Nicaragua under Somoza

1. Nicaragua under Somoza What should the U.S. do?

2. You are a career foreign service officer in the U.S. State Department. Your specialty is Central America. Because of your expertise, you have been assigned to the Nicaragua desk due to concerns about the stability of the Somoza regime. Your advice will be considered in policy decisions. You have the chance here to advance your career.

3. Just as you are getting acclimated to your new position, a tragedy strikes in Managua, Nicaragua. On Dec. 23, 1972, a devastating earthquake levels about 80% of the city, killing 10,000 people, injuring thousands more and leaving an estimated 50,000 homeless. What do you recommend the United States do? Pledge support to the Somoza regime and send as much aid as possible. Send aid but insist on strict accountability as to how the funds are spent. Express concern over the tragedy, but do nothing. It’s not our problem.

4. Understandable since he has been a strong ally in the Cold War but he is also notoriously corrupt. Still given the circumstances, there is no better option.

5. Excellent idea but there is no way he will put up with such strings. It is an insult to an ally, reminiscent of the days when the U.S. marines were present in the country.

6. Not really an option. We want to build goodwill abroad and also support an anti-Communist regime in Central America.

7. Despite your hopes that he would not use the earthquake as an opportunity to enrich himself and his friends further, Somoza has taken the funds and distributed them to his cronies for the rebuilding effort, but there has been little progress. To make matters worse, La Prensa is reporting that Somoza took excess plasma that had been donated and sold it to the United States for personal profit. Many see Somoza as using the disaster for his own personal gain. At this point, you can only hope that the opposition is just vocalizing frustration and will lose steam soon.

8. For the past several years, the radical opposition to Somoza has been rather quiet. They have been gathering support, but they have also suffered setbacks as leaders have been arrested. This quiet phase ends on December 27, 1974 with an FSLN team crashing a party at the home of a wealthy businessman, capturing among others the Foreign Minister and Somoza’s brother-in-law. The American ambassador, the guest of honor, has just left one hour before. This was a close call. Somoza’s response was to impose martial law, suspend constitutional rights and order hundreds of suspected FSLN sympathizers arrested. You are asked for your analysis of the situation. This is a sign that the opposition is strong; we should no longer support Somoza. Somoza’s actions are justified and we should continue to support him, although perhaps not so vocally; this is likely an isolated incident, but we need to watch this closely. While this is a serious incident, demanding our attention, Somoza has the strength of the National Guard behind him and will be able to put down any insurrection at this point.

9. If we abandon Somoza, other anti-Communist allies facing opposition will interpret that to mean that the U.S. is unreliable. The long-term cost could be enormous.

10. Good choice. This is not the time to panic; further study of the opposition movement is necessary to determine its strength before we take any action.

11. It seems irresponsible to ignore this incident. Our ambassador was in danger and we cannot assume that the National Guard will take care of it without further assessment on our part.

12. As it turns out, although Somoza negotiates an end to the crisis and the Sandinistas seem to gain a victory, it is a tactical move on his part. The FSLN movement is divided over what its overall strategy should be. Somoza exploits the divisions and sends a strong, loyal National Guards after the rebels.

13. Jimmy Carter wins the 1976 presidential election. You are concerned for a number of reasons. Anytime there is a new administration, there is a chance that the new Secretary of State will shake up the department, installing his or her own people. Given the low priority that Carter is assigning Central America, you will probably be safe. At the same time, you know that Carter’s foreign policy emphasizing on human rights will surely stir up some trouble in the region, especially in Somoza’s Nicaragua. While Somoza has been far from the worst violator of human rights, he is a dictator. It is highly likely that Somoza’s opposition will expect Somoza to lose the automatic support he has enjoyed from the U.S., which has provided him with legitimacy and strength. You have a feeling that the Nicaraguan desk will not be so quiet in the coming months.

