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STATE OF SECURITY IN MILITARY BASES

STATE OF SECURITY IN MILITARY BASES. AIM. The aim of the presentation is to brief members of the JSCD on the State of Security in Military Bases and Report on the Incident of 9 SAI Bn. 2. SCOPE. Regulatory framework Policy framework DODI/000132

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STATE OF SECURITY IN MILITARY BASES

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  1. STATE OF SECURITY IN MILITARY BASES

  2. AIM The aim of the presentation is to brief members of the JSCD on the State of Security in Military Bases and Report on the Incident of 9 SAI Bn 2

  3. SCOPE • Regulatory framework • Policy framework DODI/000132 • Role Players in enhancing Security in Mil Bases • Security in Context • 9 SAI Bn Incident • General Security Measures • Security Deficiencies • Security Caveats/Challenges 3

  4. SCOPE • Recent initiative to Enhance Security • Security Infrastructure deficiencies • Recent Initiatives • Conclusion 4

  5. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK The Defence Act in Chapter 8, section 50(2), notes that “…To the extent necessary for purposes of military security and safety of members of the Defence Force and employees, such members and employees may from time to time be subjected to: (a) searches and inspections; (b) screening of their communications with people in or outside the Department; (c) security clearances which probe into their private lives; and (d) shared accommodation or privation in accordance with the exigencies of military training and operations”. 5

  6. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK The Defence Act, 2002 further empowers DI to perform the following functions: Section 34 (a)(v): “The Intelligence Division must, subject to the National Strategic Intelligence Act, gather, correlate, evaluate and use strategic intelligence for the purpose of ensuring the security of defence assets of whatever description.” Section 34 (b)(iv): “The Intelligence Division must, subject to the National Strategic Intelligence Act, gather, correlate, evaluate and use operational intelligence for the purpose of ensuring the security of the forces.” Section 36: “The Intelligence Division must, in accordance with any policy, procedure or norm determined by the Minister and, in consultation with the National Intelligence Agency, conduct and institute CI measures and activities within the Ministry of Defence, the Department and the Armaments Development and Production Corporation of South Africa”. Section 37 to 41: stipulates the requirements for vetting. 6

  7. POLICY FRAMEWORK DODI/000132 Chapter 1, Page 1-1, Par 1 – Security Management Minimum standards: DODI/00132: Policy on the conduct of Counter Intelligence within the DOD, includes the Minimum Physical Security Standards as issued by DI through Level 2 CI guidelines for financial years 2014/2015 to 2017/2018. The total of active SANDF Military Units within the SANDF is fixed at 825 X Units, including the 3 external mission deployments and maritime deployments. 7

  8. POLICY FRAMEWORK DODI/000132 “Security is a command/management responsibility and every Commanding Officer/Official/ Manager of a Service/Division/Unit is accountable for security at that said Service/Division/Unit. This entails that every DOD official will at all times deemed to be responsible and accountable for the maintenance of security of information, personnel and material within his/her area of responsibility. Commanding Officers/Managers on all levels must ensure that every subordinate official is notified of his/her responsibility in this regard in his/her duty sheet or command directive”. 8

  9. POLICY FRAMEWORK DODI/000132 • Chapter 1, Page 1-1, Par 1.i. to 1.h. • “Ensure that regular on-site security assessments are conducted at premises and facilities under his/her command as part of the threat and risk assessment process and submit the results and any recommendations through the normal channel of command to DI/SDCI for endorsement before implementation thereof;” 9

  10. POLICY FRAMEWORK DODI/000132 • “Ensure that the budget of his/her Service/Division/Unit provides for the costs of implementing proper physical security measures for the protection of information at the said organisation and that allocated funds are utilised for that purpose. Expenditure of budgeted funds for the conduct of counter intelligence in the DOD and related expenses must be according to Chapter 4 of the PFMA and DODI/FIN/00002/99 (Edition 4) and JDP/FIN/00001/2003 (Edition 3)”. • DODI/00132 has been approved by CSANDF on 28 March 2013, distributed to all Chiefs of Services and Divisions and enforced by DI, IG as well as Counter Intelligence of Services and Divisions by means of investigations, assessments and audits. 10

