On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace

1. On the Origins of Warand the Preservation of Peace World War 2 The Fall of the Weimar Republic and the Policy of Appeasement

2. Effects Of The Great Depression • U.S. set up tariffs & recalled loans • Deemed necessary because of financial collapse • These devastated Germans • Gave new strength to Communists & Nazis in Germany • Fought one another in the streets • Republic seemed unable to govern • German Army leaders kept distance in governing • Tried to use influence through politicians • Push for a cabinet in favor of military & use authority of President Hindenburg • Heinrich Brüning becomes chancellor - 1930

3. Brüning as Chancellor • Goal - Restoring Germany to power and political independence • Even at cost of suffering of people in pursuit of goal • Calls for 1930 elections hoping to get Reichstag favorable to his policies – a political misjudgment • Comms and Nazis increase seats • Brüning viewed by U.S. & Britain as a force of moderation • But he used opposition at home – even welcomed it – as a leverage point in foreign policy • Foreign powers should grant concessions to Germany or deal with extremists later

4. Brüning • Poor economy fed move to extremes • Growth of Nazis helped convince Western powers to make concessions on reparations, etc. • Contrary to belief that this occurred only when the Nazis were in power • Was appeasement a policy of the West regardless of who was in pwr in Germany? • Military leaders sought most effective force possible with intention “to use war as an instrument of policy” • Would need a chancellor who would achieve those goals – in some way ending restrictions of Versailles

5. Kagan on German Foreign Policy • “Well before Hitler came to power, therefore, Germany had thrown off some of the most crucial restraints imposed by the Versailles Treaty: occupation of the Rhineland, reparations, and disarmament. When rearmament had been achieved it would be far more difficult to prevent the rejection of what remained.” • Britain & US believed Germany learned lesson after WWI & wanted only disarmament of others for sake of GER security • Germans did not want war & had no significant military power

6. What could be done? • France could not act alone because of treaty obligations • US disinclined to become involved because of Depression • What about Britain? • Memories of WWI • Weakness of British economy & greater demand for social services • Increased imperial responsibilities • Idealism of making peace • Faith placed in LoN • All of these strengthened forces in Britain who favored disarmament, uninvolvement, and appeasement

7. Interwar Revisionism • Interwar revisionist histories of WWI depicted Germany in a different light • War started by accident, not by German aggression • Negotiating machinery would prevent this from happening again • OR • Armament manufacturers & capitalism led to war • Responsibility of peacemakers to prevent these things from leading to future war • Thus policies were geared toward disarmament and conciliation with Germany

8. Britain’s Military • Labour government of 1929-31 focused in “peace, freedom and justice” • Eliminate root causes of previous war • Renounce war as an instrument of policy • Place faith in disarmament & LoN • Even at cost of strength of Royal Navy – Britain’s ultimate line of defense • Scaled back Royal Navy even in face of growing evidence of Japanese expansionism • British military Chiefs of Staff warned that their entire military was unprepared in case of war • British evaluation of Japanese invasion of Manchuria revealed lack of desire to “further provoke” Japan • Japan not even labeled as an aggressor

9. The Rising Menace of Japan • Japanese actions revealed British weakness • Would not be able to protect interest in Asia – let alone actually fight Japan • U.S. Stimson Doctrine – U.S. would not recognize treaties between China & Japan if they violated American treaty rights, impaired Chinese sovereignty or gained territory by force • This showed a lack of will by U.S. to use force & meant that Britain would be on her own • Sir Robert Vansittart (Undersec. Of Foreign Office) – Britain would be “done for in the Far East” unless U.S. prepared to use force

10. Hitler in Power – 1/30/1933 • People in Germany thought Hitler could be controlled but he maneuvered himself into a dictatorship • Western Govts’ assessment – Hitler really no different from previous German leaders • Misjudgment – failed to pay attention to Hitler’s own professed goals and policies as stated in speeches & Mein Kampf • One core goal – Lebensraum – land for expansion of Aryan Race • Land would come from East but would need to defeat France to clear the way for victory in Russia • Hitler hoped for alliance with Britain – he admired them • Also hoped for alliance with Mussolini – in part b/c of admiration but also for strategic value against FR • While most disagreed with some part of Hitler’s agenda, most could find some reason to rally around him in the beginning • Focused in first few years on solidifying control at home

11. Hitler’s Maneuvers • Would test the reactions by the democratic Western states while preparing for rearmament • Called for Britain & France to disarm down to German level at arms conference in Geneva – knew that GB & FR would refuse • Gave him excuse to pull out of conference & withdraw from LoN in Oct. of 1933 • Promised to abide by previous agreements if Germany were treated equally • British believed that if Hitler were handled carefully he would return to conference & the LoN • Hitler removed GER entirely from disarmament process while Britain held out hope that he could be conciliated

