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Dangerous Dyads. Bargaining in the Shadow of Power. Vs. Positive statements Diplomatic recognition Intercultural exchanges Alliances Trade Aid. Conflict Hostile statements Hostile nonviolent actions Use, threat, display of force War. I. The Puzzle of Dyadic Interaction.

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dangerous dyads

Dangerous Dyads

Bargaining in the Shadow of Power

i the puzzle of dyadic interaction

Vs.

  • Positive statements
  • Diplomatic recognition
  • Intercultural exchanges
  • Alliances
  • Trade
  • Aid

Conflict

Hostile statements

Hostile nonviolent actions

Use, threat, display of force

War

I. The Puzzle of Dyadic Interaction

A. Why do some pairs of states have dramatically different relationships?

b example six dyad years
B. Example: Six Dyad-Years
  • US-Iraq 1987: US forgives Iraqi attack on USS Stark, aids Iraq
  • US-Iran 1987: US destroys Iranian oil platforms, ships
  • Iran-Iraq 1987: Bloody war continues
b example six dyad years1
B. Example: Six Dyad-Years
  • US-Iraq 2003: War
  • US-Iran 2003: No War
  • Iran-Iraq 2003: No War
  • Why the differences? No single state has become more or less warlike….but the dyads have!
c forms of cooperation
C. Forms of Cooperation
  • Between Cooperation and Conflict: Bargaining
    • Formal Bargaining: Treaties, etc.
    • Tacit Bargaining: Reciprocal Action
    • Arbitration: Third-party resolution
    • Mediation: Third-party support
3 behavior convergence
3. Behavior: Convergence

Example: Mutual Tariff Reduction

d forms of conflict
D. Forms of Conflict
  • War – Standard definition is 1000 battle-deaths
  • Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) – use, threat, or display of force
3 high cooperation events
3. High-Cooperation Events
  • Are these mutually exclusive with the conflict list?
ii a model of dyadic interaction

Conflict-

Producing

Factors

Outcomes

Interaction

Salience

Issues

Bargaining

Conflict

Cooperation

Cooperation-

Producing

Factors

II. A Model of Dyadic Interaction
a political relevance

Interaction

A. Political Relevance
  • Interaction
    • Ability to communicate
    • Ability to act
c measures of interaction

Interaction

c. Measures of Interaction
  • Contiguity – Countries that border each other (or narrow body of water)

(Countries

surrounded by blue are contiguous to Red) 

ii major power status

Interaction

ii. Major power status
  • State-level finding: Major powers do more of everything – conflict and cooperation
  • Result = Dyadic effect: If at least one dyad member is major power, increased levels of cooperation and conflict
a political relevance1

Interaction

Salience

Issues

A. Political Relevance
  • Issue Salience
    • Priority relative to other concerns
    • Determines amount of power applied
    • Low salience = inaction
proximity loss of strength gradient

Conflict-

Producing

Factors

Wealthy/Advanced State

Poor State

Proximity: Loss of Strength Gradient

Resources that can be applied to a conflict decay at distance

Shift in gradient due to technology or development

2 dyadic balance of power

Conflict-

Producing

Factors

2. Dyadic Balance of Power

a. Disparity = Peace

b. Parity = War Risk

4 rivalry shadow of the past

Conflict-

Producing

Factors

4. Rivalry: Shadow of the Past
  • Repeated disputes  Future disputes
  • Easier for diversionary war
c question is rivalry the cause of conflict

Conflict-

Producing

Factors

c. Question: Is rivalry the cause of conflict?
  • Rivals fight more wars – or do states likely to fight become rivals?
  • Repeated crises  Use of more aggressive bargaining strategies
  • Rivals use more forceful strategies – against non-rivals!
5 arms races

Conflict-

Producing

Factors

5. Arms Races
  • Rivalry + Arms Race = Risk of War?
  • Most arms races difficult to demonstrate:
can you pick out the 3 arms races
Can You Pick Out the 3 Arms Races?

