Public Affair IW-220

1. College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Public Affair IW-220

2. AFDD 2-5.4 the way we think about and use public information in a military operation... “the public information battlespace”

3. contents • global information environment • information as an instrument of national power • informational flexible deterrent options • virtual force projection • case study - Haiti • using themes & messages • combating enemy PSYOP • case study - Kosovo • review

4. global information environment…technology & competition has changed the world !

5. global information environment • media are virtually everywhere - and have the technology to broadcast information in real-time • media will find people to talk to them -- if they don’t get info from us, they’ll get it from a less knowledgeable source, or from the enemy • can’t hide major troop movements • appearance of withholding/manipulating information can impair mission • mediaattention and questions on an issue bring enormous pressure on political decision makers to act quickly ...

6. the “CNN effect”a reality of the global information environmentThe speed of communications & commercial pressures to be first with a news story brings a sense of immediacy to journalism today. In essence, the CNN effect occurs when media attention and questions on an issue bring enormous pressure on political decision makers to act quickly without full knowledge of the situation. William J. Perry Former SECDEFgiven this, what advantages are there to dealing with the media ?

7. national support • - funding • - recruiting • - national will • - morale • enemy decision making • - show of force • - resolve • - sending clear messages • how can this power of information and • communications be effectively used by the NCA ?

8. information as an instrument of national power…every bit as powerful as diplomatic, economic, military instruments… combine them for an irresistiblesynergy

9. information as an instrument of national power • national will, or public support for the operation = strategic center of gravity • information is crucial to the formulation of national will -- PA ops tells the story • enemy will attempt to sway public opinion • PA ops counters these threats by: • 1. gaining and analyzing information about the environment • 2. provide timely and accurate information • 3. defending against enemy propaganda, threats or attack it’s important to create an effective synergy of PA ops within IO

10. IO construct INFORMATION SUPERIORITY INFORMATION OPERATIONS INFORMATION IN WARFARE INFORMATION WARFARE defend attack gain exploit COUNTERINFORMATION PRECISION NAV OFFENSIVE COUNTERINFORMATION WEATHER I S R DEFENSIVE COUNTERINFORMATION Information Assurance Counter- Intelligence Electronic Warfare COLLECTION/ DISSEMINATION ACTIVITIES PSYOP Counter- PSYOP Physical Attack OPSEC Deception Electronic Protection Counter- Deception Information Attack include PA ops in your IO planning & IO cells

11. AF performs strategic, operational, and tactical PA ops utilizing deployable and reach-back capabilities in support of the JFC campaign plans contain PA ops -- commanders must build in PA ops considerations in the campaign plan right from the beginning PA ops actions and capabilities must be integrated within normal campaign planning and execution -- annex F and PA guidance should contain the commanders intent for PA ops, not just specific PA actions PA ops must be coordinated and de-conflicted with other IO activities -- this is done in the JFC IO cell these capabilities give the commander some real options... AFDD 2-5.4 considerations

12. informational flexible deterrent options…options other than “bombs on target”

13. informational FDOs “attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.” -- Sun Tzu, 4th Century B.C. how can we do this?

14. informational FDOs • PA ops can be key to “driving a crisis back to peace” - Lt. Gen. Ron Keys, EUCOM J-3 • heightening public awareness and gaining and maintaining their support • promoting national (and coalition) policies, aims and objectives for the operation • combating enemy dis-information • keeping the operation in the news PA ops must be carefully orchestrated PDD - 68 helps

15. informational FDOs • presidential decision directive PDD - 68 helps the U.S. government speak with: • one voice • one intent to the international audience • goal: “...more deliberate and well-developed international public information strategy in promoting our values and interests.” • integrates public affairs activities of government departments into overall strategy through interagency core group (ICG) PDD - 68can create a powerful strategic synergy for the operational commander

16. informational FDOs • interagency core group -- ICG • assistant secretary-level reps from State, Defense, JCS, US AID, NIC, NSC, and other offices or agencies as situation requires • ICG will establish sub-groups on regional, functional, and transnational issues as appropriate • ICG chaired by Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs the ICG can coordinate powerful resources for the commander’s FDOs and if needed, help create a ‘virtual force projection’

17. virtual force projection… combine military hardware with public information to “project force”

18. virtual force projection • PA ops can effect a virtual force projection • visible activity • visible resolve • visible enthusiasm • professional images • clear, unmistakable messages & images send the enemy clear and unmistakable messages and images -- goal can be to intimidate the enemy through public information flowing through the news media

19. resolving a crisis case study Haiti

20. case study: Haiti • 1994 UN authorized the use of force to remove the military dictatorship in Haiti • asked US to restore the lawfully elected government • goal: generate public support for actions • goal: show US resolve, intent to uphold UN resolution • goal:show US willingness to resolve the conflict without military force, although force was authorized

