Today’s Lecture

1. Today’s Lecture • A comment about your final Paper • Grade spreadsheet • Turnitin.com • Plato • Preliminary comments on Kant • Immanuel Kant

2. A comment about your final Paper • You have a bonus day of grace to get your final Paper in to me. • Three things to note about this extra day of grace: • (1) It means that IF you get your paper to me, or the assignment drop box, by 4:00 p.m. on August 11th, THEN you will not receive any late penalties for your paper. • (2) This extra day of grace only applies to your Paper. • (3) Technically, this does not change the due date for the paper (which remained August 8th). • (4) If you have any extra day s of grace remaining you can add them to this bonus day.

3. Third in-class quiz and grade spreadsheet • I will be placing an undated grade spreadsheet on the course website by Wednesday. Please check to ensure that the data matches what you have (this will be the last chance to do so before the exam). • If there are any discrepancies, come and see me.

4. Turnitin.com • Remember that if your assignments are not in Turnitin.com by Friday you will receive a zero on the relevant assignment. • There is no negotiation on this one, so don’t leave this task to the last minute.

5. Plato • Our readings will be primarily concerned with the motivations for being moral (i.e. with the question ‘Why be moral?’). • It was Plato’s view that the moral life was the best life, most conducive to happiness, and the one in which the individual could express their highest, or greatest, humanity (FP, pp.600-601). (Confucius thought much the same thing.)

6. Republic: Book II • The interlocutors in this section of the dialogue are Glaucon, Adeimantus and Socrates. Glaucon will be Socrates primary interlocutor in our readings. • Socrates is narrating this story, so he is the one using the first-person pronoun. • Both Glaucon and Adeimantus were, in real life, brothers of Plato. • This dialogue is not historical, nor did Plato intend to convey that view. • Though we can’t, at this stage, know this to be the case, this text may well have been a way to attract students to study at Plato’s Academy.

7. Republic: Book II • Glaucon opens the discussion in this Book with the challenge that Socrates persuade him and Adeimantus of the greater value of the just life over the unjust life (FP, p.606). • He now sets up how he wants Socrates to go about this challenge. • He introduces three ways in which a property, event, or object (broadly construed) can be valued. • A property, event, or object (broadly construed) can be intrinsicallyvalued, or valued “for its own sake” (FP, p.606). Glaucon suggests joy as an example of this (FP, p.606).

8. Republic: Book II • A property, event, or object (broadly construed) can be extrinsically and intrinsicallyvalued, or valued both “for its own sake and also for the sake of what comes from it” (FP, p.606). Knowledge and health are suggested as examples of this (FP, p.606). • A property, event, or object (broadly construed) can be extrinsically valued, or valued “for the sake of the rewards and other things that come from them” (FP, p.606). • Extrinsically valued properties, events or objects are so valued despite their onerous character (FP, p.606).

9. Republic: Book II • Now the greatest of all valued properties, events or objects are, according to Socrates, valued both extrinsically and intrinsically. Justice being among them (FP, p.606). • Glaucon and Adeimantus want to see this view of justice properly defended, as they want to believe it themselves without any reservations. So they go about providing reasons for thinking that the unjust life is better than the just life in the hopes that Socrates will later find fault with their arguments (FP, p.606).

10. Republic: Book II • First, Glaucon proffers a narrative about the nature and origins of justice. • Injustice is, it is commonly held, naturally good, while suffering injustice is bad. (Natural goodness arises from a property, event or object [broadly construed] irrespective of the social environment in which it finds itself. The artificial goodness of a property, event or object [broadly construed] depends upon the social environment in which it finds itself [FP, p.603].)

11. Republic: Book II • So the best life is the one in which we can act unjustly but suffer no consequences of that or someone else’s injustice. • Because this is not an option for most people, suggests Glaucon, a social contract is struck under the express agreement that none of the contractors will act unjustly and none will suffer injustice. Under the laws of this contract obedience is christened justice. This is the mean between the best life (acting unjustly with impunity) and the worst life (suffering from injustice and having no recourse to escape or avenge oneself). • Glaucon adds that it would be the height of irrationality for the person who can both act unjustly and escape the consequences of injustice, to agree to such a contract (FP, p.607).

12. Republic: Book II • Second, Glaucon suggests that a thought experiment will show that those who live a just life do such “unwillingly, as something necessary, not as something good” (FP, p.606). • Glaucon recounts the story of the Ring of Gyges. In this story a humble shepherd finds the grave of an ancient king or great warrior, in which a ring can be clearly seen on one of the fingers of the corpse. He takes this ring and wears it to the local monthly meeting between his fellow shepherds, himself and the king of Lydia. While there he discovers that if he turns the ring in towards his hand he becomes invisible (FP, p.607).

