ROE).
  • The role of combat troops.
  • Cross-cultural interaction.

Yates, Military Support and Stability Operations, Military Review, Jul-Aug 97

types of stability operations
Peace Operations

Multinational Force and Observers (Sinai)

Foreign Internal Defense

El Salvador

Security Assistance

Partnership for Peace (Europe)

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance

Operation Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq)

Support to Insurgencies

Contras (Nicaragua)

Support to Counter Drug Operations

Operation Blast Furnace (Bolivia)

Combating Terrorism

Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations

Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada)

Arms Control

IFOR and SFOR (Bosnia)

Show of Force

Operation Vigilant Warrior (Kuwait)

Types of Stability Operations

FM 3-0 p. 9-6

forms of support operations
Forms of Support Operations
  • Relief Operations
    • Hurricane Andrew (1992) and Hurricane Katrina (2005)
  • Support to Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management
  • Support to Civil Law Enforcement
    • Los Angeles Riots (1992)
  • Community Assistance
    • Youth Challenge Program

FM 3-0 p. 10-4

beirut
Beirut
  • On Sept 29, 1982, US military forces were inserted in Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping force
  • Peacekeeping operations are designed to monitor and facilitate cease fire, truce, and diplomatic efforts
  • No cease fire materialized in Beirut
    • Israelis and Syrians stayed in and around city
  • In spite of this, the Marines were told to “establish presence” between Syrians and Israelis without an agreed upon withdrawal for either side
beirut9
Beirut
  • The Marines were first welcomed but steadily became perceived as being pro-Israeli
  • The Marines were highly vulnerable in a non-tactical billeting arrangement with very strict ROE
  • Violence culminated on October 23, 1983 with a terrorist bombing that claimed the lives of 241 service members

Time Reports the Terrorist Bombing

lessons beirut
Lessons: Beirut
  • “Without a clearly defined objective, determining the proper size and armament and rules of engagement for such a force is difficult at best.”
  • “with no mission since there was no withdrawal agreement” Marines are effectively sitting targets.
  • The military is but one instrument of national power, and it is not the appropriate one to be used in all situations or for all objectives.
  • Results in the development of the Weinberger Doctrine—strategic criteria to commit U.S. forces overseas.
conflicting points of view
Conflicting Points of View
  • “There had to be some way to deal with violent threats that lay between doing nothing and launching an all-out conventional war. Diplomacy could work [to address] problems most effectively when force– or the threat of force– was a credible part of the equation.”
    • Secretary of State George Shultz
conflicting points of view12
Conflicting Points of View
  • “My own feeling was that we should not commit American troops to any situation unless the objectives were so important to American interests that we had to fight, and that those conditions we met, and all diplomatic efforts failed, then we had to commit, as a last resort, not just token forces to provide an American presence, but enough forces to win and win overwhelmingly.”
    • Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger
weinberger doctrine
Weinberger Doctrine
  • The US should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies
  • If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation,we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning
  • If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives
  • The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed– their size, composition, and disposition– must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary
  • Before the US commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress
  • The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort
changing world
Changing World
  • Desert Storm
    • War can be won quickly with low casualties
    • Erases the “Vietnam Syndrome”
  • Dissolution of the Soviet Empire
    • No more threat of a superpower clash
    • US is the only superpower
    • Real opportunity for international cooperation and United Nations leadership
  • Weinberger Doctrine is not as appropriate in the post-Cold War era
powell doctrine
Powell Doctrine
  • Force should be used only as a last resort
  • Military force should be used only when there is a clear-cut military objective
  • Military force should be used only when we can measure that the military objective has been achieved
  • Military force should be used only in an overwhelming fashion
les aspin and the limited objective school
Les Aspin and the Limited Objective School
  • “…this brand new world of ours is a world of turmoil and agitation. And that agitation has provoked calls for the use of military force in a whole range of circumstances that don’t fit the mold.”
increased optempo
Increased Optempo
  • After the end of the Cold War and the tremendous success of Desert Storm, there was an increased willingness to use the military
  • Previously reserved largely for “vital” interests, the military became increasingly used for lesser interests under a strategy of “engagement and enlargement”
increased optempo18
Increased Optempo
  • The pace of deployments increased 16-fold since the end of the Cold War.
    • Between 1960 and 1991, the Army conducted 10 operations outside of normal training and alliance commitments, but between 1992 and 1998, the Army conducted 26 such operations.
    • The Marines conducted 15 contingency operations between 1982 and 1989, and 62 since 1989.
    • During the 1990s, U.S. forces of 20,000 or more troops were engaged in non-warfighting missions in Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1996), and Iraq and Kuwait (1998).

The Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, Jack Spencer, Executive Summary #1394

1996 national security strategy of engagement and enlargement
1996 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement
  • “three basic categories of national interests that can merit the use of our armed forces”
    • Vital
    • Important
    • Humanitarian
vital interests
Vital Interests
  • “… interests that are of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity -- the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and our economic well-being.”
  • “We will do whatever it takes to defend these interests, including -- when necessary -- the unilateral and decisive use of military power.”
    • Desert Storm and Vigilant Warrior (when Iraq threatened aggression against Kuwait in October 1994)
important interests
Important Interests
  • “… interests at stake do not affect our national survival, but they do affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live.”
  • “In such cases, military forces should only be used if they advance U.S. interests, they are likely to be able to accomplish their objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the interests at stake and other means have been tried and have failed to achieve our objectives. Such uses of force should also be selective and limited, reflecting the relative saliency of the interests we have at stake.”
    • Haiti and Bosnia
humanitarian interests
Humanitarian Interests
  • “Here, our decisions focus on the resources we can bring to bear by using unique capabilities of our military rather than on the combat power of military force. Generally, the military is not the best tool to address humanitarian concerns.”
  • “But under certain conditions, the use of our armed forces may be appropriate: when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond; when the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to jump-start the longer-term response to the disaster; when the response requires resources unique to the military; and when the risk to American troops is minimal.”
    • Rwanda
somalia24
Somalia
  • Drought, famine, clan violence, corruption, and inefficient government had created a humanitarian crisis in Somalia in the 1990s.
  • One of the main sources of power had been the control of food supplies. 
    • Hijacked food was used to secure the loyalty of clan leaders, and food was routinely exchanged with other countries for weapons.
    • In the early 1990’s up to 80% of internationally provided food was stolen. 
  • Between 1991 and 1992 over 300,000 Somalis were estimated to have died of starvation. 
    • UN relief efforts were unsuccessful, largely due to looting.
  • The U.N. asked its member nations for assistance. 
somalia25
Somalia
  • In December 1992, President George Bush proposed to the U.N. that United States combat troops lead the intervention force. 
    • The U.N. accepted this offer and 25,000 U.S. troops were deployed to Somalia.
operation restore hope
Operation Restore Hope
  • The US-led coalition approved by the Security Council in December 1992 had a mandate of protecting humanitarian operations and creating a secure environment for eventual political reconciliation.
    • At the same time, it had the authority to use all necessary means, including military force. Operation Restore Hope was a US-led, UN-sanctioned operation that included protection of humanitarian assistance and other peace-enforcement operations.

This picture of a Somalian women who weighed just 46 pounds was an example of an image that drew US attention to the situation

