The Case for a Light Footprint. The international project in Afghanistan

1. The Case for a Light Footprint.The international project in Afghanistan Astri Suhrke, SOAS 17 March 2010

2. Structure of involvement • Towards 130 000 NATO and allied forces • 8-10 bill USD in aid a year • 60 donors and 37 troop contributing countries • parallel structures • international advisors ubiqtuous • external budget (2/3 of funds) • COIN: military and civilian ’surge’ to defeat ’the enemy’ and provide ’government in a box’ (General McChrystal)

3. Status • 8 years of investment in money and lives have brought expanding armed conflict and risk of ’losing the war’ (McChrystal August 09) • some positive development indicators (health/education/NSP/ roads)’ but growing insurgency, corruption, poor governance, aid bubble • comparisons with other ill-fated interventions increasingly common (Vietnam, Soviet in Afghanistan) • need a ’surge’ to exit

4. Key questions • How did we get to where we are today – given that we started from a ’light footprint’? • ’disjointed incrementalism (quagmire) • ’march of folly’ (Tuchman) • deliberate policy design/ rational actor • What does the result tell us about the limitations/contradictions of a ’liberal internationalism • Alternative policy options at this point?

5. The first, light footprint October-November 2001: disinterest/caution/ US: military engagement don’t follow Soviet path, use Afghans’ ’let the UN handle the rest’ (Bush/Powell 2001) UN: fears of another Somalia, but narrative of collective responsibility in Afghanistan Brahimi: self-determination on principle and in practice -Afghanistan unruly/unfriendly territory -Soviet experience -Afghan transitional administration prerequisite for aid -Afghan, not international, security force in Kabul

6. The aid regime moves in • The pledging conferences • Tokyo 2002 (8.2 bill), Berlin 2004 (8.2 bill), London 2006 (10.4 billion), Paris 2008(20 bill/ANDS) • Aid agencies, INGOs and NGOs emphasize direct execution • lack of local capacity • massive needs • massive donor money on the horizon • Afghan Ministry of Finance fighting to establish control • dilemma of funds inflow vs building capacity • 2004: capitulates w/external budget

7. Momentum towards a heavier aid footprint • Under-estimating task of reconstruction and ’state-building’ • Problem-solving: ’more of same’ – increase international resources rather than adjusting course. Why? • Ideology of liberal internationalism • Lingering optimism of Bonn • Huge needs vs limited local capacity • Organizational vested interests • Control imperative • Political scrutiny at home • Military lobby for ’comprehensive approach’ (2005/6) • Limited imagination?

8. Military escalation • ISAF expansion from Kabul to provinces • aid actors support to provide security for programs • UN Mission supports; buoyed by welcome of ISAF in Kabul • allies support as least difficult option (PRTs) • ISAF/PRTs expand in size and function, merging command structure with other forces into unified NATO command • OEF force expansion to fight ’AQT’ • Merging ISAF/OEF command – 130 000 (over Soviet)

10. Characteristics of military increase • Gradual increase with little public notice/disucssion until 2008 • Unclear or limited articulation of policy rationale in US • GWOT • Afghanistan ’good war’ but ’neglected war’ • NATO allies • Alliance calculus • Goal inflation (’NATO’s future at stake’) • Solution in search of a problem

11. Dynamic of US military involvement • Afghanistan pre 9/11 not on US strategic radar • Accidental involvement, random trigger (9/11) • Internal dynamic of escalation • failure of ’Afghan model’ in counter-terrorism (2002) • growing insurgency(2003-4) • security for elections (2005) • recasting strategy – give COIN a chance (2007-8) • the ’windows thesis’ (’peacebuilding studies showing initial military stabilization critical; now make up for it with more) • what we need to ’do the job’

12. Rationality of military involvement • Quagmire? (unwilling – unwitting) • Oil and gas pipeline? • Organizational rationality (’can do’, no defeat on ’my watch’) • Investment trap • Rhetorical trap • Strategic instrumentality post hoc • NATO’s new strategic concept, global ’new threats’ require ’fit and flexible’ NATO (Fogh Rasmussen), Afghanistan good training ground • US – strategic access in region (Iran/Central Asia) • Political risk (’I will withdraw, but not until after the next election’ -JFK on Vietnam in 163)

13. The surge decision • March 2009 – Obama opens for AQ vs Taliban distinction; debate on COIN versus counter-terrorism goes public • December 2009 surge decision, clarity of March speech gone. • Unclear rationale • who is the main enemy and why? • additional forces more likely to suceed than previous increases? • if main enemy AQ now in Pakistan, why fight Taliban rather than split them off? • if train Afghan forces, who is their enemy? • Part of a ’bargaining from strength’ strategy • if so, why undercut by saying withdrawal by mid-2011?

