PKI in Higher Education: Dartmouth PKI Lab Update

1. PKI in Higher Education:Dartmouth PKI Lab Update Internet2 Virtual Meeting 5 October 2001

2. Researchers • Dartmouth College Computer Science • Institute for Security and Technology Studies • Dartmouth College Computing Services • David Nicol, Sean Smith: CS/ISTS • Ed Feustel: ISTS • Robert Brentrup, Larry Levine: Computing Services • Yasir Ali, Alex Iliev, John Marchesini, Eileen Ye: CS Students • Shan Jiang, Evan Knop: Alumni • Lab Created 4Q2000 Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

3. Dartmouth PKI Lab Objectives • Exploring how to effectively use public-key cryptography to build trusted information services in the real world. • Enable effective trust judgements, in systems that are heterogeneous on every level. • In users, roles, computer hardware and software, organizations, administrative domains, application contexts • What are the appropriate pieces of information for trust judgments in different contexts at different times? Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

4. End to End Approach • Server • How do we establish foundation for this trust, when computation is vulnerable to insider attack? • Client • How can user tools enable effective trust judgments? • Infrastructure • How do we deploy and manage the certificates, keys, etc., that enables this trust communication • Applications • How can applications engage in PKI-based trust judgments? Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

5. Status, October 2001 • Server • Trusted Third Parties, immune to insider attack • Private Information Retrieval (PIR) • Armored Vault • WebALPS • Client • Web/SSL/Certificate Spoofing • Requirements for Secure Web Client Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

6. Status, October 2001 • Infrastructure • Setup COTS, open-source testbeds. LDAP • Campus PKI planning • PKI/Lite: Web Authn/Authz & S/MIME • S/MIME Private Key Server • Applications • Hardened Box Office • Web Application authentication/authorizatiolocal replacement • Voting (demo of WebAlps) Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

7. Private Information Retrieval • Protecting query privacy from insider attack • Server that efficiently provides material to authorized users… • …so that the server operator learns nothing, not even statistics! • Domains with sensitive data • Health information, expensive research data Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

8. Armored Vault • Protecting archived private material from insider attack • Prove to stakeholders that policy is followed • Prototype domain: network data • Archive is encrypted and bound to policy • Built with Snort and IBM 4758-2 Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

9. WebALPS • Protecting SSL Web Servers from insider attack • SSL doesn’t help if armored pipe to cardboard box! • Move server end of SSL into securer co-processor • Built from Apache, OpenSSL and IBM 4758-2 Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

10. Hardened Box Office • Protect operator from liability • Campus agents want to sell tickets, etc. online • Server operator wants to minimize risk of exposing private customer data • Uses WebALPS hardened server • Internal application catches customer data, then signs and encrypts for entity and e-mails it Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

11. S/MIME Private Key Server • Protecting user private keys from insider attack and provides mobility • Problem: Web based e-mail offers client mobility… • … but adding PKI requires trusting the server with the private keys • Solution: uses WebALPS- hardened server • Generates, certifies, stores user keys… • … and applies them only when authorized by user • Neither bribery nor subpoena reveals the user keys! Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

12. Client: Good Trust Judgements? • Web/SSL provides server identity, not attributes • URL? • Location bar information • SSL Icon? • SSL warning window? • Certificate information? • Status bar • www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pkilab/demos/spoofing/ Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

13. Client Research Questions • Should attributes attest to name of server, or content offered? • What are semantics of “independent windows”? • Who is really providing this service? • Which certificate is being used? Why? • What information does the server acquire about the user? • Requirements for “better” browser Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

14. Infrastructure • Developing Familiarity with tools for application development • Defining strategies to setup and administer institution scale PKI environment • Interactions with Central LDAP directory • Tools to support Research projects • Compatibility testing of PKI vendors and client applications • Studies of end-user behavior, eg. Why passwords are shared • Research goal: real applications, solving real problems! Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

15. Futures • PKI more than X.509 • SDSI/SPKI. PGP, XML... • Trust Judgment in Applications • Rights Management, expressions of policy • Critical Mass, academic community as prototype lab Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI

16. For More Information • www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pkilab • Sean Smith • sws@cs.dartmouth.edu • Ed Feustel • efeustel@ists.dartmouth.edu • Robert Brentrup • Robert.J.Brentrup@dartmouth.edu Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI