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Impact of armed conflict on primary education: What local responses in Côte d’Ivoire?

International Seminar Education and International Development 29th and 30th of September 2011. Education and Conflict: What place for humanitarianism in resilient systems of education?. Impact of armed conflict on primary education: What local responses in Côte d’Ivoire?.

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Impact of armed conflict on primary education: What local responses in Côte d’Ivoire?

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  1. International Seminar Education and International Development 29th and 30th of September 2011. Education and Conflict: What place for humanitarianism in resilient systems of education? Impact of armed conflict on primary education: What local responses in Côte d’Ivoire? Dr. François Joseph AZOH EcoleNormaleSupérieure Educational Research Network for West And Central Africa

  2. GENERAL CONTEXT Conflict period : 2002 - 2011 2002 : Split of the country • North: • Teaching staff & educational officials called back South • Gradual reopening (12% stayed +volunteers) • Schools de-linked from MoE until assessment (sept.03) • Setup of a minimal administration in early 2004 • Issues related to the sitting of national examinations • South: • Set-up of parallel structures to absorb the displaced • Relocation of staff

  3. EDUCATION CONTEXT • Enrolment rate in 2001 : 74,2% • Since 2002, enrolment rate = 47,3% (2003) ; 59,5% (2004) ; 59,6% (2005) ; 74% (2006) and 74,3% (2007) • At the beginning of the war in 2002 : 700 000 pupilsleftschool • Only 16% of teachersstayed in conflict area • Before crisis, MoE contribution to educational structures (DREN) = 6 million FCFA • Throughcrisis, State interrupted subsidies in rebel areas

  4. RESEARCHQUESTIONS What are local initiatives taken during the crisis to ensure the continuity of education ? • What are the communities involvement to substitute the lack of State contribution? • How communities contribute to ensure the continuity of education ? • Beyond the financial aspects, what have been the other factors that have impeded - or hampered - the adequate functioning of the schools? • How have these factors been mitigated at the local level and at institutional level (by both central and decentralized administrations)?

  5. RESEARCHAPPROACH • Data collect from different actors: MoE, Conseil General, Mairie, DREN, IEP, EPP (schools), COGES, teachers, pupils and community/parents • Interview guide designed for each ‘type’ of respondent • A combination of individual interviews & focus groups • Criteria for choosing schools: • no significant disruption during conflict • School director already in function before/during/after the conflict • Fieldwork location : • North = War affected areas in the North • South = governmental area • Period : 2009 (fieldwork and workshop 1), 2010 (workshop 2) and 2011 (new cases)

  6. FIELDWORK LOCATION North = War affected areas Odienne and Bouaké : 4 schools in each site South = government area : Daloa and Guiglo : 4 schools in each site

  7. MAIN RESULTS Strategies to reduce the financial gap ? Alternative funding (outsideMoE): • District authorities (ConseilGénéral et Mairie): built & rehabilitated schools, canteens, teachers housing, • provided basic materials and equipment (furniture, kits), • paid (some) volunteer teachers (DREN Guiglo & Odienné); • Communities/Parents: more pressed in rebel areas • COGES: raisedadditional subsidies from parents for running the schools (between 1.5 and 3 million FCFA/year) • COGES: purchasing basic didacticmaterials in the absence of State donations (chalk, books for teachers, , etc.), basic equipment (tables, benches, desks, etc.) and for payingsome of the volunteeringteaching staff  • NGOs, INGOs & developmentpartners : providing local NGOswith cash to payvolunteeringteaching staff, thenprogressivelymovingawaytowards in-kind contributions (schoolrehabilitation, basic equipment)

  8. MAIN RESULTS

  9. Contributions for humanitarianism Many donations to support school during crisis • Unicef : recreation and school kits for students, motobikes to pedagogical supervisors • Pam : foods for canteens • Save : fuel for administration, school kits to students, training for COGES managers However, many dysfunctionings limited actions’ impact • Weakness in organisation : no participative approach to identify community members needs • Unequal distribution of actions on sites : some site lack attention whereas others were overdonated • Weakness in coordination created "Cluster Education"

  10. EDUCATION AND ELECTORAL CRISIS(November 2010 –April 2011) The current state of education in our study sites ?

  11. LESSONS LEARNED • Resilient schools as illustrating community cohesion instead of community divisions; • Community members involvement (via COGES) to save and manage education;

  12. THANKS TO SAVE THE CHILDREN NETHERLANDS UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM Questions ??

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