12. Appeasement & Avoidance • 1935 – Hitler begins announcing rearmament, military conscription • Ramsay MacDonald (GB), Pierre Laval (FR), and Mussolini met in Stresa, IT – denounced Hitler’s actions • The “Stresa Front” • They would stand together in face of future violations of TofV– Mussolini intentionally added IN EUROPE • Leaves him clear to conquer Ethiopia (Abyssinia) later • British agreement to negotiate a naval treaty with Germany without approval of other powers destroyed the “Stresa Front” and shook confidence of the French in Britain

13. The Abyssinian Crisis – 1934-35 • Mussolini looking to restore Roman imperial glory and avenge defeat of Italy in Battle of Adowa (1896) by Abyssinia • Also distract Italian people from economic troubles of Fascist regime • Italy used excuse of skirmish between Ethiopian & Italian troops to act • Diplomatic moves in the intl. community were ineffective • Laval (FR) & Mussolini – Franco-Italian Agreement 1/35 • Italy given free hand w/ Ethiopia in exchange for Italian support against German aggression in Europe • Ethiopian leader HaileSelassie appealed to LoN • Ultimately the LoN did nothing but threaten sanctions

14. Abyssinian Crisis • Britain concerned about inadequacy of its own ability to fight Italy • Therefore tread lightly in confronting Italy • Italians began build-up of troops in her neighboring colonies – transporting them through Suez Canal • Britain refused to close canal or place embargo on oil to Italy • Did not want to provoke Italy & chose to focus on the German situation in Europe • GB Foreign Sec. Samuel Hoare & Laval secretly made deal with Mussolini to grant Ethiopian land to IT in return for end of war • Causes outcry against rewarding aggression that ends with resignation of Hoare & Laval

15. Outcome of Abyssinian Crisis • By May 1936 – Selassie fled to London & Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa fell – Italy wins • Collective security dead as an ideal – LoN a joke • Britain’s prestige damaged • Italy alienated & eventually joins with Hitler • Gives further courage to aggressors • British fears of Italian strength unfounded • According to Kagan – had Britain taken action, it may prompted others (FR) to follow their lead • If no others followed – still no reason to fear the outcome • Closing the Suez would have worked – Hitler knew that • Emboldens Hitler to move on Rhineland

16. Remilitarization of the Rhineland • Clear violation of TofV and Locarno • Demilitarized Rhineland the heart of defense of FR • Created by TofV to protect FR & countries • Opened Germany to attack from West • A guarantee for Central & Eastern Europe because Germany would face two-front war • Well-being of FR relied on credibility of threat • Hitler needed rearmament to further his plans • Distraction of Abyssinian affair, friction among Stresa Front powers, and hesitation & weakness of FR & GB allowed him to act

17. French Response • In spite of political & military intelligence – no prepared plan to respond • Unlike pre-WWI offensive mindset (Elan) – FR developed a “cult of defensiveness” • Symbolized by Maginot Line • Hitler’s excuse - Franco-Soviet Pact 1935 • Mutual assistance agreement against German aggression • Hitler called it a violation of Locarno treaty that nullified demilitarization of Rhineland • In event of such an act, French had no intention beyond appealing to the League • Meant that France considered violation nonflagrant • Unilateral countermeasures not justified

18. British Response • Prior to Hitler’s move into the Rhineland & armed with forewarning – Anthony Eden preferred negotiation • Urged FR “not to make the situation more difficult” • But Hitler moved before Rhineland was used as a bargaining chip • Hitler’s assurances of no further territorial demands positively received • British mood – “Anything to keep us out of war” • Public opinion – Germany had right to do what it wanted with its own land • Kagan – British people did not understand strategic significance of what had happened

19. The Reality • French overestimated German force • General Gamelin claimed 265,000 Germans • Actually only 22K troops and 14K local police • Combined French & Belgian forces far greater than Germans • Western powers had advantage at sea • Luftwaffe not yet strong • Czechs and Rumanians pledged help & Poland offered to activate alliance with FR • If France had moved & all promises of help were kept – Germany would have faced overwhelming odds

20. A Display of Weakness Emboldens Hitler • Hitler was convinced France would not attack without British help • And that Britain would not fight to save Austria or Czechoslovakia • Germany had unfettered access to its industrial resources • French inaction led Belgium to break off alliance with FR & move to neutrality • Maginot Line stopped at the Franco-Belgian border – a large gap in French security • Rhineland event also helped persuade Mussolini to enter into the Rome-Berlin Axis (10/1936) • Further weakens France & removes Italian protection from Austria • Kagan – “The great misfortune of the Western powers was that they lacked the leaders at this moment of crisis wise enough to understand the situation and strong enough to move against the current.”

21. The Axis Powers • Italy & Germany drew closer together during Abyssinian Crisis – occupation of Rhineland diverted Western attention • Spanish Civil War – both Italy & Germany assisted Fascist dictator Francisco Franco • War provided Mussolini with chance to flex Italian muscles • Provided Hitler with potential economic advantages and a diversion of attention from Austria • Declaration of common interests in foreign policy known as the Rome-Berlin Axis • When Germany signs Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan and Italy signs on a year later – the three leave the League of Nations and stand united as the Axis Powers