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OSMA Software Assurance Symposium

Space Shuttle Return to Flight (The Safety Guy’s View). OSMA Software Assurance Symposium. Bryan O’Connor Associate Administrator Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. 30 July 2003. "Mission success stands on the foundation of our unwavering commitment to safety"

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OSMA Software Assurance Symposium

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  1. Space Shuttle Return to Flight (The Safety Guy’s View) OSMA Software Assurance Symposium Bryan O’Connor Associate Administrator Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 30 July 2003 "Mission success stands on the foundation of our unwavering commitment to safety" Administrator Sean O'Keefe January 2003 (1)

  2. Knowledge and High Risk Operations There are things we know that we know, There are things we know we don’t know, There are things we don’t know we don’t know. Donald Rumsfeld, U. S. SecDef NATO HQ Press Conference, June ‘02 At NASA (and any other organization engaged in high risk activities)… There are also things we don’t know we know!

  3. The Risk Iceberg Known Knowns Known Unknowns Unknown Knowns Unknown Unknowns

  4. The Four Levels of the Risk Iceberg • Known Knowns • Flight Data and demonstrated performance • Flight or test-validated analysis, simulations and models • Operation within certification limits • Known Unknowns • Generic but undemonstrated failure modes and hazards • Risk analysis uncertainties • Acknowledged test and analysis limitations • Unverified modeling and simulation based predictions • Envelope expansion and operations within certification but out of family • Unknown Unknowns • Bad assumptions • Unfinished experimental research • Operation outside of certification limits (temperature, Q, tire speed, etc.) • Unknown Knowns • Miscommunicated test or analysis results • Uneven understanding of data or environment across the team • Poor documentation combined with loss of corporate memory

  5. The Strategy for Safe Return to Flight • Known Knowns: (Systems Engineering and Program Management) • High quality program and mission management processes and people • “Listen to the hardware” • Known Unknowns: (Risk Management) • Reduce uncertainties with analysis, test and attention to flight results • Recertify to the real environment (has it changed over the years?) • Treat residual risk (including uncertainty) with conservative ground and flight procedures, operating margins, contingency plans • Unknown Unknowns: (Continuous Research, Test and Evaluation) • Do what we can to better understand the limitations of the system in the real environment • Constantly challenge old assumptions, models and analyses • Unknown Knowns: (Continuous Process Improvement) • Continuously assess and improve program communications, documentation, workforce competence • Improve data analysis tools and techniques (e.g. trending)

  6. Return to Flight: Near Term Activities • Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations to date • Develop and implement comprehensive inspection plan for RCC • Modify NIMA memorandum of understanding • Develop in-flight TPS inspection and repair • Upgrade NASA imaging of shuttle launch and ascent • Other Activities focused on Return to Flight • External tank upgrades (foam shedding) • Improve FOD control at KSC • Improve on-vehicle video/digital film downlink capability • Assess KSC and MAF quality systems (including GMIPS) • Address public risk policy for shuttle over-flight • Improve mission management and Certification of Flight Readiness • Review shuttle requirements (waivers, deviations, exceptions) • Validate / improve safety and mission assurance structure (in-line and independent)…”no there there” ? • Improve problem tracking and anomaly resolution

  7. Safety and Independence

  8. Typical Safety Program Interfaces (Example: Headquarters Directed Program) Functional Support NASA Administrator Independent Communications Path (re: Program) Organizational Reporting OSMA AA Code Q Enterprise AA NESC Insight Matrix support Program Center Director Policy SMA support Center SMA

  9. Typical Safety Project Interfaces(Example: Center Managed Projects) Functional Support NASA Administrator Independent Communications Path (re: Program) Organizational Reporting OSMA AA Code Q Enterprise AA NESC Projects Center Director Projects Projects Projects Policy SMA support Center SMA

  10. NASA Safety and Engineering Center Training and Development Safety & Mission Assurance Chief Engineer Office Program Enterprises $ Training Tasks Engineering/safety tasks • Supplement to agency system safety and engineering activities • Independent engineering assessments and testing • Independent safety and mission assurance analysis, surveillance, audit LaRC Academia NESC Nat’l Facilities NASA Centers Industry

  11. The Planned Result: Ex Scientia Salus (From Knowledge: Safety) CPI CRM R/T&E

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