Tues., Oct. 7

1. Tues., Oct. 7

2. specific jurisdiction

3. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court(U.S. 1987)

4. Justice O'CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the unanimous  opinion of the Court with respect to Part I, the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II-B, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice BRENNAN, Justice WHITE, Justice MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN, Justice POWELL, and Justice STEVENS join, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-A and III, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice POWELL, and Justice SCALIA join.

5. Part II-B – O’Connor, Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, StevensPart II-A - O’Connor, Rehnquist, Powell, Scalia

6. Part II-A

7. Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State. But a defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State. (O'Connor II.A)

8. Brennan’s concurrenceBrennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun

9. As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise. Nor will the litigation present a burden for which there is no corresponding benefit. A defendant who has placed goods in the stream of commerce benefits economically from the retail sale of the final product in the forum State, and indirectly benefits from the State's laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity.(Brennan, concurring)

10. Stevens’s concurrence

11. The plurality seems to assume that an unwavering line can be drawn between "mere awareness" that a component will find its way into the forum State and "purposeful availment" of the forum's market. Over the course of its dealings with Cheng Shin, Asahi has arguably engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than "[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more...." Whether or not this conduct rises to the level of purposeful availment requires a constitutional determination that is affected by the volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the components. In most circumstances I would be inclined to conclude that a regular course of dealing that results in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years would constitute "purposeful availment" even though the item delivered to the forum State was a standard product marketed throughout the world.(Stevens, concurring – with White and Blackmun)

12. J. M c INTYRE MACHINERY, LTD., v. NICASTRO(U.S., June 27, 2011)

13. Kennedy’s opinion (4)Breyer’s concurrence (2)Ginsburg’s dissent (3)

14. Kennedy’s opinion

15. Kennedy:“The principal inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign….Sometimes a defendant does so by sending its goods rather than its agents. The defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.”

16. “These facts may reveal an intent to serve the U. S. market, but they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.”

17. Breyer’s concurrence

18. Here, the relevant facts found by the New Jersey Supreme Court show no “regular … flow” or “regular course” of sales in New Jersey; and there is no “something more,” such as special state-related design, advertising, advice, marketing, or anything else. Mr. Nicastro, who here bears the burden of proving jurisdiction, has shown no specific effort by the British Manufacturer to sell in New Jersey. (Breyer, concurring)

19. Ginsburg’s dissent

20. Ginsburg: “In sum, McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote and sell its machines in the United States, “purposefully availed itself ” of the United States market nationwide, not a market in a single State or a discrete collection of States.”

21. “[N]o issue of the fair and reasonable allocation of adjudicatory authority among States of the United States is present in this case. New Jersey’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer whose dangerous product caused a workplace injury in New Jersey does not tread on the domain, or diminish the sovereignty, of any sister State.”

22. Breyer: “What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer which specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-sized distributor to sell its product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small manufacturer (say, an Appalachian potter) who sells his product (cups and saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who resells a single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State (Hawaii).”

23. Ginsburg: Is it not fair and reasonable, given the mode of trading of which this case is an example, to require the international seller to defend at the place its products cause injury? Do not litigational convenience and choice-of-law considerations point in that direction? On what measure of reason and fairness can it be considered undue to require McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey as an incident of its efforts to develop a market for its industrial machines anywhere and everywhere in the United States? Is not the burden on McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey fair, i.e. , a reasonable cost of transacting business internationally, in comparison to the burden on Nicastro to go to Nottingham, England to gain recompense for an injury he sustained using McIntyre’s product at his workplace in Saddle Brook, New Jersey?

24. intentional torts

25. Calder v. Jones (U.S. 1984)- Floridian Nat’l Enquirer writer and editor were sued, along with publisher and distributor, for defamation in CA state court by CA resident- Writer and editor argued no PJ in CA because they had no control over where the distribution was- SCt held unanimously there was PJ

26. Walden v. Fiore

27. - Foreign terrorist kills Americans abroad- He knows they are Americans- He is sued by the families in U.S. in a U.S. court - PJ?

28. quasi in rem

29. Shaffer v. Heitner(US 1977)

30. shareholder’s derivative action

31. Appellants contend that the sequestration statute as applied in this case violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment both because it permits the state courts to exercise jurisdiction despite the absence of sufficient contacts among the defendants, the litigation, and the State of Delaware and because it authorizes the deprivation of defendants' property without providing adequate procedural safeguards. 

32. footnote 12Under Delaware law, defendants whose property has been sequestered must enter a general appearance, thus subjecting themselves to in personam liability, before they can defend on the merits.

33. The primary rationale for treating the presence of property as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to adjudicate claims over which the State would not have jurisdiction if International Shoe applied is that a wrongdoer "should not be able to avoid payment of his obligations by the expedient of removing his assets to a place where he is not subject to an in personam suit."

34. I would explicitly reserve judgment . . . on whether the ownership of some forms of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently located within a State may, without more, provide the contacts necessary to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the State to the extent of the value of the property. In the case of real property, in particular, preservation of the common law concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction arguably would avoid the uncertainty of the general International Shoe standard without significant cost to “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.Shaffer v. Heitner (Powell, J. concurring)

35. [T]he strong interest of Delaware in supervising the management of a Delaware corporation]…is said to derive from the role of Delaware law in establishing the corporation and defining the obligations owed to it by its officers and directors. In order to protect this interest, appellee concludes, Delaware's courts must have jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries such as appellants.

36. This argument is undercut by the failure of the Delaware Legislature to assert the state interest appellee finds so compelling. Delaware law bases jurisdiction not on appellants' status as corporate fiduciaries, but rather on the presence of their property in the State. Although the sequestration procedure used here may be most frequently used in derivative suits against officers and directors, the authorizing statute evinces no specific concern with such actions.