Canada-Mexico

US-USSR

Israel-Syria

Belgium-Netherlands

Australia-NZ

India-Pakistan

1 joint democracy

Cooperation-

Producing

Factors

1. Joint Democracy
  • Effects of Joint Democracy:
    • The “Democratic Peace:” Virtually no wars between democracies
      • Alleged Exceptions: US-UK 1812 (UK not democracy), UK-Germany WW1 (Germany not democracy), Finland-UK WW2 (no real combat), Peru-Ecuador (few casualties), India-Pakistan (civilians left out of the loop)
    • Fewer MIDs (1/3 to 2/3 reduction)
      • Shift to covert from overt when force is used
      • MIDs less likely to escalate to higher levels of violence
      • Increased reliance on mediation, arbitration
    • Increased common interests (alliances, UN votes, IOs, etc)
    • Increased Trade – Why should this be?
2 shared interests

Cooperation-

Producing

Factors

2. Shared Interests
  • Power Transition Theory:

Mutual Satisfaction = Peace

evidence for peace through shared interests

Cooperation-

Producing

Factors

Evidence for Peace Through Shared Interests
  • Alliance portfolios: Similarity generally reduces conflict
    • Better predictor than dyadic alliance!
  • UN Votes: Similar votes = closer economic ties
3 similar institutions

Cooperation-

Producing

Factors

3. Similar Institutions
  • Even after controlling for democracy / autocracy, similar government mechanisms (executive-legislative relations, etc) increase cooperation / reduce conflict.

4. Advanced Economies

  • Joint advanced economies trade, cooperate, ally more / fight less with each other than other dyads
5 economic interdependence

Cooperation-

Producing

Factors

5. Economic Interdependence
  • Mutual gains from trade
    • Short explanation: Trade is voluntary
    • Absolute and Comparative Advantage
absolute advantage

Missiles

20

10

100

200

10

Coffee

Absolute Advantage

Given 100 resources, what can each country produce?

  • Production possibilities without trade
  • Trade allows specialization. US buys Coffee at < 10 resources. Colombia buys Missiles at < 20 resources.
  • Example: Coffee = 1, Missiles = 10. US trades 5 missiles (50 resources) for 50 coffee (50 resources)
  • Result: Both sides can achieve levels of consumption outside of the original production possibilities!
comparative advantage

Wheat

100

50

5

10

Cars

Comparative Advantage

Given 100 resources, what can each country produce?

  • US has absolute advantage in both goods – 5 to 1 in wheat, 2 to 1 in cars -- so has comparative advantage (bigger relative advantage) in wheat
  • UK has comparative advantage (smaller relative disadvantage) in cars (½ as productive rather than 20% as productive)
  • UK buys wheat at < 5 resources, US buys cars at < 10 resources
  • Example: Wheat = 1.5, Cars = 9. US sells 24 wheat (36 resources), buys 4 cars (36 resources)
5 economic interdependence1

Cooperation-

Producing

Factors

5. Economic Interdependence
  • Mutual gains from trade
    • Short explanation: Trade is voluntary
    • Absolute and Comparative Advantage
  • Reinforces democratic peace:
5 economic interdependence2

Cooperation-

Producing

Factors

5. Economic Interdependence
  • Mutual gains from trade
    • Short explanation: Trade is voluntary
    • Absolute and Comparative Advantage
  • Reinforces democratic peace
  • Allies trade more than enemies…but sometimes trade continues during war!
iii outcomes the results of bargaining conflict and cooperation

Bargaining

Conflict

Cooperation

III. Outcomes: The results of bargaining, conflict, and cooperation
  • A Theory of Bargaining: Game Theory as a tool to predict behavior and outcomes
    • Game theory = formal way to represent strategic interaction
2 assumptions of game theory

Bargaining

Conflict

Cooperation

2. Assumptions of Game Theory
  • Rational choice
    • Connected preferences – Some outcomes better than others
    • Transitive preferences – If A is better than B, and B is better than C  A is better than C
    • Choice – Pick the option believed to lead to preferred outcome
b elements of a game