14. Not the fittest of dictators, Somoza suffered symptoms of a heart attack on July 25, 1977. He flew to Miami for treatment and returned to Nicaragua on September 7. He planned to govern from his mansion overlooking the Pacific Ocean. There was much speculation in the capital that he was too sick to be effective. In fact, two weeks later he ended the state of siege he had implemented in 1974, reinstating things like freedom of press. He hoped that this would get the U.S. to send military and economic aid. At this point, you are asked to give a recommendation. Pull the plug on Somoza’s aid. It is obvious that his opposition is taking advantage of his weakness. He won’t be in power long. Continue to support him. We do not have enough of a sense of who is leading the opposition. We will lose credibility with other allies if we abandon him, especially after he lifted the sanctions.

15. This seems like a good idea. You do not want to be seen supporting a dictator when he faces so much opposition from different areas of society. If the U.S. begins supporting the opposition, we may be able to help shape a post-Somoza government. We might be able to support the moderates and the businessmen, isolating the radicals and revolutionaries. In fact, some of the Sandinistas are worried about just that outcome. They want to be able to carry out their revolution, but they will not be able to do that if the forces of moderation win. Unfortunately, as you see it, your advice is not taken. The administration has decided that it is too soon to abandon such a long time ally. Besides there are other priorities, like peace in the Middle East which demand the time of the President and the Secretary of State. They have no desire to commit to U.S. involvement of any kind in the internal politics of Nicaragua.

16. You are thinking like a team player. Nicaragua is far from the top of the President’s priority list. He is more focused on issues like working toward peace in the Middle East. The administration appreciates your cautious attitude. Too many area specialists believe that their issues are the most important. You are told to keep an eye on the situation, but at this point it is difficult to justify abandoning a long standing ally who has been doing what we want. While it may only be temporary, he has been easing restrictions and opening up society more. At the same time, the U.S. will cut back on the financial aid to Somoza.

17. Unfortunately, the question of whether or not to continue to support Somoza has divided your department. You know that you need to continually reevaluate the situation. You cannot afford to stand pat. The next crisis comes with the assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, whose newspaper La Prensa has been critical of the Somoza regime. The opposition in Nicaragua has been galvanized by this event, even though it seems that Somoza was not responsible. There have been small uprisings that the National Guard has been able to quell. What is your analysis? Somoza is denouncing his opposition as Communist. We must rally behind Somoza, a faithful cold warrior. We cannot afford another communist regime. It is clear that Somoza is playing the Communist card to enlist our support. We need to stay out of this. We should provide aid to the opposition.

18. Tempting as it may be to see this situation in Nicaragua through Cold War glasses, it is clear that Somoza’s opposition is far more than a Communist action. There are members of the business and professional classes who are prominent opponents of Somoza. President Carter can see right through Somoza’s self-serving statements. Newspaper Publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamorro

19. This is still the best option. It seems that Somoza has been able to control the uprisings and strikes so far. We do not need to be interfering. Even if Somoza loses control, at this point the opposition is broad, including businessmen and professionals, and there is no reason to believe that the Communists will be able to dominate it. Newspaper Publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamorro

20. This is a dangerous option at this point. We risk violating the sovereignty of Nicaragua, bringing much criticism from around the world. At this point, Somoza seems to still be able to handle the situation. Even clandestine aid to his opposition might be risky at this point. At least with Somoza in power, we know what we are dealing with. President Carter is looking at the situation from the perspective of human rights, not regime change. He wants to continue to pressure Somoza to do things like release political prisoners and enforce constitutional rights.

21. It’s a slow day at work. It is August 22. You have just gotten back from vacation, and other colleagues are on vacation, trying to catch that last bit of summer with the family before the kids go back to school. Hoping to go home a bit early, you begin to pack up your briefcase. The phone rings and your boss tells you he must see you immediately. When you get to your boss’ office, he tells you to shut the door and sit down. You are astonished as you listen to what he tells you. Under the direction of Eden Pastora, a group of Sandinistas has captured the National Palace, holding cabinet ministers, congressmen, and even some Somoza relatives hostage. They are demanding the release of eighty three prisoners, publication of Sandinista communiques, and $10 million. The hostages numbered over 1500 people, including many prominent Nicaraguans. Given the tense situation, you are asked to find out as much as you can about Pastora. You will also monitor the situation through contact with the American Embassy in Managua. You call home to say that you will be working late. Eden Pastora

22. Two days and much negotiation later, the siege ended. The final agreement included the release of about fifty prisoners, the publication of the communiques, and the payment of half a million dollars. Fearing that the guerrillas would actually start shooting hostages and that he would be have to face their families, Somoza had decided he needed to negotiate with the Sandinistas. With the ending of the siege, you are asked to provide an analysis of what you think that it means for the future of Somoza and Nicaragua. Your conclusion about the significance of the siege of the National Palace is: It was an isolated incident. The Sandinistas put a lot of their resources into it. With Somoza on guard now, it is unlikely they will able to do anything like it again. Somoza will use the National Guard to its fullest extent. The Nicaraguan people are appalled at the violent act. Their sympathies lie with the politicians who were held hostage. From a public relations standpoint, the episode has backfired for the Sandinistas. Somoza support is growing. With their bold and successful raid, the Sandinistas have captured the momentum of opposition, with the more moderate groups becoming marginalized. Sympathies are with the Sandinistas. This will strengthen them.

23. This is wishful thinking. While Somoza does still have the support of the National Guard, he faces a lot of opposition. There is no way for him to play this so that it strengthens him. The Sandinistas proved with their bold raid on the home of the government that Somoza is quite vulnerable. Their success in the operation breathes new life into the opposition. Ordinary Nicaraguans begin to believe that there may be another way besides the corrupt government run by Somoza. This analysis is not likely to get you the promotion that you want.

24. Unfortunately, quite the opposite reaction has happened. People lined the streets by the palace and shouted out their support for the guerrillas. The crowds were chanting anti-Somoza slogans. These spontaneous gatherings suggest that the Sandinistas have emboldened other people to show their disgust with Somoza. This Sandinista victory, where the government gave them nearly everything they wanted, shows the vulnerability of the once mighty Somoza regime. You really did not read the Nicaraguan people correctly on this one. You overhear your boss mumbling about the best people being out of town when a crisis hits. You know that you will have to redeem yourself.

25. You have gotten this one right. Spontaneous demonstrations of support for the Sandinistas and denunciation of Somoza have broken out in Managua. The Sandinistas have shown the vulnerability of the Somoza regime to attack. Many Nicaraguans now feel that the once might dictator is not so strong now. They are encouraged to join the opposition. At the same time, the success of the raid has shown that action is the way to get to the Somoza regime. The nonviolent opposition has been unable to make any progress in shaking the regime so the momentum shifts to the Sandinistas. Hopes of getting a moderate government to replace Somoza or having Somoza regain control, stamping out the guerrillas have faded. Good call. Such on target analysis will surely work in your favor when you come up for promotion. Your boss invites you to lunch for making him look good in the executive meeting.

26. Under the guidance of the OAS (Organization of American States), mediation has begun to try to find some peaceful solution to the crisis in Nicaragua. President Carter has been insistent that the United States not try to intervene alone, but rather needs to work with the other countries in the region. He has declared the days of unilateralism over. While all agree that doing nothing will cause the moderate opposition to lose influence and eventually lead to a Sandinista victory, the question is what to do. Somoza seems to be using the negotiations as a stalling tactic. Your advice is Use pressure and threats to push Somoza. Threaten to deny him exile in the U.S. Apply economic sanctions, such as cutting Nicaragua’s beef export quota to the U.S. Do not do anything that would look like the U.S. was working actively to overthrow Somoza. Instead back Somoza’s idea of a plebescite on his rule. That would be in line with U.S. support of elections and self-determination.

27. This might well be effective, but the cost is too high. President Carter has no desire to go back to the days of U.S. intervention in Latin America. At a critical time when he is bartering a peace deal in the Middle East, he does not want to see headlines about U.S. interfering in the business of another sovereign nation. It would be very distracting and could harm the peace process. It would also be disturbing to our neighbors in Latin America. This recommendation is rejected, although nobody is excited about the other option.

28. While there is not wild enthusiasm for this recommendation, it seems to be the best option overall. Somoza will surely not hold a fair election. He will work to prolong his position in power as long as he can. At the same time, the U.S. cannot afford to be seen as intervening in another country to try to determine its government. Strong arm tactics will give our enemies plenty of ammunition and will make our allies nervous. We just have to stick with the negotiations and hope for the best.

