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Ex-post analysis of the blackout on October 26 2012 in Brazil

Ex-post analysis of the blackout on October 26 2012 in Brazil. CAMS /RRPA Panel Session Mitigation and Prevention of Cascading Outages: Methodologies and Practical Applications PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013 Jorge Jardim jorge.jardim@hppa.com.br. OUTLINE.

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Ex-post analysis of the blackout on October 26 2012 in Brazil

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  1. Ex-post analysis of the blackout on October 26 2012 in Brazil CAMS/RRPA Panel Session Mitigation and Prevention of Cascading Outages: Methodologies and Practical Applications PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013 Jorge Jardim jorge.jardim@hppa.com.br

  2. OUTLINE 1. The impact of the blackout on 10/26/2012 in Brazil 2. Summary of sequence of events 3. Root causes and recommendations for system planning and operations IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  3. Impact of October 26, 2012 blackout in Brazil lAffected area • About 50 million people affected. • 11.5 GW of load shed • 6 hours to fully restore all loads. • Average load interruption time: 3 hours. • Brazil peak load: 74 GW. • Affected area peak load: 12 GW. IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  4. Sequence of events • Phase-to-phase fault on disconnects of a series capacitor at Colinas. (one disconnect opened due to melting of its contacts.) • Main line protection refuses to operate. IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  5. Sequence of events • Some(2/3 to N, 2/3 to SE,1/2 to NE) backup protection (second zone) of adjacent lines operated. Consequently, the fault was not cleared. • The sustained fault caused instability and operation of out-of-step relays. • Fault fed by Northeast for 2.5 s, by North for 3.5s, and by Southeast for 12s. IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  6. Sequence of events (after separation) • The North region was importing approximately 2.4 GW. The frequency went down to 49.8 Hz, but recovered with help of all load shedding stages. • The Northeast region was importing approximately 2.6 GW. The frequency went down to 55,9 Hz. Despite the operation of all load shedding stages the frequency was not able to recover and the region blacked out. A key factor for this was the lost of thermal power plants due to underfrequency. IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  7. PMU Frequency Records Southeast/Center Northeast North Time IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  8. Recommendations and key conclusions • Fix defective protection system, of course. • Need of standard procedures for protection system certification. • Need of reviewing underfrequency protection settings. • Need to review maintenance procedures. • Review of all SPS settings, applicability, interoperability and redundancy. • Review of some of the restoration procedures. IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

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