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A Practical Secure Neighbor Verification Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks. Reza Shokri, Marcin Poturalski, Gael Ravot, Panos Papadimitratos, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux Laboratory for Computer Communications and Applications, EPFL, Switzerland

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slide1

A Practical Secure Neighbor Verification Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks

Reza Shokri, Marcin Poturalski,

Gael Ravot, Panos Papadimitratos, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux

Laboratory for Computer Communications and Applications,

EPFL, Switzerland

Second ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security (WiSec\'09) March 2009 Zurich, Switzerland

slide4

Wormhole Attack

False Links over the Wormhole

slide5

Neighbor Verification Protocol

Motivation

- The other proposed methods are not implementable on sensor networks (e.g., directional antennas) or are not secure enough considering the sensor networks’ limitations (e.g., tight time synchronization in nanosecond precision is required).

- Our goal is to propose a secure and practical protocol for WSN.

Our Main Idea

Local geometric consistency tests

Protocol Stages

  • Ranging
  • Exchanging the Neighbor Tables (include distance)
  • Neighbor Verification (security tests)
slide8

The Ranging Protocol

Fresh Random Nonce

A

B

C

tREQ/A

REQ

tREQ/B

slide9

The Ranging Protocol

A

B

C

tREQ/A

REQ

tREQ/B

tREP/B

REP

tREP/A

slide10

The Ranging Protocol

A

B

C

tREQ/A

REQ

tREQ/B

tREP/B

REP

tREP/A

tRNG/A

RNG

(Ultra)Sound

tRNG/B

slide11

The Ranging Protocol

A

B

C

tREQ/A

REQ

tREQ/B

tREP/B

REP

tREP/A

tRNG/A

RNG

(Ultra)Sound

tRNG/B

ACK

slide12

A

B

C

tREQ/A

tREQ/B

REQ

tREP/B

tREP/A

REP

tRNG/A

RNG

tRNG/B

(Ultra)Sound

ACK

The Ranging Protocol

Node B:

Empirical Synchronization Error

“Synchronization Test”

Speed of sound

slide13

B

>= dwb + dwb

A

dbc

>= dwb + dwb

C

The Ranging Protocol (Over Attack)

dwb

dwa

B

A

dwc

dbc

C

The adversary can change adjust the distance between nodes only by introducing different delay values while relaying RNG messages

slide14

Neighbor Table Exchange

C

D

E

F

B

G

A

Each node broadcasts its neighbor table to its direct neighbors.

Neighbor tables include distance between nodes.

We assume nodes are deployed on a plane. (it can be extended to 3D)

slide16

Neighbor Verification (Security Tests)

(1)

d(B->A) = d(A->B)

Link Symmetry Test

slide17

R

Neighbor Verification (Security Tests)

(1)

(2)

d(B->A) = d(A->B)

d(B->A) < R

Link Symmetry Test

Maximum Range Test

slide18

R

Neighbor Verification (Security Tests)

(1)

(2)

d(B->A) = d(A->B)

d(B->A) < R

Link Symmetry Test

Maximum Range Test

(3)

Quadrilateral Test

Each 4 neighbors that form a clique must belong to a quadrilateral.

(embedding graph on a plane)

slide19

R

Neighbor Verification (Security Tests)

(1)

(2)

d(B->A) = d(A->B)

d(B->A) < R

Link Symmetry Test

Maximum Range Test

(3)

(4)

Quadrilateral Test

Each 4 neighbors that form a clique must belong to a quadrilateral.

(embedding graph on a plane)

Quadrilateral Convexity Test

A link will be marked as verified link if it belongs to a convex quadrilateral.

slide21

Security Analysis

To successfully create a false link:

the attacker has to convince 4 nodes that form a convex quadrilateral

(2-2)

D

A

C

B

A

(3-1)

D

B

C

slide22

Security Analysis

(2-2)

D

A

C

B

D

A

A

D

B

C

C

B

Nodes’ perception (2)

Nodes’ perception (1)

We have proved that neither of these perceptions are possible.

Thus, 2-2 attack is impossible.

slide23

Security Analysis

A

(3-1)

D

B

C

A

Nodes’ perception

D

B

C

We have proved that the attack is possible only if:

A

D

B

C

slide24

Experimental Results

Settings

The ranging protocol has been implemented on Crossbow Cricket motes

slide25

Experimental Results

Settings

The ranging protocol has been implemented on Crossbow Cricket motes

Results

Time Synchronization Error: 99.55% below 5 microsecond

Distance Measurement Error: Below 5cm error (Range up to 4m)

Link Symmetry Error: 97% below 7cm (74% below 2cm)

slide26

Performance Evaluation in Benign Setting

Links have to satisfy the convex quadrilateral test to be verified by our protocol.

Yet, even in a benign setting, some links might not belong to any convex quadrilateral, and therefore remain unverifiable.

How percentage of true links can be verified?

slide27

Performance Evaluation in Benign Setting

Coverage

Uniform distribution of nodes in a field measuring 400m*400m

“R”: Transmission range = 100m

“e”: Maximum distance estimation error as percentage of R.

slide28

Conclusion

  • Neighbor Verification Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks
    • Based on estimation of node distance and simple, local tests
    • Practical solution, implemented on Cricket motes
    • Formal analysis and proof of correctness
    • Highly effective against powerful adversaries
    • Adding detection of adversary increases security (see tech-report)
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