21. Haiti results • Haiti dictators recognized international and US resolve -- saw and heard leaders express support and determination to restore elected government • recognized willingness to use military force -- saw preparations, heard from military leaders and service members who believed in and supported the operation • saw mobilization on TV -- watched forces load and depart • quickly struck a deal to restore the elected government

22. “The objective is to ensure military operations are put in the proper context for the American public and audiences around the world.” Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton commander, Haiti operation

23. using themes & messages

24. never just “answer” a question ! • respond to the question • ANSWER + MESSAGE = RESPONSE

25. using themes & messages • themes • overarching reasons for the campaign • messages • your main points - build them in advance • hooking • message up front • you lead • bridging • don’t wait for “right” Q • move beyond the question to the message • flagging • foot stompers - tell ‘em what’s important • voice inflection, hand gestures, body language Bridge

26. combating enemy PSYOPwhat PSYOPS techniques will the enemy use againstus in the “public information battlespace ?”

27. propaganda“propaganda for and against war, often originating from senders halfway across the world, sometimes masking the real source, will be cleverly infiltrated into the news exactly as entertainment is infiltrated into it today.”Alvin and Heidi Toffler War and Anti-War, 1993

28. propaganda • enemy propaganda techniques • atrocity • hyperbolic inflation • dehumanization & demonization • polarization • divine sanction • metapropaganda • transfer • bandwagon • unwarranted extrapolations

29. combating enemy propaganda • anticipate & identify propaganda techniques being used -- intel & PA = IO synergy • build PA Ops plan to counter the techniques • base plans on absolute credibility and ground truth • absolute credibility is the “gold standard” to counter the enemy’s propaganda -- credibility built up over years & decades -- vanishes overnight

30. Kosovo case study: combating enemy propaganda

31. “for leaders, winning the media campaign is just as important as winning the military campaign - the two are inseparable - can’t win one without the other.” Dr. Jamie Shea NATO Spokesman

32. why plan for and try to win the “media campaign ?”

33. because . . . • keeps public opinion behind the operation • convinces your adversary that you are not going to give up • sends a message to the enemy leadership • sends a message to the victims to hold on and stay the course how well did we do it in Kosovo ?

34. Admiral Ellis’ views . . . “not a shining moment for the U.S. or NATO” • the enemy was better at this than we were… and far more nimble • the enemy deliberately and criminally killed innocents by the thousands…but no one saw it • we accidentally killed innocents sometimes by the dozens…and the world watched on the evening news • we were continuously reacting, investigating and trying to answer “how could this happen?” • Milosevic had informational “interior lines” “a much underutilized instrument of national and alliance power… ignore it at your peril”

35. why did we fail, if we failed ?

36. “It is quite simple -- no pictures, no news.” Dr. Jamie Shea a simplistic analysis or a profound insight ?

37. obstacles - press coverage in the information age international press: • primarily interested in the instantaneous image -- becomes reality of the day • believes objectivity requires a “pro-con” debate • constructs the story from the picture, rather than other way around how do we deal with this new environment ?

38. Shea’s solutions • get out “ahead” of events - (recognize public information as a “battlespace”) - gain, maintain the initiative! • give ‘em pictures ! dedicate resources to do this • use government & military leaders rather than “spokesmen” to take the case to the public • stress theme repeatedly that we are morally right • develop & use messages over and over again - across entire spectrum

39. Shea’s solutions • saturate the airwaves with your themes, your leaders, your messages, your images • don’t expect perfection • cold war paradigm is N/A to most of today’s missions - so “weigh & challenge” classification • mobilize PA ops early • smooth, fast operational information flow between Joint Task Force and PA critical

40. Shea’s solutions • intel needs to provide more unclassified info - and provide it faster - will help us “get out front” • PA needs to better understand enemy’s propaganda plan - and “get out front” of the enemy’s efforts • plan to work the “public information battlespace,” include PA ops in exercises and wargames and expand media training for leaders

41. “…what information was released was managed, massaged, and manipulated by NATO and the Pentagon -- with an eye to filling up air time with the alliance’s message of the day, rather than filling in the blanks for the thirsty media and the uninformed public.”James Kitfield National Journal

42. press views of PA ops • managed, massaged, manipulated • ground vs. air war - media accessibility • possible backlash if not careful

43. implications for the future • images are stronger than words • must better understand and get ahead of enemy propaganda • must be able to anticipate and get bad news out first - before the enemy puts his “spin” on it • must be able to better understand the “media” increasing use of internet by friend and foe are changing the dynamics of news reporting • must be able to carefully coordinate and orchestrate PA ops across oceans and time zones • be careful, open and up-front with all this -- the press are not dummies and will not “be used !”

44. summary