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China s Quest for Soft Power and Cultural Security

Main Argument: The CCP Asserts China's Rationalism" as a Source of Soft Power. . Main Argument: The CCP Asserts China's Rationalism" as a Source of Soft Power. A shift in CCP discourse on China's relations with the region and worldincluding the developing worldbegan in 1996 and was institution

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China s Quest for Soft Power and Cultural Security

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    1. China’s Quest for Soft Power and Cultural Security Daniel Lynch, Ph.D. Associate Professor, School of International Relations Director, Politics and International Relations Ph.D. Program Executive Board Member, US-China Institute (http://china.usc.edu) University of Southern California

    2. Main Argument: The CCP Asserts China’s “Rationalism” as a Source of Soft Power

    3. Main Argument: The CCP Asserts China’s “Rationalism” as a Source of Soft Power A shift in CCP discourse on China’s relations with the region and world—including the developing world—began in 1996 and was institutionalized as orthodoxy in 2002-2005. Using the terminology of “English School” IR theory, the new orthodoxy claims Chinese foreign policy has returned, following a 150-year diversion, from Realism to Rationalism.

    4. Main Argument: The CCP Asserts China’s “Rationalism” as a Source of Soft Power A shift in CCP discourse on China’s relations with the region and world—including the developing world—began in 1996 and was institutionalized as orthodoxy in 2002-2005. Using the terminology of “English School” IR theory, the new orthodoxy claims Chinese foreign policy has returned, following a 150-year diversion, from Realism to Rationalism. BUT: Careful analysis of what CCP elites are actually writing for each other—as confirmed in interviews—suggests the shift is primarily tactical, not genuine. Realism remains at the core of mainstream Chinese thinking on the international future.

    5. Main Argument: The CCP Asserts China’s “Rationalism” as a Source of Soft Power A shift in CCP discourse on China’s relations with the region and world—including the developing world—began in 1996 and was institutionalized as orthodoxy in 2002-2005. Using the terminology of “English School” IR theory, the new orthodoxy claims Chinese foreign policy has returned, following a 150-year diversion, from Realism to Rationalism. BUT: Careful analysis of what CCP elites are actually writing for each other—as confirmed in interviews—suggests the shift is primarily tactical, not genuine. Realism remains at the core of mainstream Chinese thinking on the international future. Implications for the developing world are that Beijing will continue to view it as a source of resources the CCP can use to increase Chinese state power, but with the understanding that it must make occasional tactical concessions and pay careful lip service to respecting international humanitarian norms.

    8. The English School’s “Three Traditions” Realism: With roots in the thinking of Machiavelli and Hobbes, Realists see states as constantly competing with one another—often militarily—for dominance in zero-sum games.

    9. The English School’s “Three Traditions” Realism: With roots in the thinking of Machiavelli and Hobbes, Realists see states as constantly competing with one another—often militarily—for dominance in zero-sum games. In evaluating whether to cooperate with other states, states rationally assess the gains that would accrue to them through cooperation relative to other states, not the absolute gains that could accrue to the community of states.

    10. The English School’s “Three Traditions” Realism: With roots in the thinking of Machiavelli and Hobbes, Realists see states as constantly competing with one another—often militarily—for dominance in zero-sum games. In evaluating whether to cooperate with other states, states rationally assess the gains that would accrue to them through cooperation relative to other states, not the absolute gains that could accrue to the community of states. Sovereign autonomy is primary; international society secondary. International society exists only at the sufferance of the member states and to serve their interests.

    12. The English School’s “Three Traditions” Rationalism: With roots in the thinking of 17th century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius and such liberal English philosophers as John Locke, Rationalism stresses that humans—even in the anarchic international realm—have a natural tendency to enter into cooperative relations with one another.

    13. The English School’s “Three Traditions” Rationalism: With roots in the thinking of 17th century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius and such liberal English philosophers as John Locke, Rationalism stresses that humans—even in the anarchic international realm—have a natural tendency to enter into cooperative relations with one another. That is why states readily form societies of states, and in those societies arrange for exchanges and cooperative endeavors that will increase the absolute gains of all the participating states, even at the risk of some states achieving greater relative gains.