13. Republic: Book II • Glaucon’s story ends in the following way: • “When he [i.e. the shepherd] realized this, he at once arranged to become one of the messengers sent to report to the king. And when he arrived there, he seduced the king’s wife, attacked the king with her help, killed him, and took over the kingdom” (FP, p.607).

14. Republic: Book II • Now Glaucon suggests that we imagine a just and unjust man equipped with two such rings. We are now asked to imagine what their lives would be like after they discover the power of their respective rings. The rings, as has been recounted in the story of the Ring of Gyges, allow each individual to act as they like and with impunity. • It is Glaucon’s contention that both of these individuals will, if only eventually, find themselves living relevantly similar lives, and, what’s more, lives that are unjust. • Indeed, the individual who did not live unjustly in such circumstances would be thought so much more the idiot for not doing so.

15. Republic: Book II • This, Glaucon suggests, shows that individuals only live a just life when compelled to do so, and when opportunity arises where they can be unjust with impunity, they act accordingly (FP, pp.607-08).

16. Republic: Book II • Third, Glaucon broaches the topic of why it is (reasonably) thought that the unjust life is better than the just. • To do this he stipulates that we must abstract both the unjust life and the just life away from any contingencies that might mislead us into thinking one is better than the other, and then consider the best example of both kinds of life. • “We’ll subtract nothing from the injustice of an unjust person and nothing from the justice of a just one, but we’ll take each to be complete in his own way of life” (FP, p.608).

17. Republic: Book II • In the life of the individual who excels at being unjust, he must be able to be unjust in the ‘best way’, successful in what he does, or at least able to correct most (if not all) of his mistakes undetected, and so able to maintain a reputation of being just. If he is detected he must possess the wherewithal to persuade, or at least quiet, his critics, either through rhetoric or force (FP, p.608).

18. Republic: Book II • In the life of the individual who excels at being just, he must be able to be just in the ‘best way’, always doing what is just, but never receiving recognition for it. Indeed he must have the reputation for being unjust, otherwise “it wouldn’t be clear whether he is just for the sake of justice itself or for the sake of those honours and rewards [i.e. attaching to the reputation of being just]” (FP, p.608).

19. Republic: Book II • The end of the lives of these individuals is recounted as follows: • “They’ll say that a just person in such circumstances will be whipped, stretched on a rack, chained, blinded by fire, and, at the end, impaled, and will realize then that one shouldn’t want to be just but to be believed to be just” (FP, p.609). • The life of the unjust person will go in the opposite direction. He will be successful in accumulating wealth and good reputation, able to marry and enter contracts with whomever he likes, and always win in competition since he has no scruples about how he does so. He will also assuage the gods through the kinds of great sacrifices only the wealthy can perform. For this alone he will receive the blessings of the gods (FP, p.609).

20. Republic: Book II • This side of the debate (i.e. on defending the unjust life) does not end here. Adeimantus now jumps into the conversation. • It is his contention that justice, and the just life, is commonly recommended and praised on the grounds of the benefits it brings those who are just (rather than on its intrinsic value). Not just in social reputation and influence, but in the nature and extent of the blessings from the gods. This includes blessings of wealth and good fortune in life, and great happiness in the after-life. The unjust, on the other hand, receive only torment and hardship in the after-life (FP, pp.609-10).

21. Republic: Book II • It gets worse, according to Adeimantus. • It is commonly held, even among the poets (a kind of religious authority in classical Greece), that: • (1) The just and moderate life is, though good, onerous and difficult, while the unjust and immoderate life is, though shameful, are easy and “sweet” (FP, p.610); • (2) What’s more, Adeimantus continues, unjust activities are more profitable than just ones, and bring the unjust wealth, honour and happiness.The just are, alternatively, weak, poor and dishonoured (FP, p.610);

22. Republic: Book II • (3) Finally, the injustice of the unjust need not haunt them through the actions or judgments of the gods. (i) Due to the action or inaction of the Deities, the lives of the just are often harsher than the lives of the unjust. (ii) Priests and prophets testify to the power of sacrifices and incantations to both sway the gods to our will and appease them for any wrong doing on our part (even if we have already died and those who sacrifice do so on our behalf) (FP, pp.610-11). • All of these considerations, argues Adeimantus, work against the appeal of living the just life, and work towards making the life of the unjust appealing (FP, p.611).

23. Republic: Book II • Adeimantus considers some objections to his account. • Objection 1: It will be difficult to successfully conceal our unjust actions. • Response: (i) Nothing worth having is easy to get. (ii) We can form secret societies to protect and conceal ourselves. (iii) We can employ the best to speak on our behalf in court, or forcefully silence our critics in the public sphere (FP, p.611).

