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The Vote of Confidence

The Vote of Confidence. The executive is responsible to the legislature in parliamentary systems Exceptions: France: PM also responsible to the President Switzerland: The executive can not be removed All other: The Cabinet needs the Legislature’s support . The Vote of Confidence.

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The Vote of Confidence

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  1. The Vote of Confidence • The executive is responsible to the legislature in parliamentary systems • Exceptions: • France: PM also responsible to the President • Switzerland: The executive can not be removed • All other: The Cabinet needs the Legislature’s support

  2. The Vote of Confidence • When does the Cabinet need the support of the legislature? • During formation • Investiture Vote • If challenged • Vote of no-confidence • Figure 4.1 – Lifecycle of government

  3. The Lifecycle • Various types of rules/institutions exist • Role of Head of State • Formal Investiture Vote • Resignation after a loss of Vote of No-Confidence • Cabinet’s ability to dissolve the Legislature • The Legislature’s ability to dissolve itself • Maximum time between elections

  4. ‘Votes of Confidence’ • A formal Investiture Vote is not required everywhere • A Vote of No-Confidence always exists (except Switzerland) • A loss on a normal vote is not fatal • Often, however, followed by a confidence vote

  5. ‘Votes of Confidence’ • The Vote of Confidence is a double edged sword • Allows the legislature to remove cabinet • Allows the cabinet to raise the stakes of the legislative game • Fianna Fail minority cabinet in 1998 • Haughey (PM or Taoiseach) threatens to resign if the legislature rejects the cabinet’s proposal • Role of threat and popularity • Elsewhere, e.g., in France, formal procedures exist

  6. Viable & Effective Government • The ability to win votes of no confidence is crucial • Viable governments/cabinets • The ability to win other votes is also important • Effective governments/cabinets • A cabinet may be viable but not effective

  7. Viable vs. Effective • Politically it is unlikely to observe a viable but ineffective cabinet • Electoral costs of ineffectiveness • What determines viability? • Legislative support • Cabinet parties – role of cohesion • Non-cabinet parties - ? • Cabinet vs. legislative coalitions • A party in legislative coalition but not cabinet coalition is called a ‘support party’

  8. Viable vs. Effective Cabinets • Sometimes non-cabinet parties abstain • What does abstaining mean? • Parties/legislators can vote for, against or abstain. • Only two outcomes are possible • When an absolute majority is required, abstaining has the same effect as voting for.

  9. Legislative vs. Cabinet Coalitions • Legislative and Cabinet Coalition may differ in composition • The only ‘need to coincide’ on votes of confidence • A focus on cabinet coalitions downplays the importance of the legislature • Threats of votes of no-confidence, committee influence, etc.

  10. Legislative vs. Cabinet Coalitions • Equating ‘winning’ with a legislative majority • Minimal winning coalitions • Policy motivation – public goods production • Implications for minority & surplus cabinets • Minority cabinets can be viable • If parties are policy motivated

  11. Viable Minority Cabinets • Minority cabinets are quite frequent • 33% of all cabinets • 37% of all cabinets when no cabinet holds a majority • Only 42% are minimal winning • Differences across countries • Sweden, Denmark, Norway – Minority • Finland, Italy - Surplus

  12. Viable Minority Cabinets • Minority cabinets as deviations • Waiting for a new majority (caretaker) • ‘Immobilisme’ thesis • Almost a majority • The ‘Almost a majority’ explanation accounts for many coalitions • But why? • Office seeking politicians will never tolerate a minority cabinet

  13. Viable Minority Cabinets • Policy-Seeking and Minority Cabinets • Policy benefits both parties in and out of cabinet • Parties out of cabinet may support cabinet if it favors the cabinet’s policies • How much better of is the party if in the cabinet • Opportunities to influence policy in opposition • Cost of governing • Long term goals (waiting for defeat)

  14. Viable Minority Cabinets • Oppositional influence • Extra-governmental institutions • Legislative structures and norms (Strom) • Helps account for Scandinavian countries, France, Italy • Does not help explain Belgium, Iceland Portugal

  15. Viable Minority Cabinets • Luebbert: Party leaders want to remain party leaders • Consensual vs. Unconsolidated Systems • Consensual -> Corporatism • Under Corporatism policy is made, to a greater degree, outside the legislature • Allows party leaders to take firm stands on policy but stay outside the policy bargaining • Explains Scandinavia but fails in Austria (corporatist but no minority coalitions)

  16. Viable Minority Cabinets • An alternative approach: • Focus on policy-viable coalitions • Policy-viable coalitions are preferred to other potential coalitions because of their policy preferences Socialist 40 Center 20 Conservative 40

  17. Viable Minority Cabinets • Italy • Christian Democrats • Hold a sizeable share of the legislative seats • ‘Centrally’ located in the policy spectrum • Single-party minority DC cabinets ruled Italy for much of the period

  18. Surplus Majority Cabinets • Office-seekers -> no extra parties • Surplus coalitions almost as common as minority coalitions • Finland, Italy, the Netherlands • Some reasons • Constitutional amendments • Low party discipline/cohesion • Are they surplus?

  19. Surplus Majority Cabinets • Some (bad) explanations: • Governments of national unity • Often called form, rarely form • The Italian pentapartito cabinets • Formed in 1981 • Surplus – three non-essential parties • Yet coalition form, fell, formed again (.. & again…)

  20. Surplus Majority Cabinets • How do we then explain surplus cabinets? • Role of policy: • In the Italian pentapartito, the smaller parties are located, ideologically, between the larger coalition parties • Luebbert: More likely in ‘dominant party systems’ • Dominant party’s attempt to lessen the ‘blackmail potential’ of minor parties • Depends on rules about cabinet resignation (influences costs)

  21. Surplus Majority Cabinets • Luebbert (cont.) • What is a dominant party? • In terms of votes, no minority party is • We have to look to policy to clarify the idea of a dominant party • Basically, a party located in the center of the policy space • Basically the same argument as for the existence of minority cabinets! • Italy & Finland fit the bill

  22. Summary • The vote of confidence – the link between the executive and the legislature • Viable vs. Effective Government -> Minority Cabinets are possible -> Surplus Cabinets exist -> Bargaining positions is important in explaining both

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