    14. The English School’s “Three Traditions” Rationalism: With roots in the thinking of 17th century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius and such liberal English philosophers as John Locke, Rationalism stresses that humans—even in the anarchic international realm—have a natural tendency to enter into cooperative relations with one another. That is why states readily form societies of states, and in those societies arrange for exchanges and cooperative endeavors that will increase the absolute gains of all the participating states, even at the risk of some states achieving greater relative gains. Competition between states can be managed through diplomacy and international institution-building.

    16. The English School’s “Three Traditions” Revolutionism (Cosmopolitanism): With roots in the thinking of people ranging from Kant to Marx to Jesus to Walden Bello, Revolutionism asserts the primacy of a world society of human beings over and above the international society of (often abusive) states.

    17. The English School’s “Three Traditions” Revolutionism (Cosmopolitanism): With roots in the thinking of people ranging from Kant to Marx to Jesus to Walden Bello, Revolutionism asserts the primacy of a world society of human beings over and above the international society of (often abusive) states. Human rights of a variety of sorts are universal; states might pursue them through agreements with other states and a commitment to collective action.

    18. The English School’s “Three Traditions” Revolutionism (Cosmopolitanism): With roots in the thinking of people ranging from Kant to Marx to Jesus to Walden Bello, Revolutionism asserts the primacy of a world society of human beings over and above the international society of (often abusive) states. Human rights of a variety of sorts are universal; states might pursue them through agreements with other states and a commitment to collective action. But often, the NGOs of global civil society believe they must take direct action to bypass states and work directly to improve the lives of humans in world society.

    19. The English School’s “Three Traditions” Revolutionism (Cosmopolitanism): With roots in the thinking of people ranging from Kant to Marx to Jesus to Walden Bello, Revolutionism asserts the primacy of a world society of human beings over and above the international society of (often abusive) states. Human rights of a variety of sorts are universal; states might pursue them through agreements with other states and a commitment to collective action. But often, the NGOs of global civil society believe they must take direct action to bypass states and work directly to improve the lives of humans in world society. Cosmopolitanism is an absolute no-go zone for CCP elites!

    22. Pluralist Rationalism vs. Solidarist Rationalism

    23. Pluralist Rationalism vs. Solidarist Rationalism The differences between pluralist and solidarist Rationalism hinge on the type and extent of norms, rules, and institutions that an international society’s state members will be willing to form at the risk of departing from the foundational rules of sovereignty and non-intervention.

    24. Pluralist Rationalism vs. Solidarist Rationalism The differences between pluralist and solidarist Rationalism hinge on the type and extent of norms, rules, and institutions that an international society’s state members will be willing to form at the risk of departing from the foundational rules of sovereignty and non-intervention. Pluralists think that sovereignty/non-intervention principles should restrict international society to fairly minimal rules of coexistence. This is as far as even those CCP elites who can be classified as genuinely Rationalist are generally willing to go.

    26. Pluralist Rationalism vs. Solidarist Rationalism The differences between pluralist and solidarist Rationalism hinge on the type and extent of norms, rules, and institutions that an international society’s state members will be willing to form at the risk of departing from the foundational rules of sovereignty and non-intervention. Pluralists think that sovereignty/non-intervention principles should restrict international society to fairly minimal rules of coexistence. This is as far as even those CCP elites who can be classified as genuinely Rationalist are generally willing to go. Solidarists believe that international society can, and should, develop quite wide-ranging norms, rules, and institutions in pursuit of shared interests—even moving toward common identities.

    27. Pluralist Rationalism vs. Solidarist Rationalism The differences between pluralist and solidarist Rationalism hinge on the type and extent of norms, rules, and institutions that an international society’s state members will be willing to form at the risk of departing from the foundational rules of sovereignty and non-intervention. Pluralists think that sovereignty/non-intervention principles should restrict international society to fairly minimal rules of coexistence. This is as far as even those CCP elites who can be classified as genuinely Rationalist are generally willing to go. Solidarists believe that international society can, and should, develop quite wide-ranging norms, rules, and institutions in pursuit of shared interests—even moving toward common identities. CCP elites consistently deny the validity of solidarism, seeing it as just one step removed from dangerous Cosmopolitanism.

