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QPS R2E Mitigation and Consolidation Strategies for LS1

QPS R2E Mitigation and Consolidation Strategies for LS1. R. Denz, TE-MPE-EP Acknowledgements: present and past QPS teams & supporters, R2E community. Outline. Introduction QPS – protection of superconducting elements in the LHC Protection strategies

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QPS R2E Mitigation and Consolidation Strategies for LS1

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  1. QPS R2E Mitigation and Consolidation Strategies for LS1 R. Denz, TE-MPE-EP Acknowledgements: present and past QPS teams & supporters, R2E community

  2. Outline • Introduction • QPS – protection of superconducting elements in the LHC • Protection strategies • Radiation induced faults in 2012 (latest news) • Mitigation and consolidation measures • Relocation of equipment • DAQ systems & field-bus couplers • DSP bases systems (fast digital detection systems) • High precision systems • Summary

  3. Introduction – a short reminder … • Due to functional requirements a significant amount of QPS and EE equipment is exposed to radiation during LHC operation • Radiation load depends on location and LHC exploitation • QPS and EE equipment locations • LHC tunnel • Main magnet protection, nQPS, some 13kA EE systems (e.g. point 3) • Partly shielded areas (RR13,17,53,57,73,77, UJ14, 16, 56) • IPQ, IPD, IT, 600 A protection, EE 600 A, EE 13 kA • Protected areas (UA23, 27, 43, 47, 63, 67, 83, 87, UJ33) • IPQ, IPD, IT, 600 A protection, EE 600 A, EE 13 kA • LHC exploitation and expected radiation load • t < LS1: radiation load still below design levels but effects noticeable • LS1 < t < LS2: radiation load at design levels  preparation has to start now • t > LS2: radiation load above design levels • … left to the reader as a homework ;-)) Relocation during LS1 LS1 < t < LS2 / T < LS1 ≈ 10

  4. QPS - protection of superconducting elements in the LHC • The dependability of the system is critical for LHC performance. • Due to the mere size of the system, reliability, availability and maintainability are a major challenge. • Mitigation and consolidation measures are normally not straightforward to implement.

  5. QPS protection strategies - overview • Main circuits (main dipoles and quads) • Analog & digital quench detection systems for main magnets, quench heaters, cold by-pass diodes and energy extraction systems • Dedicated bus-bar splice protection • Insertion region magnets, inner triplets and corresponding bus-bars • Global protection of magnet and bus-bar by digital quench detector, quench heaters • Correctors magnet circuits • Global protection of magnet and bus-bar by digital quench detector • Energy extraction systems where necessary • HTS hybrid current leads (all type of circuits and ratings) • Individual protection by digital protection system • Supervision • Field-bus based data acquisition systems

  6. Radiation induced faults • Fault analysis has to be done very carefully as not all problems are related to radiation • Equipment faults, EMC, bad connections, circuit breakers, real triggers (very rare but not excluded) • In addition there remain some doubtful cases where the exact cause of the trip cannot be determined easily • E.g. dedicated test in CNRAD on fast radiation induced transients in PhotoMOS devices • Radiation induced faults are responsible for most of the QPS triggers in stable beam conditions • So far only non-destructive errors have been observed. • Confirmed radiation induced faults are transmitted regularly to the R2E project to be included in their statistics • Radiation to electronics related problems are discussed as well in the RADWG

  7. Radiation induced fault statistics 2012 • ΣSEU_2012 / ΣSEU_2011 = 0.37 • SEU_DUMP_2011 = 3.5 / [fb-1]; SEU_DUMP_2012 = 1.6 / [fb-1] RADTOL Detection Systems!

  8. Radiation induced fault statistics 2012 – arc distribution

  9. Mitigation and consolidation measures – relocation • Relocation of equipment into protected area is the preferred solution for R2E consolidation • Solves the cause of the problem; gives a lot of flexibility for existing and future designs • With modern electronics very long instrumentation cables may become acceptable eventually in combination with deported (analog and digital) I/O • During LS1 all QPS equipment currently installed in UJ14, UJ16 and UJ56 will be re-located to protected areas • In 2012 so far 9/23 beam dumps out of SB conditions were provoked by equipment installed in these areas! • IT protection no longer required to be radiation tolerant; this is very important with respect to future upgrades of the triplets implicating more sophisticated protection equipment (Nb3Sn) • Relocation as a consolidation measure needs to be further studied for LHC operation a after LS2 • Dedicated manpower e.g. a thésard wishful …

  10. Mitigation and consolidation measures – DAQ systems • Notorious “ISO150” problem causing permanenttrigger on DAQ systems type DQAMCMB and DQAMCMQ (main magnet protection) • Firmware upgrade for DQAMCMB and DQAMCMQ as first mitigation measure • Deployment concluded in 2011  significant reduction in down time • Includes a few other upgrades to simplify operation • 103/103 transparent in 2012, 91/116 in 2011! • Change from level to falling edge trigger • Prevents DAQ system from stalling and avoids access • Fault indicated by a status flag (ST_DQAMC_BUS) not part of the QPS_OK signal • Add secondary software trigger to keep post mortem functionality • Trigger associated to U_HDS_1 signal (< 800 V) • Full consolidation requires new hardware design replacing incriminated chip and optimized routing of trigger signal • Done within spare part production  200 boards delivered recently • Type tests finished, 2 systems already deployed in LHC (no problem so far)

  11. Mitigation and consolidation measures – field-bus coupler • Loss of fieldbus communication of DAQ systems type DQAMC • Failure of the fieldbus coupler chip (MicroFip™) • 7 cases in 2011, 6 in 2012 so far observed • Radiation tests performed by QPS in CNRAD 2009 and 2010 showed this kind of problem with both versions of the chip • Fault state can be cured by a power cycle, an auto power cycle option has been already successfully tested in CNRAD 2009, 2011, 2012