Bargaining

Conflict

Cooperation

b. Elements of a game
  • Players – In IR, this means states
  • Strategies – The choices players have
  • Outcomes – The results of the players’ choices
  • Payoffs – How much each player values each Outcome
3 making predictions solving a game

Bargaining

Conflict

Cooperation

3. Making Predictions: Solving a Game
  • Goal = Find an equilibrium (stable behavior, unlikely to change without change in conditions)
  • Basic tool = Nash Equilibrium  Neither player could do any better by unilaterally changing its strategy choice
  • Example:
c limitation no equilibrium

Bargaining

Conflict

Cooperation

c. Limitation: No Equilibrium

Not every game has a Nash Equilibrium. Prediction = no stable pure strategy, stability only results from “mixing” strategies (probabilistic prediction)

  • Example:
d limitation multiple equilibria

Bargaining

Conflict

Cooperation

d. Limitation: Multiple Equilibria

Some games have multiple Nash Equilibria. Prediction = either equilibrium can result

  • Example:
4 games nations play

Bargaining

Conflict

Cooperation

4. Games Nations Play
  • Prisoners’ Dilemma: Used to model “Security Dilemmas” -- Efforts to increase own security make others less secure (arms races, etc.)
  • Both players end up worse, even though each plays rationally!
4 games nations play1

Bargaining

Conflict

Cooperation

4. Games Nations Play

b. Chicken

  • Equilibria: Someone swerves – but who?
  • Used to model nuclear crises
  • Credible commitment – throw away the steering wheel!
4 games nations play2

Bargaining

Conflict

Cooperation

4. Games Nations Play

c. “Battle of the Sexes”

  • Equilibria: Both do better than nothing, but someone benefits more
  • Used to model environmental cooperation, border demarcation, etc.
  • Incentive to deceive – Convince other player you would prefer no agreement to getting your way
5 is there hope for cooperation in a realist world

Bargaining

Conflict

Cooperation

5. Is There Hope for Cooperation in a Realist World?
  • Realists argue that Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) represents the international system
  • BUT: Tournament of Strategies showed that when playing repeated PD the best strategy is not “Always Defect” – it’s “Tit-for-Tat!”
  • Tit-for-Tat = Cooperate, then Reciprocate: Allows cooperation even in the most hostile circumstances BUT also risks escalation
  • Conclusion: Anarchy need not  war. Cooperation can evolve in a world full of PD players!
  • Institutions and “tying hands” can allow credible commitment, allowing cooperation. Cooperative “win-win” strategies (maximize joint payoffs) include:
    • Commit to silence in PD (join a gang that punishes squealers)
    • Commit to “no play” in Chicken
    • Commit to take turns in Battle of the Sexes, PD, or Chicken
b empirical outcomes of dyadic bargaining

Outcomes

B. Empirical Outcomes of Dyadic Bargaining
  • Who gets more?
    • More power
    • Cost Tolerance: Willing to take losses
    • Salience ● Power predicts better than Power alone
    • “Tied Hands” and Costly Signals: Ability to convince opponent that further concessions are impossible / unacceptable
  • Will bargaining fail?
    • Zones of Agreement: Area of mutually acceptable outcomes (better than no agreement – which often means war -- for both sides)
    • Expected costs of failure: What happens if there is no agreement?
    • “Shadow of the Future” – Bargaining over future bargaining power (i.e. territory) is most difficult
c outcomes of conflict

Outcomes

C. Outcomes of Conflict
  • Economic conflict (tariffs)  increased political conflict (and vice versa)
  • Dyadic war is rare:
    • 193 sovereign states  18,528 dyads. Formula = [n(n-1)]/2
    • Nearly 1 million “dyad-years” over the past two centuries
    • Less than 1 war per 1,000 opportunities: No current interstate wars!
c who wins wars