    29. The Chinese thinkers whose ideas I will briefly introduce today include: * Men Honghua (???) (Central Party School) * Li Jidong (???) (PLA International Politics Research Centre) * Luo Shou (??) and Wang Guifang (???) (PLA Military Sciences Institute) * Zheng Bijian (???) (senior CCP specialist on propaganda and foreign policy) * Fang Guangshun (???) (Liaoning University) * Cai Tuo (??) (Nankai University) and Liu Zhenye (???) (Tianjin University of Commerce) * An anonymous think-tank scholar whom I interviewed in either Beijing or Shanghai

    30. Chinese thinking: Men Honghua (Central Party School)

    31. Chinese thinking: Men Honghua (Central Party School) 1. Countering Alastair Iain Johnston, Men argues that Chinese strategic culture—the state’s core identity—is essentially Rationalist, having been built, over thousands of years, on such traditional Confucian concepts as benevolence (?), propriety (?), morality (?), and harmony (?).

    32. Chinese thinking: Men Honghua (Central Party School) 2. Prior to the 19th century, “Chinese people emphasized that ‘harmony is precious’ (???)…[but only] harmony in diversity (????).”

    33. Chinese thinking: Men Honghua (Central Party School) 2. Prior to the 19th century, “Chinese people emphasized that ‘harmony is precious’ (???)…[but only] harmony in diversity (????).” This is a vision in which essentially distinct entities enter into interdependent relationships “to ameliorate each other’s shortcomings and share each other’s strengths, thereby forming a harmonious world.”

    34. Chinese thinking: Men Honghua (Central Party School) 3. International brutalization at the hands of the West and Japan threw this essentially-Rationalist China temporarily off-track.

    35. Chinese thinking: Men Honghua (Central Party School) 3. International brutalization at the hands of the West and Japan threw this essentially-Rationalist China temporarily off-track. “The harmony-is-precious orientation of Chinese strategic culture which had persisted for many thousands of years changed to a conflict-oriented culture…seeking to use armed struggle to realize national independence and unification.”

    36. Chinese thinking: Men Honghua (Central Party School) 3. International brutalization at the hands of the West and Japan threw this essentially-Rationalist China temporarily off-track. “The harmony-is-precious orientation of Chinese strategic culture which had persisted for many thousands of years changed to a conflict-oriented culture…seeking to use armed struggle to realize national independence and unification.” But “the deepest infrastructural levels of Chinese strategic culture…have not been completely destroyed.”

    38. Chinese thinking: Li Jidong (PLA International Politics Research Centre)

    39. Chinese thinking: Li Jidong (PLA International Politics Research Centre) The key problem is “how to make Confucianism’s inherent intelligence and attractiveness serve our country’s development strategy and national interests.”

    40. Chinese thinking: Li Jidong (PLA International Politics Research Centre) The key problem is “how to make Confucianism’s inherent intelligence and attractiveness serve our country’s development strategy and national interests.” “The most vexing contradiction is how to contest the West’s, especially America’s, ‘discourse hegemony’ …The ‘Realism’ that they promote…now constitutes the mainstream of international political culture.”

    41. Chinese thinking: Li Jidong (PLA International Politics Research Centre) The key problem is “how to make Confucianism’s inherent intelligence and attractiveness serve our country’s development strategy and national interests.” “The most vexing contradiction is how to contest the West’s, especially America’s, ‘discourse hegemony’ …The ‘Realism’ that they promote…now constitutes the mainstream of international political culture. “Under the circumstances, would it be possible for China’s [inherently] ‘benevolent culture’ to ascend and become international political culture’s mainstream?”

    43. Chinese thinking: Luo Shou and Wang Guifang (PLA Military Sciences Institute) Three expected stages in China’s rise:

    44. Chinese thinking: Luo Shou and Wang Guifang (PLA Military Sciences Institute) Three expected stages in China’s rise: 1. China will “construct a secure surrounding environment.” This requires developing strategic partnerships with neighbouring countries, especially Russia, Japan, and India, and playing an active (sometimes leading) role in regional organizations such as ASEAN and the SCO.

    45. Chinese thinking: Luo Shou and Wang Guifang (PLA Military Sciences Institute) Three expected stages in China’s rise: 1. China will “construct a secure surrounding environment.” This requires developing strategic partnerships with neighbouring countries, especially Russia, Japan, and India, and playing an active (sometimes leading) role in regional organizations such as ASEAN and the SCO. Also in this stage, China must vigorously guard against Tibetan and Uighur independence, and “especially try to stabilize cross-Strait relations within the ‘one China framework,’ absolutely not permitting Taiwan to split apart from the fatherland.”

