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MATEO, ET. AL. VS. HON. ONOFRE VILLALUZMarch 31, 1973G.R. Nos. L-34756-59
Background: • In 1971, American Express Bank at Sangley Point, Cavite was robbed, and American Servicemen were killed. • Criminal actions were filed against herein petitioners for Robbery with Homicide. • The Information fell on the sala of Respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz.
Background: • While the case was pending, petitioner Martinez filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, and later on filed a Supplemental Motion based on the claim that the pre-trial identification of him by witness Elliot Grey in a police line-up in the absence of his counsel was unconstitutional, and the identification of him during the trial is inadmissible. • The prosecution then opposed the said Motion to Dismiss. However, respondent judge did not been decide on the motion.
Background: • Meanwhile, another suspect in the Sangley Point robbery was arrested in the name of Rolando Reyes. • On October 5, 1971, when the motions to dismiss were submitted for resolution, Respondent Judge issued an order that pursuant to Sec 6, Rule 135 of the New Rules of Court, the motion to dismiss will be resolved only after the prosecution has presented and rested its evidence as against Rolando Reyes.
Background: • It appears that Reyes had executed an extrajudicial statement on October 1, 1971 implicating petitioners, subscribed and sworn to before the respondent judge. • So evidently, respondent judge was aware of this as he was the one who subscribed the statement, and it was for this reason that he had deferred the ruling on petitioner Martinez’ motion to dismiss.
Background: • However, Reyes’ case was tried separately from and in the absence of petitioners, so that the proceedings against him did not constitute evidence against petitioners. • While the motions to dismiss remain unresolved, the prosecution filed a motion to present additional evidence, which was opposed by Martinez for the reason that it is prejudicial to his substantial rights, and effectively deprived him of a fair trial because the prosecution has already rested its case.
Background: • Respondent Judge then granted the prosecution’s motion to present additional evidence on the ground that is within the sound discretion of the Honorable Court whether or not to allow the presentation of additional evidence after the parties have rested their case. • However, when Reyes was presented as an additional witness, and in the course thereof, marked the extrajudicial statement purportedly executed by him before the respondent judge, he repudiated the said statement saying that the executed it because he had been threatened by a government agent.
Background: • Petitioners then filed their Joint Motion for Disqualification contending that respondent judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, should disqualify himself from sitting in the case under 2nd paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
Background: • Rule 1, Section 137 • Section 1.Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. • A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Background: • However, respondent judge denied the Motion for Disqualification. • Hence, the petitioners filed the present case, based on the asserted violation of a constitutional right not to be convicted of an offense without due process of law.
Ruling: • The Supreme Court granted the petition.
Ruling: • It racionated that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal footing. In the language of Justice Dizon: "It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."
Ruling: • Petitioners can assert then, and rightly so, that the Supreme has the power to set aside the order denying the motion for disqualification. While the discretion in the first instance belongs to the respondent judge, its exercise is subject to our corrective authority. Certainly, there can be no question as to its being considered abused if it can be shown that to refuse inhibition is to cast valid doubts as to a court's impartiality.
Ruling: • The specific issue then that must be resolved is whether the circumstance of a party having subscribed before respondent Judge an extra-judicial statement purporting to describe the manner in which an offense was committed, later on repudiated by him as the product of intimidation in the course of his having been asked to testify against petitioners, would suffice to negate that degree of objectivity the Constitution requires? The answer must be in the affirmative.Petitioners are thus entitled to the relief sought.
Ruling: • Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before him in such extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his later declaration that there was intimidation by a government agent exerted on him. That was hardly flattering to respondent Judge. It is not only that. His sense of fairness under the circumstances could easily be blunted. The absence of the requisite due process element is thus noticeable. There is this circumstance even more telling. It was he who attested to its due execution on October 1, 1971 wherein Rolando Reyes admitted his participation in the crime and in addition implicated petitioners. At that time, their motion for dismissal of the charges against them was pending; its resolution was deferred by respondent Judge until after the prosecution had presented and rested its evidence against affiant, who was himself indicted and tried for the same offense, but in a separate proceeding.
Ruling: • It cannot be doubted then that respondent Judge in effect ruled that such extra-judicial statement was executed freely. With its repudiation on the ground that it was not so at all, coercion having come into the picture there is apparent the situation of a judge having to pass on a question that by implication had already been answered by him. Such a fact became rather obvious. For respondent Judge was called upon to review a matter on which he had previously given his opinion. It is this inroad in one's objectivity that is sought to be avoided by the law on disqualification. The misgivings then as to the requirement of due process for "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" not being met are more titan justified. Hence the conclusion reached by us.
Ruling: • To avoid any further controversies of this nature, lower court judges are well-advised to limit themselves to the task of adjudication and to leave to others the role of notarizing declarations. The less an occupant of the bench fritters away his time and energy in tasks more incumbent on officials of the executive branch the less the danger of his being a participant in any event that might lend itself to the interpretation that his impartiality has been compromised.
Canon 3 • Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision to made. • Section 1 • Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice. • Section 2 • Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
Canon 3 • Section 3 • Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases. • Section 4 • Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before, them make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
Canon 3 • Section 5 • Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where: • The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings; • The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy; • The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy; • The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein; • The judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review; • The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or • The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings;
Canon 3 • Section 6 • A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.