Outcomes

c. Who Wins Wars?
  • Total victory uncommon (2/3 end by negotiation)
  • 59% of wars won by initially stronger side -- BUT: initiators of wars victorious 68% of the time, yet only stronger 59% of the time
  • Implication: “Which side started it?” better predicts victory than military power, though advantage declines over time
  • Extension: Democracies win more often, though advantage declines over time (they lose long wars)
3 outcomes of cooperation

Outcomes

3. Outcomes of Cooperation
  • Some evidence that political cooperation  economic cooperation (US/USSR)
  • Mediation and Arbitration appear unreliable BUT selection bias probably responsible (they get the tough cases)
  • Foreign aid  increases dyadic trade gains  increased interdependence
back to the model

Conflict-

Producing

Factors

Outcomes

Interaction

Salience

Issues

Bargaining

Conflict

Cooperation

Cooperation-

Producing

Factors

Back to the Model
iv puzzles of dyadic relations
IV. Puzzles of Dyadic Relations
  • Do IGOs promote dyadic peace?
  • Do alliances create peace between dyads, or do they raise the specter of war?
  • What bargaining strategy best avoids war and produces cooperation?
  • If we want peace, should we prepare for war?
a do igos produce dyadic peace
A. Do IGOs produce dyadic peace?

1. Unexplained finding: Same IGOs = increased war risk

2. Possible reasons

  • Coincidence (IGOs not associated with war)
  • Similar interests (IGOs and war have common causes)
  • Interaction (IGOs cause war)
  • Levels of Analysis (Improperly Aggregating to System Level)
  • Differences between IGOs (Let’s study this more)
    • Universal: No effect
    • Limited-purpose: Depends
      • Regional Political or Social = Increased war risk
      • Regional Military or Economic = Decreased war risk

3. Another puzzle: Same IGOs = decreased MIDs!

b alliances
B. Alliances
  • Statistical evidence: disputed. After controlling for contiguity, alliances seem to make war less likely between the allies
  • Why might allies be more likely to fight each other?
slide67

Alliances and PreferencesAllies: Nowhere to go but downNonaligned: Equal chance of increased conflict and increased cooperationRivals: If not already fighting, nowhere to go but up

c which bargaining strategies promote peace
C. Which bargaining strategies promote peace?
  • Known hazards – Bully and Fight
    • Bully: one OR both sides respond to concessions by increasing demands (i.e. appeasement fails)
    • Fight: Reciprocal escalation (BOTH sides respond to conflict with higher level of conflict)
  • Appeasement also fails – Of six known cases in crises, five were diplomatic defeats for appeaser and one led to war
3 reciprocity a strategy for cooperation
3. Reciprocity: A Strategy for Cooperation?
  • Yes – But ALSO a recipe for conflict spirals!
d deterrence
D. Deterrence

Melians: It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours to be your slaves?

Athenians: To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation.

Melians: But must we be your enemies? Will you not receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you?

Athenians: No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our weakness.

  • Historical Background
    • Ancient Greece: Melian Dialogue

“The strong do what they will and the weak do what they must.”

Athens demands submission by Melians, even though Melos is insignificant

Why fight a war over something so small?

b masada
b. Masada
  • Jewish revolt against Rome
  • Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada
b masada1
b. Masada
  • Jewish revolt against Rome
  • Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada
  • Rome imports 15,000 laborers from around empire, spends a year building ramp
  • Why?
c 1919 1938 intra war deterrence fails
c. 1919-1938: Intra-War Deterrence Fails
  • Giulio Douhet: Opening hours of any major war  destruction of cities with explosives, gas, incendiaries  panic and social collapse
    • 1922, 1932-4: Attempts to ban bombers
  • Despite fear of bombers, Britain actually initiated city warfare in World War II!
    • Deterrence failed…
    • Mass killing / city destruction generally didn’t have the expected effect on civilian morale
d nuclear deterrence strategies
d. Nuclear Deterrence Strategies
  • Massive Retaliation: Depended on atomic superiority
  • Mutually-Assured Destruction: “Tripwires”
  • Flexible Response: Credibility at every level
  • Proportional Deterrence: Enter the French….
  • Warfighting: Soviet and US Hard-liners’ doctrine
2 requirements
2. Requirements
  • Clarity: Threat must be understood

Failures:

slide79

No [adequate] attention has been paid to a proposal, extremely important from the military and political point of view, to create a fully automated retaliatory strike system that would be activated from the top command levels in a moment of a crisis.