    46. Chinese thinking: Luo Shou and Wang Guifang (PLA Military Sciences Institute) Three expected stages in China’s rise: 2. The second stage requires moving beyond the Asian region in order to “mould” (??) a global security environment beneficial to China’s interests.

    47. Chinese thinking: Luo Shou and Wang Guifang (PLA Military Sciences Institute) Three expected stages in China’s rise: 2. The second stage requires moving beyond the Asian region in order to “mould” (??) a global security environment beneficial to China’s interests. “This is a kind of active, initiative-taking posture, chiefly exemplified by expanding our international space and realizing the unification of our fatherland.”

    48. Chinese thinking: Luo Shou and Wang Guifang (PLA Military Sciences Institute) Three expected stages in China’s rise: 2. The second stage requires moving beyond the Asian region in order to “mould” (??) a global security environment beneficial to China’s interests. “This is a kind of active, initiative-taking posture, chiefly exemplified by expanding our international space and realizing the unification of our fatherland.” “China will no longer be just a regional great power, but will have marched into the ranks of the world’s great powers. This will require that China shoulder more responsibilities and make more contributions.”

    49. Chinese thinking: Luo Shou and Wang Guifang (PLA Military Sciences Institute) Three expected stages in China’s rise: 3. The primary task in the third stage will be to “plan and operate (??) a new international political and economic order that can universally be accepted by international society.”

    50. Chinese thinking: Luo Shou and Wang Guifang (PLA Military Sciences Institute) Three expected stages in China’s rise: 3. (cont.) “We can say that the ‘plan and operate’ stage will be the highest level of China’s peaceful rise. China’s national interest will have fundamentally fused with the global interest” [i.e., in effect, what’s good for China will become what’s good for the world].

    51. Chinese thinking: Luo Shou and Wang Guifang (PLA Military Sciences Institute) Three expected stages in China’s rise: 3. (cont.) “We can say that the ‘plan and operate’ stage will be the highest level of China’s peaceful rise. China’s national interest will have fundamentally fused with the global interest” [i.e., in effect, what’s good for China will become what’s good for the world]. “China will comprehensively blend into international society while the situation and developments in other parts of the world directly impact upon China’s own interests.”

    52. Chinese thinking: Luo Shou and Wang Guifang (PLA Military Sciences Institute) Three expected stages in China’s rise: 3. (cont.) China will “profoundly lead and guide the international situation’s direction of development, working hard to uphold the international strategic balance” and guaranteeing international stability.

    53. Chinese thinking: Luo Shou and Wang Guifang (PLA Military Sciences Institute) Three expected stages in China’s rise: 3. (cont.) China will “profoundly lead and guide the international situation’s direction of development, working hard to uphold the international strategic balance” and guaranteeing international stability. “Especially important is that China will develop its discourse power…[and] will cultivate influence over the world’s direction of development within the realm of culture and values, and, as a result, obtain universal world respect.” 

    55. CCP elder Zheng Bijian explicitly rejects solidarist Rationalism and Revolutionism

    57. CCP elder Zheng Bijian explicitly rejects solidarist Rationalism and Revolutionism “I believe that in the present and for a very, very long time into the future, the human world will only be able to take nation-states as the basic form of organization.”

    58. CCP elder Zheng Bijian explicitly rejects solidarist Rationalism and Revolutionism “I believe that in the present and for a very, very long time into the future, the human world will only be able to take nation-states as the basic form of organization. “Even though we have all manner of international organizations; even though we have economic globalization and regional integration; and despite the fact nations can unite together in this way and that, even yielding a portion of their sovereignty, the nation-state—this fundamental thing—will not change.”

    59. CCP elder Zheng Bijian explicitly rejects solidarist Rationalism and Revolutionism “I believe that in the present and for a very, very long time into the future, the human world will only be able to take nation-states as the basic form of organization. “Even though we have all manner of international organizations; even though we have economic globalization and regional integration; and despite the fact nations can unite together in this way and that, even yielding a portion of their sovereignty, the nation-state—this fundamental thing—will not change.” “Speaking with regard to China’s own national conditions, it is even less likely to change.”

    61. Liaoning U’s Fang Guangshun also rejects solidarist Rationalism and Revolutionism

    62. Liaoning U’s Fang Guangshun also rejects solidarist Rationalism and Revolutionism “From ancient times to the present, throughout the history of human society, there has never appeared a single great united cultural formation. In fact, it has been just the opposite: Each kind of culture persistently expresses its distinctive nature, existing and developing in a setting of plurality.”

