A Practical Secure Neighbor Verification Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks
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A Practical Secure Neighbor Verification Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks. Reza Shokri, Marcin Poturalski, Gael Ravot, Panos Papadimitratos, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux Laboratory for Computer Communications and Applications, EPFL, Switzerland

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A Practical Secure Neighbor Verification Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks

Reza Shokri, Marcin Poturalski,

Gael Ravot, Panos Papadimitratos, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux

Laboratory for Computer Communications and Applications,

EPFL, Switzerland

Second ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security (WiSec'09) March 2009 Zurich, Switzerland


Wormhole Attack Wireless Sensor Networks


Wormhole Attack Wireless Sensor Networks

Wormhole


Wormhole Attack Wireless Sensor Networks

False Links over the Wormhole


Neighbor Verification Protocol Wireless Sensor Networks

Motivation

- The other proposed methods are not implementable on sensor networks (e.g., directional antennas) or are not secure enough considering the sensor networks’ limitations (e.g., tight time synchronization in nanosecond precision is required).

- Our goal is to propose a secure and practical protocol for WSN.

Our Main Idea

Local geometric consistency tests

Protocol Stages

  • Ranging

  • Exchanging the Neighbor Tables (include distance)

  • Neighbor Verification (security tests)


The Ranging Protocol Wireless Sensor Networks


The Ranging Protocol Wireless Sensor Networks

C

D

?

?

B

?

A


The Ranging Protocol Wireless Sensor Networks

Fresh Random Nonce

A

B

C

tREQ/A

REQ

tREQ/B


The Ranging Protocol Wireless Sensor Networks

A

B

C

tREQ/A

REQ

tREQ/B

tREP/B

REP

tREP/A


The Ranging Protocol Wireless Sensor Networks

A

B

C

tREQ/A

REQ

tREQ/B

tREP/B

REP

tREP/A

tRNG/A

RNG

(Ultra)Sound

tRNG/B


The Ranging Protocol Wireless Sensor Networks

A

B

C

tREQ/A

REQ

tREQ/B

tREP/B

REP

tREP/A

tRNG/A

RNG

(Ultra)Sound

tRNG/B

ACK


A Wireless Sensor Networks

B

C

tREQ/A

tREQ/B

REQ

tREP/B

tREP/A

REP

tRNG/A

RNG

tRNG/B

(Ultra)Sound

ACK

The Ranging Protocol

Node B:

Empirical Synchronization Error

“Synchronization Test”

Speed of sound


B Wireless Sensor Networks

>= dwb + dwb

A

dbc

>= dwb + dwb

C

The Ranging Protocol (Over Attack)

dwb

dwa

B

A

dwc

dbc

C

The adversary can change adjust the distance between nodes only by introducing different delay values while relaying RNG messages


Neighbor Table Exchange Wireless Sensor Networks

C

D

E

F

B

G

A

Each node broadcasts its neighbor table to its direct neighbors.

Neighbor tables include distance between nodes.

We assume nodes are deployed on a plane. (it can be extended to 3D)


Neighbor Verification (Security Tests) Wireless Sensor Networks


Neighbor Verification (Security Tests) Wireless Sensor Networks

(1)

d(B->A) = d(A->B)

Link Symmetry Test


R Wireless Sensor Networks

Neighbor Verification (Security Tests)

(1)

(2)

d(B->A) = d(A->B)

d(B->A) < R

Link Symmetry Test

Maximum Range Test


R Wireless Sensor Networks

Neighbor Verification (Security Tests)

(1)

(2)

d(B->A) = d(A->B)

d(B->A) < R

Link Symmetry Test

Maximum Range Test

(3)

Quadrilateral Test

Each 4 neighbors that form a clique must belong to a quadrilateral.

(embedding graph on a plane)


R Wireless Sensor Networks

Neighbor Verification (Security Tests)

(1)

(2)

d(B->A) = d(A->B)

d(B->A) < R

Link Symmetry Test

Maximum Range Test

(3)

(4)

Quadrilateral Test

Each 4 neighbors that form a clique must belong to a quadrilateral.

(embedding graph on a plane)

Quadrilateral Convexity Test

A link will be marked as verified link if it belongs to a convex quadrilateral.


Security Analysis Wireless Sensor Networks


Security Analysis Wireless Sensor Networks

To successfully create a false link:

the attacker has to convince 4 nodes that form a convex quadrilateral

(2-2)

D

A

C

B

A

(3-1)

D

B

C


Security Analysis Wireless Sensor Networks

(2-2)

D

A

C

B

D

A

A

D

B

C

C

B

Nodes’ perception (2)

Nodes’ perception (1)

We have proved that neither of these perceptions are possible.

Thus, 2-2 attack is impossible.


Security Analysis Wireless Sensor Networks

A

(3-1)

D

B

C

A

Nodes’ perception

D

B

C

We have proved that the attack is possible only if:

A

D

B

C


Experimental Results Wireless Sensor Networks

Settings

The ranging protocol has been implemented on Crossbow Cricket motes


Experimental Results Wireless Sensor Networks

Settings

The ranging protocol has been implemented on Crossbow Cricket motes

Results

Time Synchronization Error: 99.55% below 5 microsecond

Distance Measurement Error: Below 5cm error (Range up to 4m)

Link Symmetry Error: 97% below 7cm (74% below 2cm)


Performance Evaluation in Benign Setting Wireless Sensor Networks

Links have to satisfy the convex quadrilateral test to be verified by our protocol.

Yet, even in a benign setting, some links might not belong to any convex quadrilateral, and therefore remain unverifiable.

How percentage of true links can be verified?


Performance Evaluation in Benign Setting Wireless Sensor Networks

Coverage

Uniform distribution of nodes in a field measuring 400m*400m

“R”: Transmission range = 100m

“e”: Maximum distance estimation error as percentage of R.


Conclusion Wireless Sensor Networks

  • Neighbor Verification Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks

    • Based on estimation of node distance and simple, local tests

    • Practical solution, implemented on Cricket motes

    • Formal analysis and proof of correctness

    • Highly effective against powerful adversaries

    • Adding detection of adversary increases security (see tech-report)


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