  11. POLICY FRAMEWORK The Defence Review 2015 was approved by both houses of parliament to arrest the decline within the DOD, that affects infrastructure which is also part of security. The SANDF has initiated the establishment of a full time protective security capability as a proposal to replace reserve forces guards at sensitive or operational bases as well as at DOD ammunition depots and DOD/SANDF critical infrastructure. In accordance with the Defence Act 42 of 2002, the SANDF has published a Reference document (GWU 203 – June 1992) and a Training Manual that guide the training and execution of guard duties. 11

  12. POLICY FRAMEWORK There are sensitive DOD/SANDF units and critical infrastructure sites with high value information, equipment, weapons, and ammunition. The security at these sites are influenced by the employment of reserve force members as it further complicates command and control aspects for the Commanding Officers since reserve force members are not part of the Unit and are exposed to have detailed knowledge of the internal security measures. There is a drive to limit the employment of reserve force members in sensitive areas. 12

  13. ROLE PLAYERS TO CURB CRIMINALITY • Military Police Division. • Prevention of crime. • Investigation of crime. • Maintenance of law and order. • Rehabilitation of military offenders. • Defence Intelligence • Institutes CI policy, Counter Measures and conduct CI Monitoring, evaluations and assessments through Sub-Division Counter Intelligence. 13

  14. ROLE PLAYERS TO CURB CRIMINALITY • Defence Inspectorate Division • Conduct audits and investigations to combat fraud and corruption, irregular and wasteful expenditure in the DOD • Defence Legal Services Division • Military prosecution services 14

  15. 15 R 10, 870 953 R 4, 342 111 R 7, 743 067 R 7, 180 587

  16. SECURITY IN CONTEXT 16

  17. INCIDENT AT 9 SAI BN

  18. INCIDENT • The incident at 9 SAI Bn unfolded in the following manner: • On 14 April 2017 at 03:17 a.m. five armed suspects climbed over the outer perimeter fence, cut a hole in the inner perimeter fence and entered the unit magazine. • The suspects overpowered the two roving guards and disarmed them of the one weapon and a total of 10 rounds of ammunition was also taken from the guards.

  19. INCIDENT • The suspects proceeded to the guard room, overpowered the 5 guards in the magazine duty room, and demanded the keys to the weapon store. • Five weapons were stolen from the weapon safe of the guard room, bringing the total weapons stolen to six. • The suspects locked the guards in the magazine and exited the unit by making a hole in the fence.

  20. ACTIONS TAKEN • Security: The number of deployed guards were increased from 6 to 12. • Security Lights: The perimeter fence lights and unit lights are serviceable and been monitored at all times. • Alarm System and Spotlight: The requirement to mount an alarm system with back up batteries at the tower remains a high priority. • Communications: Communications between the guards and the Duty Room was improved and is monitored

  21. INCIDENT • Investigations by SAPS: Intensive investigation by the SAPS was launched and any possible hints that may have led to the capture and recovery of the stolen weapons were followed. • Security Evaluation by Defence Intelligence: Defence Intelligence conducted an overall security evaluation and members who were on guard were subjected to polygraph test. One of the guards was found to be inconsistent in his responses.

  22. ACTION TAKEN • BOI No7/2017: The recommendations of BOI No 7 of 2017 have been implemented. • CCTV Cameras: Installation of CCV Cameras is a priority and will be expedite when funds become available. • Suspension Process: Guards who were on duty that day have been called on Office Orders and Letters of Suspension were served to them

  23. ACTIONTAKEN • Rotation of the Officer Commanding and Regiment Sergeant Major: C Army has since instructed the General Officer Commanding of the Infantry Formation to rotate both the Officer Commanding and the Regimental Sergeant Major and the process to appoint suitable candidates is underway.

