Four types of evidentiality . Kees Hengeveld Marize Mattos Dall’Aglio Hattnher. Introduction. A hierarchical approach to grammatical categories has proven to be useful in the domain of TMA Such an approach has not been applied to evidentiality
Marize MattosDall’Aglio Hattnher
A hierarchical approach to grammatical categories has proven to be useful in the domain of TMA
Such an approach has not been applied to evidentiality
This paper offers such an approach and studies the predictions that follow from it in a sample of native languages of Brazil
The sample consists of 64 languages out of the 226 extant and extinct native languages of Brazil
It contains languages from 15 out of the 20 major genetic groupings
Of the 64 sample languages 34 have at least one evidential subcategory
1. Layering in Functional Discourse Grammar
2. Evidentiality in Functional Discourse Grammar
3. The co-existence of evidential subcategories
4. The co-occurrence of evidential subcategories
Hidatsa (Matthews 1965)
Wíra i ápáari ki stao ski.
tree it grow INGR REM.PST CERT
‘The tree must have begun to grow a long time ago.’
certainty (remote past (ingressive (predicate+arguments)))
Within a level, TMA categories start out at the lowest layer and gradually expand their scope moving to higher layers
Across levels, TMA categories may move up at any point from the representational to the interpersonal level
Reportativity distinctions indicate that the speaker is not expressing his/her own cognitive material, but is passing on the opinions of others.
This means that reportativity operates at the layer of the communicated content at the Interpersonal Level: the message content contained in a discourse act is characterized as transmitted rather than originally produced.
Lakondê (Telles & Wetzels 2006: 240)
Ta'wḛn 'teh-'naw ta-'a̰jh-wi-setaw-'tãn’.
woods path-LOC DIR-walk-1.DU-REP-IMPF
‘Let’s walk to the path in the woods, someone told me.’
The speaker infers a certain piece of information on the basis of his/her own existing knowledge.
It operates at the layer of the propositional content at the Representational Level. This layer deals with mental constructs as represented in the speakers’s brain.
Karo (Gabas 2004: 269)
‘I suppose he is sleeping.’
The speaker deduces the information he/she presents from perceptual evidence.
Deduction necessarily involves two states-of-affairs: the perceived one and the deduced one: the speaker deduces the occurrence of one state-of-affairs on the basis of another.
Deduction therefore operates at the layer of the Episode.
Tariana (Aikhenvald 2003: 288)
Tʃinu niwhã-nihka di-na.
dog 3.SG.NF.bite-REC.PST.DED 3.SG.NF-OBJ
‘The dog bit him (I can see obvious signs).’
The speaker witnessed the event directly through one of the senses.
Event perception operates at the layer of the state-of-affairs, as it is this state-of-affairs that is directly perceived.
Lakondê (Telles & Wetzels 2006: 246, 247)
‘He did not eat.’ (I saw it)
‘You have washed (something) for me.’ (I heard the sound coming from the river)’
e: Event Perception
Combinability with behavioural illocutions
Hup (Epps 2008: 655-656)
‘(He’s) scared, he says.’
‘Come here, she said!’
Interaction with absolute and relative tense:
I infer that he is/has been/had been smoking
I smell that he is/has been/*had been smoking
I see him smoking/*having been smoking
There is an implicational relationship between evidential meanings present in a language according to the following evidentiality hierarchy:
event perception ⊂ deduction ⊂ inference
This follows from the FDG view on grammaticalization
Desano (Miller 1999: 65-68)
Bãdu yɨ tĩgɨ-re paa-pɨ.
Manuel 1.SG brother-SPEC hit-REP.3.M.SG
‘Manuel hit my older brother (it is said).’
Bɨ̃ʔɨ̃ yoaro-ge aʔhra-y-a.
2.SG far-LOC come-DED-NON3
‘You have come a long way (it appears).’
Desano (Miller 1999: 65-68)
Pisadã wai-re ba-di-gɨ árĩ-bĩ̃.
cat fish-SPEC eat-PST-M.SG be-DED.3.M.SG
‘The cat must have eaten the fish.’ (you can see his paw marks on the ground where he ate it).
Gɨa õ-ge-re era-bɨ.
1.PL.EXCL here-LOC-SPEC arrive-NON3.PERC.PST
‘We arrive here.’
attested ⊂ reported ⊂ inferring
De Haan (1998)
visual ⊂ non-visual ⊂ inferential ⊂ quotative
If it is true that evidentiality is not one category but actually covers four different subcategories applying at different layers of grammatical structure, we expect it to be possible for two or more evidential expressions from different subcategories to co-occur in a single expression.
I hear (from A) that A inferred on the basis of his existing knowledge that B deduced from visual evidence that C had been smoking, something that B did not witness directly.
Yuhup (Bozzi 2002:183)
̱ɟidɘ̌h ̃ɟàbmcɨ ́ ̠̄̄dí ̄bàh
3.PL dance INFER REP
‘It seems they dance, it is said.’
Hup (Epps 2008: 658)
‘There was apparently nobody there, it’s said.’
Sabanê (Araújo 2004: 54)
‘Somebody said that the kitten died.’
Karo (Gabas 1999: 277)
péŋ aʔ=wĩ-n aket memã
white.man 3.SG=kill-IND DED INFER
‘The white man must have supposedly killed it/him.’
Wanano (Stenzel 2004: 103)
‘He fell right down.’
Wanano (Stenzel 2004:358)
‘Oh! This one’s (been) flattened.’
A sharp line should be drawn between reportativity on the one hand, and event perception, deduction, and inference on the other.
The latter three sub-categories enter into an implicational hierarchy, while reportativity forms a sub-category in its own right.
Our classification and hierarchy make correct predictions about the co-existence and co-occurrence of evidential sub-categories.
Our hierarchy makes better predictions than existing ones, as a result of the separation of reportativity from all other sub-categories of evidentiality.