the tofino security industrial solution l.
Skip this Video
Loading SlideShow in 5 Seconds..
The Tofino Security Industrial Solution PowerPoint Presentation
Download Presentation
The Tofino Security Industrial Solution

Loading in 2 Seconds...

play fullscreen
1 / 37

The Tofino Security Industrial Solution - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

  • Uploaded on

The Tofino Security Industrial Solution. Making the Control System Intrinsically Secure. Agenda. Who Turned Out the Lights? Making the Case for Control System Security Plugging the Holes Understanding Defence-in-Depth Security

I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about 'The Tofino Security Industrial Solution' - Olivia

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
the tofino security industrial solution

The Tofino Security Industrial Solution

Making the Control System Intrinsically Secure

  • Who Turned Out the Lights?Making the Case for Control System Security
  • Plugging the HolesUnderstanding Defence-in-Depth Security
  • The Tofino Industrial Security SolutionCreating Intrinsically Secure Control Systems
  • Questions & Answers
who turned out the lights

Who Turned Out the Lights?

Making the Case for Control System Security

the incident in harrisburg pa
The Incident in Harrisburg, PA
  • Oct 2006 -a foreign-based hacker (via Internet) infiltrates the laptop of an employee at the Harrisburg water system.
  • Uses the employee’s remote access as the entry point into the SCADA system.
  • The hacker then installs malware and spyware in a SCADA HMI computer.
but it won t happen to my system
But It Won’t Happen to My System…

“Most public utilities rely on a highly customized SCADA system. No two are the same, so hacking them requires specific knowledge”.

Scott Berinato; “Debunking the Threat to Water Utilities” CIO Magazine March 15, 2002

security incidents in the water industry
Security Incidents in the Water Industry
  • Salt River Project SCADA Hack
  • Maroochy Shire Sewage Spill
  • Software Flaw Makes MA Water Undrinkable
  • Trojan/Keylogger on Ontario Water SCADA System
  • Viruses Found on Auzzie SCADA Laptops
  • Audit/Blaster Causes Water SCADA Crash
  • DoS attack on water system via Korean telecom
  • Penetration of California irrigation district wastewater treatment plant SCADA.
  • SCADA system tagged with message, "I enter in your server like you in Iraq."
security incidents in the oil industry
Security Incidents in the Oil Industry
  • Electronic Sabotage of Venezuela Oil Operations
  • CIA Trojan Causes Siberian Gas Pipeline Explosion
  • Anti-Virus Software Prevents Boiler Safety Shutdown
  • Slammer Infected Laptop Shuts Down DCS
  • Virus Infection of Operator Training Simulator
  • Electronic Sabotage of Gas Processing Plant
  • Slammer Impacts Offshore Platforms
  • SQL Slammer Impacts Drill Site
  • Code Red Worm Defaces Automation Web Pages
  • Penetration Test Locks-Up Gas SCADA System
  • Contractor Laptop Infects Control System
security incidents in the chemical industry
Security Incidents in the Chemical Industry
  • IP Address Change Shuts Down Chemical Plant
  • Hacker Changes Chemical Plant Set Points via Modem
  • Nachi Worm on Advanced Process Control Servers
  • SCADA Attack on Plant of Chemical Company
  • Contractor Accidentally Connects to Remote PLC
  • Sasser Causes Loss of View in Chemical Plant
  • Infected New HMI Infects Chemical Plant DCS
  • Blaster Worm Infects Chemical Plant
security incidents in the power industry
Security Incidents in the Power Industry
  • Slammer Infects Control Central LAN via VPN
  • Slammer Causes Loss of Comms to Substations
  • Slammer Infects Ohio Nuclear Plant SPDS
  • Iranian Hackers Attempt to Disrupt Israel Power System
  • Utility SCADA System Attacked
  • Virus Attacks a European Utility
  • Facility Cyber Attacks Reported by Asian Utility
  • E-Tag Forgery Incident in Power PSE
  • Power Plant Security Details Leaked on Internet
risking it all on the great wall

Risking It All on the Great Wall

Why Security Solutions Fail

the bastion model of security
The Bastion Model of Security
  • A popular solution for industrial security is to install single firewall between business and the control system.
  • Known as the Bastion Model since it depends on a single point of security.
  • Other examples of the bastion model:
    • The Great Wall of China
    • The Maginot Line
a few incorrectly configured firewalls
A Few Incorrectly Configured Firewalls…
  • Study of 37 firewalls from financial,energy,telecommunications, media, automotive, and security firms...

“Almost 80 percent of firewalls allow both the "Any" service on inbound rules and insecure access to the firewalls. These are gross mistakes by any account.”

A quantitative study of firewall configuration errors“Avishai Wool, " IEEE Computer Magazine, IEEE Computer Society, June 2004

the bastion model doesn t work
The Bastion Model Doesn't Work
  • The Slammer Worm infiltrated a:
    • Nuclear plant via a contractor’s T1 line;
    • Power utility SCADA system via a VPN;
    • Petroleum control system via laptop;
    • Paper machine HMI via dial-up modem.
  • Firewalls existed in at least three of these cases.

* Industrial Security Incident Database June 2006

pathways into the control network

Infected Remote Support


Office LAN

Unauthorized Connections

Infected Laptops




Plant Network

Control LAN

External PLC Networks

RS-232 Links

Pathways into the Control Network
how the bad guys get in
How the Bad Guys Get In…
  • Corporate WANs & Business Networks
  • Directly from the Internet
  • Trusted third parties
  • Infected laptops being connected to the PCN
plugging the holes

Plugging the Holes

Creating Defense in Depth

Security Strategies

a perimeter defence is not enough
A Perimeter Defence is Not Enough
  • We can’t just install a control system firewall and forget about security.
  • The bad guys will eventually get in.
  • So we must harden the plant floor.
  • We need Defence in Depth.

