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RANDOM MARGINAL and RANDOM REMOVAL values

RANDOM MARGINAL and RANDOM REMOVAL values. E. Calvo Universidad de Valencia. SING 3 III Spain Italy Netherlands Meeting On Game Theory VII Spanish Meeting On Game Theory. (2) Random Removal. (3) Random Marginal. [ N ={ 1,…,n } ]. Start. [ S ={ 1,…,s } ]. Active set. Agreement. Y.

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RANDOM MARGINAL and RANDOM REMOVAL values

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  1. RANDOM MARGINAL and RANDOM REMOVAL values E. Calvo Universidad de Valencia SING 3III Spain Italy Netherlands Meeting On Game TheoryVII Spanish Meeting On Game Theory

  2. (2) Random Removal (3) Random Marginal [ N={1,…,n} ] Start [ S={1,…,s} ] Active set Agreement Y N H&MC i leaves Breakdown RR RM i leaves [ S={1,…,s} ] Agreement Y N i leaves New active set Bargaining: (1) Hart and Mas-Colell (1996)

  3. (also Shapley NTU, and Harsanyi solutions)

  4. Monotonicity RM “optimistic” RR “pessimistic”

  5. Characterization of RM and RR values Efficient S-utilitarian S-egalilitarian

  6. Consistent value Maschler and Owen (1989) Shapley value (1953) Random Marginal value Hyperplane games TU-games

  7. Solidarity value Nowak and Radzik (1994) Random Removal value TU-games

  8. “mass” homogeneity Large market games RM value value allocation (core allocation)

  9. “mass” homogeneity Large market games RR value Equal split allocation

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