somalia role of combat troops
Somalia(Role of Combat Troops)
  • The Army force (ARFOR) area of operations included over 21,000 square miles.
    • Over these distances, units conducted air assault operations, patrols, security operations, cordons and searches, and other combat operations in support of humanitarian agencies.
    • Other ARFOR operations included building or rebuilding over 1,100 kilometers of roads, constructing two Bailey Bridges, escorting hundreds of convoys, confiscating thousands of weapons, and providing theater communications.
  • Due to these efforts, humanitarian agencies declared an end to the food emergency, community elders became empowered, and marketplaces were revitalized and functioning.
somalia changing missions and mission creep
Somalia(Changing Missions and Mission Creep)
  • In March 1993 the U.N. officially took over the operation, naming this mission UNOSOM II.
    • The objective of this mission was to promote “nation building” within Somalia.
    • One main target was to disarm the Somali people.
      • UNOSOM II stressed restoring law and order, improving the infrastructure, and assisting the people with setting up a representative government.
somalia the enemy
Somalia(The Enemy)
  • This change of mission was a direct threat to the power base of clan leader Mohammed Farah Aidid
  • On Oct 3, 1993 Task Force Ranger raided the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu to search for Aidid.
  • This led to a 17 hour battle in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed and 84 were wounded.
  • Conservative estimates say more than 500 Somalians were killed and over 1,000 injured, but pictures of the body of a dead US soldier being dragged through the streets and the capture of a US helicopter pilot caused a public outcry against the US policy in Somalia
withdrawal political military dimension
Withdrawal(Political-military dimension)
  • On Oct 7, President Clinton announced the beginning of the US withdrawal.
  • Marks the beginning of a period in which the US becomes very “casualty adverse”
    • High optempo use of the Army in SASO lessens
    • US does not intervene in a timely or meaningful way in Rwanda
    • Army not used in Kosovo
somalia review
Somalia Review
  • Discuss in terms of
    • The role of combat troops
    • The enemy
    • Changing missions and mission creep
    • Cross-cultural interaction
    • Political-military dimension
la riots non traditional environment
LA Riots(Non-traditional environment)
  • April 29, 1992: Police officers acquitted in beating trial of Rodney King
  • Most destructive civil disturbance in US history, causing the deaths of at least 54 people and more than $800 million in property damage throughout LA County.
  • More than 10,000 troops from the California National Guard (CANG), 2,000 active component soldiers, and 1,500 Marines were deployed to the area at the height of operations.
posse comitatis and the la riots operational constraints
Posse Comitatis and the LA Riots(Operational constraints)
  • “The CANG's procedure for approving law enforcement requests had been rapid and gave maximum discretion to subordinate commanders to coordinate directly with the supported law enforcement entities. Before the establishment of JTF-LA and the federalization of the CANG, virtually 100 percent of law enforcement support requests had been approved. Following federalization, only about 20 percent were approved.”
      • After-action briefing by the California National Guard Plans, Operations, and Military Support Officer; June 8-11, Reno, Nevada.
posse comitatis and the la riots operational constraints35
Posse Comitatis and the LA Riots(Operational constraints)
  • “It [JTF-LA] required each request for assistance to be subjected to a nebulous test to determine whether the requested assignment constituted a law enforcement or a military function. As a result, after the federalization on May 1 . . . not only were the federal troops rendered largely unavailable for most assignments requested by the LAPD, but the National Guard, under federal command, was made subject to the same restrictions, and therefore had to refuse many post-federalization requests for help.”
      • William Webster, former FBI Director
training and la riots cross cultural interaction
Training and LA Riots(Cross- cultural interaction)
  • “Police officers responded to a domestic dispute, accompanied by Marines. They had just gone up to the door when two shotgun birdshot rounds were fired through the door, hitting the officers. One yelled ‘cover me!’ to the Marines, who then laid down a heavy base of fire. . . . The police officer had not meant ‘shoot’ when he yelled ‘cover me’ to the Marines. [He] meant . . . point your weapons and be prepared to respond if necessary. However, the Marines responded instantly in the precise way they had been trained, where ‘cover me’ means provide me with cover using firepower. . . . over two hundred bullets [were] fired into that house.”
    • James D. Delk, Fires & Furies: The L.A. Riots
la riots review
LA Riots Review
  • Discuss in terms of
    • Nontraditional environment
    • Operational constraints
    • Cross-cultural interaction
bush s 2002 national security strategy
Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy
  • September 11 attack creates new conditions
  • NSS includes concept of preemptive actions
bush s 2002 national security strategy39
Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy
  • “The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction— and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”
axis of evil
Axis of Evil
  • In his Jan 29, 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush had labeled Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as comprising an “axis of evil” of “regimes that sponsor terror”
  • In Sept 2002, the Director of Central Intelligence issued a report stating, “Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions.  Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.” 
  • Bush felt reports such as this justified him to take preemptive action against Iraq
slide41
Next
  • Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Global War on Terror