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SRA-Europe, 15th Annual Conference, Ljubljana (SI). ADAPTATION OF THE ARAMIS METHODOLOGY TO INTEGRATE THE SECURITY OF HAZARDOUS INSTALLATIONS AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES. OLIVIER SALVI, FRANÇOIS FONTAINE, BRUNO DEBRAY contact : olivier.salvi@ineris.fr.

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slide1

SRA-Europe, 15th Annual Conference, Ljubljana (SI)

ADAPTATION OF THE ARAMIS METHODOLOGY TO INTEGRATE THE SECURITY OF HAZARDOUS INSTALLATIONS AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

OLIVIER SALVI, FRANÇOIS FONTAINE, BRUNO DEBRAYcontact : olivier.salvi@ineris.fr

emergence of new risks malevolent on chemical sites
Emergence of new risks: Malevolent on chemical sites

E.g: Cellatex - Givet – France, July 2000

  • After the selling off of the CELLATEX plant, 153 laid off employees stop the production and demonstrate in the plant on 5 July 2000...
  • During the night, 4 fires started in the buildings. In the plant, 4 tons of carbon sulphide, 90 tons of soda, and 50000 L of sulphuric acid.On 10 July, the employees threatened to destroy the plant if their claims are not satisfied...500 neighbours are evacuated...
malevolent on chemical sites
Malevolent on chemical sites

E.g: Socatrem - Reims – France, March 2001

  • …« Les 147 salariés d’une cartonnerie, en liquidation depuis le 6 mars, sans proposition concrète de repreneur, tentent de se faire entendre par le biais de manifestations ponctuelles. Hier, ils sont passés à la vitesse supérieure et ont menacé de faire sauter leur usine... 
  • ...En ligne de mire, 2 barils de 200 litres de méthyléthylcétone. Il s’agit d’un liquide particulièrement dangereux. Explosif, incendiaire et asphyxiant...Un feu est allumé à proximité des deux barils... » (l’Union du 12 avril 2001)
malevolent on chemical sites4
Malevolent on chemical sites

Daewoo - Mont Saint Martin - France, January 2003

  • Difficult social climate (Company liquidation)
  • 2 January, 2003 - threat on chemical storage
  • 23 January, 2003 - fire on site caused by malevolent

Report – All establishments were covered by the Seveso Directive or by specific environmental regulations

emergence of new risks attacks on chemical sites or on transportation of dangerous goods
Emergence of new risks: Attacks on chemical sites or on transportation of dangerous goods
  • USS Cole – Yemen - 2000
  • Limburg – Yemen - 2002
  • Baqiq Oil Refinery - Saudi Arabia - February 24, 2006

 Necessity to develop adapted methodologies and tools

and now
And now ?
  • New French regulation (Decree n° 2006-212 of February 23, 2006 related to the security of Critical Infrastructures (« secteurs d’activités d’importance vitale ») 
    • Necessity to carry out a risk analysis by activities sector (e.g. chemical sites, marshalling yards etc.)
    • Operators must establish an “Operator Security Plan”
    • Public Authorities have to establish an “External Security Plan”
  • How to integrate security aspects ? Information on risk assessment already exists for most of these critical infrastructure.
slide7

Experience

feedback

Hazard Identification

Risk

Assessment

Lessons learned from past accidents

Risk Analysis

Investigations

Consequences Assessment

Recovery

Intervention

Prevention Measures

Preparedness (exercises)

Response

Prevention

Mitigation Measures

Emergency Planning

1st layer of risk knowledge: the Major Hazards Control Approach(accidental risks)

slide8

Threat

Assessment

Knowledge

Management

Experience

feedback

Better Hazard Identification

Risk

Assessment

Lessons learned from past events

Threat Analysis

(modus operandi)

Investigations

Consequences Assessment

Recovery

Intervention

Prevention Measures

Preparedness (exercises)

Countermeasures

Prevention

Prevention

CBRN

Response

Response

Mitigation Measures

Emergency Planning

2nd layer of risk knowledge (security) to develop a global approach including risks and threats

new dedicated methodologies for security
New Dedicated methodologies for Security:
  • American Chemistry Council, ACC (2001). Site security guidelines for the US chemical industry
  • CCPS, (2002) Guidelines for Analysing and Managing the security vulnerabilities of fixed chemical sites
  • American Petroleum Institute, API (2003). Security guidelines for the petroleum industry
  • European Initiatives (Germany, Austria, The Netherlands)
  • … or
  • Adaptation of the ARAMIS methodology
principles of the aramis methodology

