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Russian Perceptions of non-nuclear deterrence

This research examines Russian perceptions of non-nuclear deterrence, including the assumptions, military doctrine, and strategic implications. It explores how Russia uses non-nuclear capabilities to shape the environment and potentially encourage escalation.

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Russian Perceptions of non-nuclear deterrence

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  1. Harrison Menke Menke007@live.missouristate.edu Russian Perceptions of non-nuclear deterrence

  2. Introduction • Research Question: What are Russian Perceptions of Non-Nuclear Deterrence? • Russian Assumptions • Current Confines of Non-Nuclear Deterrence

  3. Doctrine • Military Doctrine (2010, 2014) • Russia Understands Nuclear Weapons Cannot be a Panacea • Kokoshinand Pre-Nuclear Deterrence • “Strategic Gesture”

  4. Roles, Targets, and Intentions • Early Stage: Targets Depth and C2 • As Escalation Continues: Targets Shift to Civilian Politico-Economic Infrastructure • Non-Nuclear De-Escalation?

  5. Kremlin Approval: Capabilities New Strike Platforms Improved Missiles Leadership Views “…Russia has the will to use them [Russia’s non-nuclear deterrent] if it satisfies the national interests of our state and our people.” –V.V. Putin

  6. Naval Launch Point Coverage Yellow Rings: 1,300 km Red Rings: 3,000 km *Maps from 7 Fee Beneath the Keel, “The RF Navy vs Your ‘Critically Important Facilities,” March 29, 2015.

  7. The Syrian Testing Ground Russian Cruise Missile Launches *Map partly from The Aviationist, “This Infographic Provides All the Details About the Russian Strategic Bomber Fleet Operations Over Syria,” Nov. 21, 2015.

  8. Implications • A New Coercive Toolkit • Weakens Traditional Conventional-Nuclear Firebreaks • Strategic Effects without Crossing the Nuclear Threshold • Likely to Encourage Escalation and Crisis Instability

  9. Complex Response • “Shaping the Environment Before Crisis and Conflict” • Diplomatic/Messaging • Denial • Capabilities

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