    63. Liaoning U’s Fang Guangshun also rejects solidarist Rationalism and Revolutionism “From ancient times to the present, throughout the history of human society, there has never appeared a single great united cultural formation. In fact, it has been just the opposite: Each kind of culture persistently expresses its distinctive nature, existing and developing in a setting of plurality.” “When the environment which the human race occupies changes, the plurality of cultures—just like the plurality of genes—serves as a potential resource for adjustment, adaptation, and change.”

    65. Cosmopolitan global civil society (GCS) is rejected as limited and flawed

    66. Cosmopolitan global civil society (GCS) is rejected as limited and flawed The Four Chief Weaknesses of GCS (Cai Tuo of Nankai University and Liu Zhenye of the Tianjin University of Commerce):

    67. Cosmopolitan global civil society (GCS) is rejected as limited and flawed The Four Chief Weaknesses of GCS (Cai Tuo of Nankai University and Liu Zhenye of the Tianjin University of Commerce): 1. GCS organizations can only become influential in issue-areas ignored by states. Once states decide to focus on an issue-area, they quickly brush GCS organizations aside.

    68. Cosmopolitan global civil society (GCS) is rejected as limited and flawed The Four Chief Weaknesses of GCS (Cai Tuo of Nankai University and Liu Zhenye of the Tianjin University of Commerce): 2. NGOs suffer from a legitimacy deficit in the world outside the West—something which cannot (generally) be said of states, many of which are legitimated effectively through nationalism.

    69. Cosmopolitan global civil society (GCS) is rejected as limited and flawed The Four Chief Weaknesses of GCS (Cai Tuo of Nankai University and Liu Zhenye of the Tianjin University of Commerce): 3. GCS activities are biased. Already “quite a few NGOs even go so far as to expend great energy to promote the interests of Western countries internationally,” especially in the realms of human rights and environmental politics.

    70. Cosmopolitan global civil society (GCS) is rejected as limited and flawed The Four Chief Weaknesses of GCS (Cai Tuo of Nankai University and Liu Zhenye of the Tianjin University of Commerce): 4. While GCS is in many ways a positive philanthropic force, it also includes among its ranks “anti-social elements that go against the tide” such as anti- globalization activists, terrorists, national extremists, criminal syndicates, and cults.

    71. Cosmopolitan global civil society (GCS) is rejected as limited and flawed The Four Chief Weaknesses of GCS (Cai Tuo of Nankai University and Liu Zhenye of the Tianjin University of Commerce): 4. (cont.) Restricting the activities of such groups— which have become “the chief sickness of GCS”—is the responsibility of states. GCS organizations cannot police themselves. They lack the capacity. Only states can perform this function.

    73. Boundaries: A think tank scholar (only) flirts with Revolutionism

    74. Boundaries: A think tank scholar (only) flirts with Revolutionism Three stages in the rise of a “harmonious world”:

    75. Boundaries: A think tank scholar (only) flirts with Revolutionism Three stages in the rise of a “harmonious world”: 1. Individual “harmonious countries” will band together to form “harmonious regions.” This is already happening in Northern Europe.

    76. Boundaries: A think tank scholar (only) flirts with Revolutionism Three stages in the rise of a “harmonious world”: 1. Individual “harmonious countries” will band together to form “harmonious regions.” This is already happening in Northern Europe. But it’s too soon to start happening in Asia, because there aren’t any harmonious countries there yet.

    77. Boundaries: A think tank scholar (only) flirts with Revolutionism Three stages in the rise of a “harmonious world”: 1. Individual “harmonious countries” will band together to form “harmonious regions.” This is already happening in Northern Europe. But it’s too soon to start happening in Asia, because there aren’t any harmonious countries there yet. Not even Japan is harmonious (too much sociopolitical conformity) nor is Singapore (insufficiently democratic).

    78. Boundaries: A think tank scholar (only) flirts with Revolutionism Three stages in the rise of a “harmonious world”: 1. Individual “harmonious countries” will band together to form “harmonious regions.” This is already happening in Northern Europe. But it’s too soon to start happening in Asia, because there aren’t any harmonious countries there yet. Not even Japan is harmonious (too much sociopolitical conformity) nor is Singapore (insufficiently democratic). China will make progress toward building a harmonious society by 2025, but won’t succeed before 2050.