14. The political anatomy of the surge • Surge only makes sense as a political not strategic decision • second-term president • defend against the conservatives at home • protect legislation in Congress • do what is minimally necessary • low risk ’on my watch’

15. Meta-logic of US involvement • George Kennan’s prehistoric beast • Miltarization of foreign/national security policy (Bacevich) • Culture, professional military ’caste’,mil-industrial complex, Wilsonian idealism • [structure of U.S.capitalism] • Afghan engagement totally irrationality in terms of US ’national interests’

16. Levels of rationality • Partial/fragmented rationality (political,organizational) • Internal dynamic of intervention towards goal expansion and deepening involvement • Limits policy options and increases risk: • deepening involvement limits future choices at each juncture • investment trap (defend what have done/investment) • rhetoric trap (increased the stakes to justify involvement) • Increasing political costs of eventual defeat/compromise

17. Will ’it’ work? • Unclear/multiple objectives (statebuilding, democracy,WHAM, reconstruction, rights-based development) • ’State-building’ – reasonably effective and legitimate state • key to other objectives • International project of statebuilding weakened by five contradictions

18. # 1 Control vs ownership • Strong external demand for control over policy • ambitious policy objectives • limited or ”irrelevant” local capacity • high stakes (NATO’s future) • time constraint (political will at home uncertain) • bureaucratic/political demands for result • Strong Afghan demands for ’ownership’ • ideological framework • material-political benefits • Contradictions play out on all levels • Project, subnational admin/appointment, national policy)

19. #2 Dependenc vs sustainability • external aid • overwhelming national legal resources • 90-95% of all state and development expenditures • 70 percent of recurrent expenditures in state-controlled budget • present ’rentier state’ unprecedented in Afghan history • incl Daoud and Soviet period • rentier states tend to collapse with loss of aid

20. Afghan rentier states

21. #3 Dependence vs legitimate state The rentier state • weakens local political accountability and representation • lowers incentives for local accountability • marginalizes elected/parliamentary structures • patron-client relations structured towards donors • donor priorities take precedence • salutary effects of domestic taxation reduced

22. # 4 Effective vs legitimate state • heavy external hand may increase state efficiency • but • weakens traditional and historically important sources of legitimacy (nationalism/Islam) • generates opposition on nationalist, religious,conservative ground • feeds into the insurgency • legitimacy of external aid limited - utilitarian (’social contract) • elections as secondary source of legitimacy for state – external and manipulated by all

23. Cross-cutting contradiction: Building the ANA • Armed forces central to historical process/projects of statebuilding • Increase of ANA now ’dramatic’ relative to earlier plans and periods: 130 00/300 000 by 2013 (or before) • Problems: • nationally unsustainable (WB:70 00 goal ’unsustainable) • extreme dependence on foreign funds undercuts national legitimacy in country and region (whose army? what purpose?) • unlikely to foster a democratic/legitimate state when civilian institutions weak (Afghan army in two previous coups, ’73+’78)

24. The multiplier effect The ongoing war intensifies the contradictions in the statebuilding project • pressure for more and faster result • pressure for more external control/direction/presence • military objectives/institutions favored • collateral damage and foreign troop presence used by adversaries to undermine legitimacy of Afghan government and state

25. What to do? • More-is-more: counsel of reinvestment • more foreign funds, consultants, troops • Strengthen contradictions in short run • Possibly overcome in the long run if sufficient • funds&consultants to reform the state, drive out the black economy, • foreign troop to work with ANA on training and COIN • Practically feasible?(to date, more-strategy produced modest results) • Politically feasible? To succeed will require such foreign presence as to be de facto trusteeship? (’shared sovereignty’)

26. Alternative: • Pull back to reduce contradictions and conflictual consequences of heavy presence • military strategy • reduced NATO presence in provinces, cease offensive operations • give space for Afghan political dynamic/pragmatism • political strategy • reduce our interference in ’the political marketplace’ • counter narrative/chance of ’renewed civil war’ • military: international stabilization of capital • political: devolution of power to provinces • insurgency: • National framework for some power-sharing and local-level deals or change of power structure

27. Ideals and interests • Ideally: transition needs regional buy-in • In practice: partial , continuous process • Long-term: more important to accommodate interests of regional states than Western powers • Long-term Western interests in Afghanistan? • Humanitarian and development assistance • Moral/political obligations to facilitate transition to lower levels of violence and framework for Afghan autonomous development • More cost-effective and focused counter-terrorist policies • Taliban can be our allies, not enemy