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Brian Head Griffith University and Australian Research Alliance for Children & Youth. TAKING SUBSIDIARITY SERIOUSLY: threat or opportunity for State governments?. In this presentation I will briefly:
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Australian Research Alliance for Children & YouthTAKING SUBSIDIARITY SERIOUSLY:threat or opportunity for State governments?
Summarise attempts to implement subsidiarity to address primarily regional issues;
Summarise attempts to improve federalism to address primarily national issues.OVERVIEW (cont’d)
The business case for 2-tier federalism remains rhetorical and impractical; more work is needed;
IF we are likely to have 3-tier federalism for the next generation, we should make it work better;
The current half-hearted attempts at regional policy and programs (by both C’wealth & States) need to be made genuinely cooperative and involve genuine devolution.
This requires taking subsidiarity more seriously, within agreed national policy frameworks.Overview (cont’d)
close to the people;
but deprived of power and resources;
subject to cost-shifting (more unfunded tasks);
increasing boldness in identifying State governments as the oppressor [and the unnecessary and costly layer of bureaucracy in a future 2-tiered federal system].
Commonwealth, incidentally, has made a point of “courting” local government over the last 30 years, and involving local government in various regional “partnership” arrangements that reduce the direct responsibilities of the States.Criticisms (1) – localgovt
fiscal centralisation (though GST helps);
functional overlap/duplication, and intrusion into traditional State areas of service delivery;
increasing centralisation of policy controls in Canberra (regardless of political party):
by financial leverage (tied grants)
expansion of the Commonwealth’s powers through international agreements.Criticisms(2) –State govt
their capacity to delay or frustrate sound C’wealth initiatives, e.g. national standards;
their failure to spend enough on key services or economic infrastructure;
their failure in some instances to support significant “national” reform programs;
their tolerance of regulatory inconsistencies among States and high costs for business.Criticisms(3) –Commonwealth
lack of uniformity/consistency in regulations,
complex project-approval processes,
industrial relations complexity.
Business concerned to ensure that “national” economic competitiveness issues (e.g. trade, infrastructure & micro-economic reform) can be addressed rapidly and decisively.
Hence, support in principle for 2-tier federalism.Criticisms(4) –Big Business
there is often an impatience with fragmentation of responsibility for key outcomes;
a preference for a less complex (and more uniform/national) approach to major issues of program design;
a desire for strong national standards;
occasional sympathy for 2-tier federalism, if necessary to achieve such standards.Criticisms(5) –majorNGOs
-- structural inequality of powers/roles?
-- revenue needs at lower levels?
-- capacity for relational coordination/cooperation?
-- poor outcomes for citizens and business?
It follows that the recipes and prescriptions for change are also diverse.
There are large divides between incremental models for change (adapt/improve current arrangements) and radical models (fundamental reconstruction).Reform and innovation
Economic rationalists and political centralists both argue for abolishing States, in order to cut wasteful duplication, cut costs of surplus politicians and bureaucracy, and promote national standards.
They are usually less clear about regional options.
They generally pay little attention to ensuring that the alleged deficiencies of States would not be repeated on a wider scale among many regional entities.Two-tier federalism
Regional champions argue that ‘communities of interest’ are not sufficiently recognised; the historical boundaries of the large States are inappropriate.
Hence regional entities may be the answer.
Question: are Tasmania and ACT more coherent regional entities and thus more legitimate in eyes of their citizens?Two-tier federalism (cont’d)
-- number of regions (12? 30? 80? over 100?);
-- broad or narrow regional powers;
-- reliance on ‘new states’ constitutional device to multiply regions/States over time;
-- administrative or legal-constitutional approaches to creating robust regional entities.
Questions: do we need regional entities to produce better regional results? and
: would more regional entities produce better results than fewer entities?Two-tier federalism
Decisions should be taken as close as possible to the citizens by the lowest-level competent authority.
Central authority performs only those tasks that are its exclusive domain, plus those tasks which (for reasons of scale, capacity or powers) cannot be effectively undertaken at lower levels.
As a principle, it is widely supported, but in practice is highly contested and could lead to a variety of outcomes.Subsidiarity – is it the answer?
Can equally be used to support local and regional entities – against either the States or Canberra.
States have not seriously tried to devolve large functions to local government (though some cost-shifting); content for LGAs to have narrow role.
States have been experimenting with regional planning and program administration, e.g. in natural resource management. Role of LGAs is uncertain.Subsidiarity in practice - States
Direct central management of policy and program implementation
- requiring a large service-delivery workforce; OR
Indirect control through agreements, standards, and tied funding, with a variety of potential providers:
-- other levels of government (State, local, regional)
-- private sector contractors
-- community NFP organisations.
Changing balance over time; shift towards indirect and contractual controls.Choices for central government
e.g. -- social services (AAP 1970s; CfC 2004)
-- regional econ devt (1970s, 1990s….)
-- regional forestry agreements (1990s)
-- regional NRM (NHT 1998, NAPSWQ)
But C’wealth model is generally contractual, retaining ultimate regulatory and funding power, while promoting involvement of non-State actors at local and regional levels.Subsidiarity – the C’wealth
The States have been increasingly willing to enter into national agreements with C’wealth on many policy areas: e.g. corporate business regulation, competition policy, govt trading enterprises, mutual recognition, energy, water, transport, environment, benchmarking of service delivery.
COAG forum is more productive than portfolio-based ministerial councils
Financial incentives are helpful.National agreements
especially the big-bang version of constitutional change to abolish the States.
2. More work is needed on options and transitional arrangements, and testing public support for various options (evidence-based policy dev’t).
3. IF we are likely to have 3-tier federalism for the next generation, we should make it work better by innovative attempts to deliver better regional services through cooperative arrangements.Conclusions
5. This requires C’wealth and States both taking subsidiarity more seriously, but within agreed national policy frameworks.
6. We need more research and debate on options for reform along these lines.
7. The States need to take this opportunity to rethink their core business (what works best at State level?) and support both sensible devolution and national frameworks.Conclusions (2)