  24. GENERAL SECURITY MEASURES • Regular inspections and sporadic inspections • Internal Audits • Stocktaking • Use of minimum force/self defence • Suitability Boards • Crime prevention through environmental design • Issuing of notices to illegal occupation of DOD owned land and facilities • Establishment of nodal point on anti-criminality • Inclusion anti - criminality clause in commanders’ performance agreement 26

  25. GENERAL SECURITY MEASURES In accordance with the Defence Act 42 of 2002, the SANDF (DI) conducts vetting and continuous screening of SANDF members (Full and Part Time), but remains dependant on the sustained provision of information and data from other State Departments to conduct effective vetting and continuous screening. Vetting and continuous screening capability thus remain an effective counter measure and security mechanism to detect and identify members/officials involved with organised crime and to counter criminal elements (insider threat) from being employed or retained (repeated offenders). It should however be noted that the DI (SDCI)’s vetting capacity however requires a critical increase in capacity with a HR retention strategy for specialist vetting practitioners to maintain these functions and has a cost commitment implication for the DOD/SANDF. 27

  26. RECENT INITIATIVES TO ENHANCE SECURITY In order to further enhance security within the DOD/SANDF, the review of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 has also been initiated on matters concerning security and transgression to consider more strict regulations on sentences, penalties and corrective measures as deterrence measure. With the inception of Project IKHAYA that focuses on the institutionalisation of Counter Intelligence (CI) within the DOD/SANDF: • The DOD/SANDF has since 2012 redefined military security functions (passive measures) to migrate to the conduct of Counter Intelligence (active measures) at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels. 28

  27. RECENT INITIATIVES TO ENHANCE SECURITY • This project has been registered to ensure the establishment of CI functional control by DI (SDCI) to support Commanding Officers and the deployment of qualified CI Practitioners to Serv/Divs Headquarters and Tactical Units to increase the efforts to counter identified CI adversaries and address security related matters. • The project is currently in Phase 4 (Implementation) and the success of this project however is dependant upon the provision of additional funding for restructuring (expansion of CI structures) and operational funding for Serv/Divs to create and sustain CI mobility and force projection for the exploit of actionable intelligence. 29

  28. RECENT INITIATIVES TO ENHANCE SECURITY The SANDF has reactivated Project BROEKSKEUR with the aim to streamline and prioritise the maintenance and upgrading of infrastructure in cooperation with National Department of Public Works (NDPW). The SANDF intends through Project BROEKSKEUR to reprioritise, reschedule and fast track the turnaround time supported by ring fenced funding for the maintenance and upgrading of SANDF security infrastructure. It needs to be emphasised that the dependency on the NDPW to maintain current and the construction of newly required infrastructure has shown slow progress over the years. 30

  29. RECENT INITIATIVES TO ENHANCE SECURITY The shortfall on the budget, especially of tactical level military units, are insufficient to acquire and install the required security technologies (ie CCTV systems, Biometrics, Alarms, Intruder Detection Systems, etc). The required minimum physical security technologies for sensitive Units or facilities have become critical to serve as a force multiplier and a deterrent measure to support the safety of guard personnel as well as the hardening of the security infrastructure of military headquarters, operational rooms, offices where classified information is stored, information and communication centres, as well as logistical and weapon depots/stores. 31

  30. SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICIENCIES The security infrastructure deficiencies identified on physical security measures with emphasis on the external perimeter fencing, barriers, illumination, CCTV systems, alarms and bio-metric systems are listed below as salient points. To repair security infrastructure deviancies specialised repair survices are required from NDPW . The maintenance and upgrading of infrastructure through project BROEKSKEUR need to be rolled out to all 825 military units. 32

  31. Theft of Firearms. Proof of ownership (Unit) when serial numbers are filed off Theft of Rations. To prove shortage of rations at the specific unit. Proof of ownership when rations are removed from its original package. Theft of Diesel and Petrol. Theft of fuel often goes undetected as fuel consumption is inconsistent. Unserviceable vehicles and vehicles in for repairs. Theft of State Property Military Facilities are not secured properly (Budget) SECURITY CAVEATS/CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED 33

  32. Courts Courts issue lenient sentences to perpetrators Sentences / fines do not deter offenders Military courts do not have jurisdiction over civilians Investigations 172 Investigating Officials versus number of cases reported annually Vast geographical areas to cover External and internal operational obligations SECURITY CAVEATS/CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED 34

  33. SECURITY CAVEATS/CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED • Zoning of military areas • Thoroughfare of civilians from neighbouring areas • Illegal occupation of DOD land and facilities • Expansion of settlements in close proximity to DOD land and facilities (9 SAI Bn & Khayelitsha Township, 14 SAI Bn & Ncise, ASB JHB & Zuurbekom) • Personnel Involvement in criminality • Collusion with criminals (corrupt own force element) • Habitual offenders 35

  34. Thank You 36

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