-- Soviet Central Committee, 1985

the dead hand system
The “Dead Hand” System:
  • Underground command post
  • If communications fail AND nuclear explosions detected by sensors…
  • Rocket is launched with internal radio
  • Radio broadcasts launch orders / codes to Soviet ICBMs
  • Thus, even if all Soviet leaders killed and communications disrupted, Soviet missiles will annihilate the USA
  • Problem: They didn’t TELL us about it!
iraq invades kuwait 1990
Iraq Invades Kuwait, 1990
  • All evidence suggests that Saddam did not expect opposition from the US – misinterpreted generic statement that US doesn’t take a position on the border disputes of other nations as permission to invade
2 requirements1
2. Requirements
  • Clarity: Threat must be understood

Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

  • Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed

Failures:

2 requirements2
2. Requirements
  • Clarity: Threat must be understood

Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

  • Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed

Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam

  • Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line

Failures:

sanctions on the prc
Sanctions on the PRC
  • US Demand: Stop anti-democracy crackdown (i.e. Don’t preserve Communist government authority)
  • Sanctions:
    • Ban on arms sales
    • Ban on direct high-level military contacts
    • Ban on some government financing
    • suspension of export licenses for satellites contracted to be launched in China
    • suspension of export licenses for crime control and detection instruments and equipment
    • denial of export licenses for any goods or technology used in nuclear production, if the President finds that such products could be diverted to the research or development of a nuclear explosive device
  • Outcome: China ignores sanctions, most of which are lifted within a year or two
iraq violates the geneva protocol 1982 1983
Iraq Violates the Geneva Protocol, 1982-1983
  • Iran-Iraq war is intense and bloody
  • Iraq begins using tear gas, then blister agents, then nerve gas
  • West is silent because Iran is considered the greater threat
  • Iran retaliates, but lacked enough chemical weapons to do serious damage
2 requirements3
2. Requirements
  • Clarity: Threat must be understood

Failures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

  • Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed

Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam

  • Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line

Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war

  • Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed

Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America

  • Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefits

Possible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination

3 types of deterrence
3. Types of Deterrence
  • General Deterrence: You won’t dare attack me because you know I’m armed and ready
  • Immediate Deterrence: I’m warning you right now – attack and I’ll shoot!
  • Extended Deterrence: Don’t attack my friend either -- or I’ll shoot
  • Existential Deterrence: I don’t have a gun but I could go buy one if needed
4 dilemmas of deterrence
4. Dilemmas of Deterrence
  • Security Dilemma: Increased costs and credibility also mean decreased restraint
  • Vulnerability Dilemma: If you don’t attempt to counter deterrent threat, maybe you intend to strike first… (Soviet silos)
  • Rational Irrationality: Fait accompli and “The threat that leaves something to chance:” Rationality decreases credibility, but irrationality decreases restraint
5 does deterrence work
5. Does deterrence work?
  • Inherent uncertainty: If opponent does nothing, is deterrence working?
  • General deterrence creates bias: unstated threats may deter. Perhaps having to state a threat means it is unlikely to succeed…
  • Some evidence supports extendedimmediate deterrence
v the fundamental puzzle vicious circle or virtuous circle
V. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous Circle?
  • Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other
v the fundamental puzzle vicious circle or virtuous circle1
V. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous Circle?
  • Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other
  • So do most cooperation-producing factors
v the fundamental puzzle vicious circle or virtuous circle2
V. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous Circle?
  • Most conflict-producing factors reinforce each other
  • So do most cooperation-producing factors
  • Which of these two feedback loops is more powerful in the long run?