Crunchy on the Outside - Soft in the Middle

defence in depth strategy
Defence-in-Depth Strategy
  • “By defense-in-depth strategy, we mean the protection measures composed of more than one security control to protect the property.”
  • “By the use of this kind of multi-layer measures, another layer will protect the property even if one layer is destroyed, so the property is protected more firmly.”

Yokogawa Security Standard of System

TI 33Y01B30-01E

the solution in the it world
The Solution in the IT World
  • Your desktop has flaws so you add security software:
    • Patches
    • Personal Firewalls (like ZoneAlarm)
    • Anti-Virus Software
    • Encryption (VPN Client or PGP)
  • This is a good idea for PCs in the control system…
  • But you can’t add software to your DCS, PLC or RTU…
distributed security appliances
Distributed Security Appliances
  • Add hardware instead - a security appliance designed to be placed in front of individual control devices (such as PLC, DCS, RTU etc).
  • Protects the control device from any unauthorized contact, probing, commands, etc.
distributed security appliances21

Layers 1/2 Defence (Device)

Layers 3/4 Defence (Control System)

Layer 5 Defence (Enterprise)

Distributed Security Appliances

Internet Attacks


Infected Business PC

Internet Firewall

Business Network


Business/Control System Firewall

Distributed FW

Infected HMI

Distributed FW

Cluster of PLCs


DCS Controllers

the tofino industrial security solution

The Tofino Industrial Security Solution

Creating Intrinsically Secure Control Systems

key tofino components
Key Tofino™ Components
  • Tofino™ Security Appliance
  • Tofino™ Loadable Security Modules (LSM)
  • Tofino™ Central Management Platform (CMP)
the tofino architecture

Corporate Intranet

Tofino™ Central Management Platform

IDS Module Being Loaded to Appliance

Status Being Sent to CMP


Tofino™ Appliance Monitoring DCS Network

Tofino™ Appliance Protecting PLC

Cluster of DCS Controllers

HMI Station


PLC Controllers

The Tofino™ Architecture
tofino security appliance
Tofino™ Security Appliance
  • Industrially hardened hardware appliances.
  • Installed in front of individual and/or networks of HMI, DCS, PLC or RTU control devices that require protection.
tofino loadable security modules
Tofino™ Loadable Security Modules
  • LSMs are software plug-ins providing security services such as:
    • Firewall,
    • Intrusion detection system (IDS),
    • VPN encryption.
  • Each LSM is downloaded into the security appliance to allow it to offer customizable security functions, depending on the requirements of the control system.
  • The Firewall LSM is available now.
  • Others will be released through 2008.
tofino central management platform
Tofino™ Central Management Platform
  • The CMP is a Windows-based centralized management server.
  • Provides database for monitoring, supervision and configuration of each security appliance.
key tofino features

Key Tofino Features

Intrinsically Secure

Designed for Industry

form factor and robustness
Hardware specifications:

Temperature -40C to 70C

Dual Power Supply

Form factor similar to common I/O or barriers

Form Factor and Robustness

Dual Digital Inputs

Serial Port Option

(Q2 2008)

Ethernet Ports

DIN Rail Mount

Secure USB Ports

Dual 9-32 VDC

zero configuration deployment model
Zero Configuration Deployment Model
  • Field technician need do no more than:
    • Attach the firewall to the DIN Rail
    • Attach instrument power
    • Plug in network cables
    • Walk away…
  • Tofino is completely transparent to the process network on startup.
simple to operate
Simple to Operate
  • Plug security appliance onto the control network in front of a PLC, DCS or HMI station:
    • Select the appropriate device from a central database where each device’s protocols andvulnerabilities are recorded.
    • Guides administratorto load appropriate rules to protect that specific device.
intuitive rule generator
Intuitive Rule Generator

Globally control specific types of communications

Preconfigured to block known device flaws

Create a list of devices that can “talk” to a protected device and allowed protocols

administration and global management
One management station can monitor and manage hundreds of firewalls, deployed in remote locations.

Reports with encrypted heartbeat (like a fieldbus) to report status and events.

Administration and Global Management
more than just a firewall
Loadable Security Modules (LSM) allow multiple security functions to be deployed in one appliance.

In 2007 the Firewall LSM is available

Through out 2008 IDS and VPN/Encryption will be released

New modules can be deployed at any time.

More Than Just a Firewall

List of available modules for download

sample tofino use cases
Sample Tofino Use Cases
  • Satellite Control Networks
  • Protection from Alien Control Networks
  • Protection Of Safety Systems
  • Protection from External Networks
  • Protection from Insecure Networks
  • Protection for Unpatchable Systems
  • Protection of Wireless Systems
  • Protection of OPC Traffic
  • Future – Full Scale Network Separation
tofino intrinsically secure
Tofino – Intrinsically Secure
  • More than a firewall - LSM’s can provide security solutions tailored to specific plant floor situations.
  • Designed with the environment, staff capabilities and needs of industry in mind.
  • A truly distributed security solution, yet can be easily managed from a central location.
  • Flexible enough to be used by a small plant or a multi-national organization with 1000’s devices scattered around the globe.

Byres Security Inc.

Lantzville, BC

250 390 1333

MTL Instruments

Edmonton, Alberta

780 485-3139