  12. Mitigation and consolidation measures – field-bus coupler II • Recent investigations show that an auto power cycle option could be added to the installed devices without destructive interventions • Microcontroller detects absence of fieldbus communication and reboots • Similar approach already implemented for nQPS remote power cycle • Additional circuit could be attached on the existing connector used for the programming of the device • Type tests to be completed and prototypes to be built • Field tests still possible in 2012/13 • Implementation of the “Magic Token” on selected boards as well to be studied

  13. Mitigation and consolidation measures – field-bus coupler III • On the long term all MicroFip™ based devices need to be replaced as this chip will no longer be produced • In general discontinued electronic components become more an more a problem for the maintenance of QPS systems • In case of the MicroFip™ the CERN wide solution for replacement is the in house developed NanoFip chip • NanoFip is a FLASH FPGA based implementation of the fieldbus protocol • FPGA type already in use by QPS ( symmetric quench detection) • No problems so far in LHC confirming the good radiation test results • Unfortunately the new chip is “nano-compatible” in software and hardware to the old version • 1st QPS hardware prototype available but further development postponed due to lack of manpower • QPS fieldbus network to be reconfigured in order to allow smooth transition, i.e. not to be forced to update all devices in one go • First deployment foreseen for QPS during LS1 in the DS areas?

  14. Mitigation and consolidation measures – DSP based systems • The TI TMS320C6211™ based general purpose detection board has been developed for the protection of insertion region magnets, inner triplets and corrector magnet circuits. • The design is not radiation tolerant as not required at the time of the development • The DSP based approach turned out to be crucial for the commissioning of the corrector magnet circuits • On target development, flexibility, fast firmware development cycles • A part the inherent sensibility to radiation induced faults, the performance of the system is excellent with respect to reliability and availability • The high dynamic range of the current reading requires a fast high resolution ADC (not available at beginning of the century …) or a complex digital to analog feedback loop • Future devices will use fast high resolution 24 bit ∑Δ ADCs • The DSP based boards will be replaced by FPGA based radiation tolerant systems (Jens will give you all the details) • The task has been accomplished for the insertion region magnets and inner triplets  field test on RQ6.R1 during TS#3 and run afterwards. • The algorithm for the 600 A protection is currently ported to an FPGA in the framework of a radiation tolerant design  not so easy piece of work

  15. Mitigation and consolidation measures – 600 A protection • The big advantage of the concept is that it only requires the lead instrumentation • Only reasonable solution for circuits with large family size; to be avoided for single magnets • Most complex detection system used by QPS • Very tedious commissioning; still some open issues e.g. tune feedback compatibility at higher energy • Algorithm is currently ported to an FPGA in the framework of a radiation tolerant design  not so easy piece of work • Higher thresholds will make this task easier  (wish)list of circuits sent to GURU(s) • Type tests mustbe completed prior to LS1 and a field test during the powering tests in February must be performed. • As an additional / alternative measure the change of evaluation logic is still possible (1 && 1) || (1 && 1) instead of (1 || 1). More equipment to be installed DQGPU type A to be revised but otherwise almost transparent.

  16. Mitigation and consolidation measures – high precision digital protection systems (nQPS splice protection and HTS lead protection) • Firmware upgrade • Triplication of digital filters and other modifications • Expected to cure a significant amount but not all faults (seems to work …) • Partial deployment in half cells 8 to 11 around IP1, 2, 5, and 8 for splice protection • Hardware upgrade (required for some hot zones only) • Technology evaluated – two possible options • FPGA based version using high resolution ADC • ADS1281 results promising • Standard technology with optimised firmware and modified evaluation logic • Using four instead of two redundant processors and majority voting • (1 && 1) || (1 && 1) • Implementation study showing feasibility completed • Design in 2012  installation in hot zones during LS1 • Radiation levels measured by R2E (J. Mekki) during the 2012 run in half cells like 11L1, 9R5, 8R5 indicate that this hardware upgrade will become necessary during LS1 in DS areas around point 1, 5, and probably 7

  17. New devices to be implemented during LS1 • For new devices the radiation tolerance is taken into account according to the required levels • The new devices developed by the EE section follow the same strategy • Radiation tolerance normally inherited from previous projects

  18. Summary I • During the LHC exploitation in 2010, 2011 and 2012 the protection system for superconducting circuits of the LHC demonstrated its reliability and capability to ensure the integrity of the protected superconducting elements. • None of the observed faults caused a total loss of magnet and/or circuit protection. • Redundancy of the protection systems is essential • While there were no magnet quenches above injection current so far there were some real triggers of current lead protection systems. • The system availability has been significantly improved over the last years; the outstanding problems are in most case related to radiation induced faults. • While most of the radiation induced faults are transparent to LHC operation, the number of beam dumps caused by spurious triggers is an issue. • Mitigation and consolidation measures applied so far allowed to keep the fault rate reasonable despite increasing luminosity • TCLs, additional shielding, firmware upgrades

  19. Summary II • The main problem are the DSP based quench detectors originally developed for radiation free areas • Consolidation work has been launched already in 2008 • The symmetric quench detection board is the first result of these efforts • Fully satisfying performance during LHC operation • During the upcoming stop of the LHC in 2013/2014 the system upgrades will focus on: • Completion of radiation to electronics consolidation • Enhanced supervision capabilities, especially for the quench heater circuits of the main dipoles • Full implementation of the redundant UPS powering scheme • Present mitigation & consolidation measures concern the LHC run up to LS2; operation after LS2 will be a different story and require definitively more effort

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