29. Unfortunately, as you suspected all along, the mediation failed. The OAS negotiators gave up after it became obvious that Somoza was just dragging the talks out with no intention of trying to find a solution. They had tried for three months with no progress at all. Now, the moderate opposition, whom we had hoped would come to power found itself caught between the two extremes, Somoza and the Sandinistas with little support. They were surprised that the U.S. had no backup plan in case the mediation failed. The truth is with the failure of mediation, U.S. policy towards Nicaragua is in disarray. The first decision is to end military aid to Somoza and to bring home half of the staff of the U.S. Embassy. Even this proved to be ineffective since Somoza had stockpiles of weapons and then turned to other sources, such as Israel. The Sandinistas launched an insurrection at this point, the beginning of 1979. Although the embassy in Nicaragua reports that Somoza should survive these attacks, there are skeptics who have seen deep hatred of Somoza throughout the population. At this point there is not much to do but wait and watch.

30. It is June 1979. While reports have indicated that Somoza and the National Guard may survive the Sandinista offensive, heavy fighting continued. Opposition leaders have begun to discuss forming a broad based government to take power after Somoza. The Sandinistas will have a role, but it is unclear how large that role will be. What should the U.S. do? Support the opposition wholeheartedly and work to get Somoza to leave. After all, his days are numbered. The opposition may not be strong enough to win a military victory, but Somoza cannot hang on forever either. Do not worry about the composition of the new government; any government would be better than Somoza. Stay out of it. There is nothing to be gained from getting involved at this point. Work to get Somoza to leave, but make it clear that the U.S. expects any new government to be transitional. Democratic elections must follow very quickly. Try to get the OAS to back up your plan.

31. While it is becoming clear that Somoza needs to go, we need to be careful about throwing our support to the opposition. The danger in supporting any opposition is that we could end up with a radical regime run by the Sandinistas. We may be responsible for putting a regime in power that then turns its hostility towards us. We do not need another Cuba in the hemisphere. The coalition may look broad based, but we need to look closely at who holds the most powerful positions. Months from now the radicals could chase the moderates from the government. This strategy is risky. It could easily backfire.

32. It would be nice to just stay out of it, but we really cannot. We have been involved with Somoza for too long. Others in the hemisphere have taken action and we will risk losing credibility and leadership if we do nothing. Mexico has already broken relations with Nicaragua and is urging others to do the same. We cannot allow Mexico to take the lead here. We cannot be seen to bury our heads in the sand when things get tough. We are probably in the best position to persuade Somoza to step down so the bloodshed may end. Your advice prompts your boss to suggest that if want to run away from trouble, you should perhaps consider a career change.

33. This is clearly the best option. We want to take leadership but also have the OAS on board with our actions, so as not to seem like we are acting unilaterally. We have the most effective leverage to get Somoza to resign, since we have been his biggest supporter over the years. We can tolerate a transitional government with some Sandinista elements, if we are assured elections will follow. Again, getting the OAS to support elections is important, not only for Nicaragua but on general principle for other situations that might arise. There is no guarantee of success here, but it would represent the ideal solution. It’s worth a try. Good thinking.

34. Despite gaining the support of the OAS, the U.S. has ended up doing most of the work to facilitate an end to the crisis. The rebels continue to form their government in anticipation of taking power. U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua Lawrence Pezzullo continues to work on Somoza, trying to get him to leave. Finally, on July 16, 1979, he convinces Somoza that the game is up. Somoza leaves Nicaragua forever, starting his journey that will begin in Miami but end with his exile in Paraguay, where he is assassinated fourteen months later. Four days later, on July 20, the new government and the top Sandinista leadership arrives in Managua to be greeted by a crowd of about 50,000 very enthusiastic Nicaraguans. The big question is what will happen next. In a country where a family had held power for about five decades, it was not clear who would be taking control and how. You are told to watch the new government very carefully, looking for signs of trouble, such as consolidation of power by Sandinistas.

35. Your boss has asked you to write a report which provides three possible scenarios for the future of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Evaluate the likelihood of each one. Since this is an important task, it might be advisable to consult with some of your colleagues. You need to provide the best analysis possible.