24. Republic: Book II • Objection 2: We can’t conceal our actions from the gods, or force their silence. • Response: • (1) We only know of the gods through poets and the laws. • (2) If the gods do not exist, or do not care for human affairs, we need not worry. • (3) If they do exist and care for human affairs, we need not worry. • (4) According to the poets and laws (who are the sole repository of knowledge about the gods) we can appease the gods for any of our wrong doing. • (5) If we are unjust, we can profit from our injustice and assuage the gods with our spoils.

25. Republic: Book II • (6) If we are just, we lose the profit from being unjust and are not threatened punishment from the gods. • (7) It is better to both profit from injustice and assuage the gods with the spoils than to be just, poor and well regarded by the gods. • (8) So, we should be unjust, and assuage the gods with our spoils (FP, p.611).

26. Republic: Book II • Objection 3: But what of our end in Hades (it is in some ways the equivalent of Hell) or the welfare of our children or their children? • Response: The poets, laws and prophets tell us of the power of ritual to atone for our misdeeds (FP, p.611). • So, why be moral (or just)?

27. An argument from class discussion • (1) There is no ought (i.e. there is no moral duty to do x) where there is no can (i.e. where we cannot do x). • (2) We cannot, on mass, distribute our wealth and live in accord with our greater obligations. • (3) We cannot live a purely (read consistently) moral life and live in accord with our greater obligations (i.e. the moral constraints for a purely moral life are not ultimately realizable together in the one life). • (4) So, we have no obligation, on mass, to distribute our wealth. • (5) So, we have no obligation to live a purely moral life. • Is this argument right? Should we embrace an immoral life?

28. Immanuel Kant • Immanuel Kant was a Prussian philosopher. • He was born in 1724 and died in 1804. • Arguably, he was the greatest of the Enlightenment philosophers and one of the greatest of the European philosophers. • He was a Christian, and was raised in a Pietist home (not Lutheran as I suggested in class [I did admit I wasn’t at all sure]). • He wrote on Metaphysics, Epistemology an Moral Philosophy (FP, pp.222-23).

29. Preliminary comments on Kant • Kant makes a strong distinction between reason and emotion. • Emotions, for Kant, are unreliable grounds for acting. He is here contrasting himself with philosophers like Hume, who seen certain passions or sentiments as integral to living a moral life. • Kant would go as far as to argue that our natural inclinations, emotions, or sentiments lead us away from, or interfere with, rational action. • This is no small point for Kant as he views all moral action as rational action.

30. Preliminary comments on Kant • Kant believes that all human beings share a faculty of reason. • He also believes that there are objective principles of reason. That is, Kant believes that there are principles of reason that all rational agents (human or nonhuman) ought to hold. • Kant reaffirms the distinction between the descriptive (what actually happens; or what is the case) and the normative (what should or ought to be the case…even if it isn’t). • Moral philosophy concerns itself with what ought to be the case…whether or not it is or isn’t the case.

31. Preliminary comments on Kant • The philosopher David Hume pointed out what has since become known as the Naturalistic Fallacy: To draw an ought from an is, is fallacious. • I.e. it doesn’t follow that because something is the case, or people approve of something, that it ought to be the case or that people ought to approve of it. • Kant would agree with this.

32. Preliminary comments on Kant • It also doesn’t follow that because something is not the case, or people disapprove of something, that it ought not to be the case or that people or ought not approve of it. • This should caution us from merely appealing to common moral judgment about x as reasonable grounds for holding said moral judgment.

33. Preliminary comments on Kant • Moral Philosophy, for Kant, has both an empirical (a posteriori) element and a non-empirical (a priori) element. • The moral philosopher, according to Kant, is concerned primarily with the a priori ground of moral reasoning. • A ground, principle or object counts as a priori if it can be understood or examined independently of past, present or future experience.

34. Preliminary comments on Kant • In moral discourse, the notion of, or what it means to be, a moral (rational) agent can be examined, for Kant, independently of experience. Such an examination will also entail an examination of the will (which is the faculty or power which gives rise to action/agency), and the kinds of a priori principles which may count as rational, versus empirical.

35. First Section • In this First Section, it is important to remember that Kant is primarily concerned with what we can deduce or infer, and defend, from our common moral knowledge (FP, p.634). • He will discuss, in order of appearance, the importance of the good will, the proper motivation for action, and the proper form of moral maxims or principles (FP, p.634).

36. First Section: Intrinsic versus extrinsic goodness or value • Kant begins this section by looking for an intrinsically good ground for the moral life. • Remember that for something to be extrinsically good or valuable is for it to derive its goodness or value from its relation to another good or ‘object’ of value. • For something to be intrinsically good or valuable is for it to enjoy a goodness or value in itself (without reference to any other good or valuable ‘object’).

37. First Section: Intrinsic versus extrinsic goodness or value • You can understand the beginning of this section as assuming that the moral life is good. This is suggested by the status accorded those who would live morally (see FP, p.643). The question is, Is it extrinsically or intrinsically good?