Risk severity

Consequence

Safety culture

Number of vulnerable targets

Characteristics of the Critical event

= Substances involved,

amount, rate

F(initiating event)

Efficiency of the SMS

Efficiency of the

safety barriers

Frequency

Severity

Vulnerability

Principles of the ARAMIS methodology

Risk = Frequency  Intensity  Vulnerability

principles of the methodology 6 major steps
Principles of the methodology – 6 major steps
  • Identification of major accident hazards
  • Identification of the safety barriers and assessment of their performances
  • Evaluation of safety management efficiency to barrier reliability
  • Identification of Reference Accident Scenarios
  • Assessment and mapping of the risk severity of reference scenarios
  • Evaluation and mapping of the vulnerability of the plant’s surroundings
initial aramis methodology

Identify all hazardous equipments

MIMAH

MIRAS

Collect data about frequencies

Select pertinent hazardous equipments

Associate CE to each equipment

Estimate frequencies of CE from generic data

Calculate frequencies of CE from the fault trees

Build fault trees

Build event trees

Calculate frequencies of Dangerous phenomena

Estimate the class of consequences of the DP

Build bow ties

Use risk matrix to define the RAS

Identify safety barriers

Propose new barriers

Define the level of confidence of safety barriers

Vulnerability

Severity

Set a risk reduction goal

Estimate the risk reduction

Define the study area

Classify the barriers

Calculate the consequences of the RAS

Divide the study area into meshes

Select the barriers for audit

Calculate severity for each CE and each DP for each mesh

Identify the targets

Audit delivery systems

Audit safety culture

Quantify the targets

Aggregate all the severities into a global severity index for each mesh

Calculate operational LC

Calculate the vulnerability for each mesh

Management Safety Culture

Estimate risk reduction

Draw the severity map

Draw the vulnerability map

Establish the complete set of scenarios

Initial ARAMIS methodology
slide13

UE

ME

DDC

and

DP

CuE

ME

SCE

TCE

DC

or

UE

DP

ME

DDC

or

UE

NSC

TCE

DP

ME

UE

SCE

DDC

or

ME

UE

TCE

DP

DC

or

ME

UE

DDC

and

UE

ARAMIS : a bow-tie approach

CE

Critical

Event

Event Tree

Fault Tree

slide14

UE

ME

DDC

and

DP

UE

ME

SCE

TCE

DC

or

UE

DP

ME

DDC

or

UE

NSC

TCE

DP

ME

UE

SCE

DDC

or

ME

UE

TCE

DP

DC

or

ME

UE

DDC

and

UE

ARAMIS : a bow-tie approach

CE

Safety barriers

slide15

Threat analysisUse analysis of past events

Selection of malovelentscenarios

slide16

Specific security measures

Verify if safety measures can benefit security

conclusion
Conclusion
  • Safety and security : Using the same approach improves consistency and efficiency of the analysis, and it saves resources
  • Benefits from ARAMIS
    • threat assessment : use MIMAH results to determine the hazard potential and the most sensitive installations
    • prevention and countermeasures : verify if countermeasures for safety can benefit for security
    • response : use the severity calculation
  • Complete ARAMIS with
    • scenarios of malevolent actions
    • specific security countermeasures
    • analysis of past events
bibliography
Bibliography
  • User Guide to be downloaded : http://aramis.jrc.it
  • Special Issue of Journal of Hazardous Material
  • Outcomes of the ARAMIS project (Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for IndustrieS in the framework of SEVESO II directive), New stakes and opportunities in the control of major accident hazards. Vol. 130.
  • Salvi O., Debray B., 2006, A global view on ARAMIS, a risk assessment methodology for industries in the framework of the SEVESO II directive. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 2006, vol. 130, n° 3, pp. 187-199.
acknowledgement
Acknowledgement
  • The work presented in this paper has been elaborated in the frame of the EU project ARAMIS “Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for IndustrieS”, co-ordinated by INERIS (F) and including EC-JRC-IPSC-MAHB (I), Faculté Polytechnique de Mons (B), Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (E), ARMINES (F), Risø National Laboratory (D), Universita di Roma (I), Central Mining Institute (PL), Delft University of Technology (NL), European Process Safety Centre (UK), École des Mines de Paris (F), École des Mines de Saint Etienne (F), École des Mines d’Alès (F), Technical University of Ostrava (CZ) and Jozef Stefan Institute (Si).
  • The project is co-funded under the Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development Programme in the 5th Framework Programme for Science Research and Technological Development of the European Commission.