    79. Boundaries: A think tank scholar (only) flirts with Revolutionism Three stages in the rise of a “harmonious world”: 2. Between 2025 and 2050, leading states will recognize that a new universally-valid shared norm has emerged: the norm that governance should be “people-based” (??). This means a focus on democracy, development, peace, and concern for others.

    80. Boundaries: A think tank scholar (only) flirts with Revolutionism Three stages in the rise of a “harmonious world”: 3. At some point after 2050, the world will move in the direction of “integration into a single unit” (???).

    81. Boundaries: A think tank scholar (only) flirts with Revolutionism Three stages in the rise of a “harmonious world”: 3. At some point after 2050, the world will move in the direction of “integration into a single unit” (???). Integration has already begun in the economic realm and will gradually “spill over” into politics. The trend is, moreover, “unavoidable and irreversible.” But it will take a very long time to complete the process: 100 years or more.

    82. Boundaries: A think tank scholar (only) flirts with Revolutionism Three stages in the rise of a “harmonious world”: 3. But then—whoa!—came SECOND THOUGHTS on the “unavoidable and irreversible” trend toward “integration into a single unit:”

    83. Boundaries: A think tank scholar (only) flirts with Revolutionism Three stages in the rise of a “harmonious world”: 3. But then—whoa!—came SECOND THOUGHTS on the “unavoidable and irreversible” trend toward “integration into a single unit:” A few minutes after making the prediction that political integration is inevitable, the scholar suddenly said:

    84. Boundaries: A think tank scholar (only) flirts with Revolutionism Three stages in the rise of a “harmonious world”: 3. But then—whoa!—came SECOND THOUGHTS on the “unavoidable and irreversible” trend toward “integration into a single unit:” A few minutes after making the prediction that political integration is inevitable, the scholar suddenly said: “Come to think of it, better not include that part, the part about the political integration.” When I reminded him that no interview subject would be named in publications, he laughed and said “well, then, it should be okay.”

    86. Conclusions and Implications

    87. Conclusions and Implications 1. There is no straight line between what Chinese political and academic elites say they expect the future to hold and what Chinese foreign policies will actually become. But there is a positive correlation.

    88. Conclusions and Implications 1. There is no straight line between what Chinese political and academic elites say they expect the future to hold and what Chinese foreign policies will actually become. But there is a positive correlation. 2. The turn toward Rationalist discourse after 2002 is at best unconsolidated and possibly just an act of public diplomacy. The fundamental Realist world view does not seem to have changed for most political and academic elites.

    89. Conclusions and Implications 1. There is no straight line between what Chinese political and academic elites say they expect the future to hold and what Chinese foreign policies will actually become. But there is a positive correlation. 2. The turn toward Rationalist discourse after 2002 is at best unconsolidated and possibly just an act of public diplomacy. The fundamental Realist world view does not seem to have changed for most political and academic elites. 3. Those Chinese thinkers who have genuinely embraced Rationalism stick to the pluralist end of the spectrum. They reject solidarism.

    90. Conclusions and Implications 1. There is no straight line between what Chinese political and academic elites say they expect the future to hold and what Chinese foreign policies will actually become. But there is a positive correlation. 2. The turn toward Rationalist discourse after 2002 is at best unconsolidated and possibly just an act of public diplomacy. The fundamental Realist world view does not seem to have changed for most political and academic elites. 3. Those Chinese thinkers who have genuinely embraced Rationalism stick to the pluralist end of the spectrum. They reject solidarism. 4. China’s continued integration into the global economy as well as international political, social, and even cultural orders should keep pulling thought in the direction of (even) solidarist Rationalism.

    91. Conclusions and Implications 1. There is no straight line between what Chinese political and academic elites say they expect the future to hold and what Chinese foreign policies will actually become. But there is a positive correlation. 2. The turn toward Rationalist discourse after 2002 is at best unconsolidated and possibly just an act of public diplomacy. The fundamental Realist world view does not seem to have changed for most political and academic elites. 3. Those Chinese thinkers who have genuinely embraced Rationalism stick to the pluralist end of the spectrum. They reject solidarism. 4. China’s continued integration into the global economy as well as international political, social, and even cultural orders should keep pulling thought in the direction of (even) solidarist Rationalism. 5. But there seems little to no prospect of abandoning the Realist core, let alone seriously engaging with the solidarism represented by the international society of democratic states, or the cosmopolitanism called for by global civil society.

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