The Case for War 2003: An Alternative View

The Case for War 2003: An Alternative View Contrarian Group B Ray Simms Bill Mullen Curt Hammill Rob Canavosio-Zuzelski Or Something Else? GGS 684 Spring 2011

Background U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell addresses the United Nations Security Council on 5 February 2003: “My … purpose today is to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism…”

What may have been missed? We intend to: Challenge key assumptions Identify faulty logic or information Re-assess rejected evidence Present alternative hypotheses

Challenge Key Assumptions Denial & Deception Assumption 1a: The intercepted conversations by Iraqi officers were legitimate conversations, not planned deception by Iraq.

Challenge Key Assumptions Denial & Deception Assumption 1b: The presence of a truck and large vehicle at an ammunition bunker means that it holds chemical munitions

Challenge Key AssumptionsBiological Weapons Assumption 2a: Production of biological agents means that the regime has the completed the much more difficult tasks of weaponization, storage, and delivery to a vulnerable target.

Challenge Key AssumptionsBiological Weapons Ahmed Chalabi “Curveball” Assumption 2b: Intelligence sources are unbiased observers who will provide correct information.

Challenge Key AssumptionsChemical Weapons Assumption 3a: Bulldozed and freshly graded earth is only used to remove traces of chemical activity

Challenge Key AssumptionsChemical Weapons Assumption 3b: Finding 11 old artillery shells that are possibly capable of holding chemical munitions means that there is widespread WMD program.

Challenge Key AssumptionsNuclear Weapons Assumption 4: The aluminum tubes (and other incompatible components) are for the nuclear program.

Challenge Key AssumptionsTerrorism Assumption 5: Tacit approval and limited contact between terrorist groups and the Iraq government implies an alliance between the two groups.

Faulty Logic and Information • Compliance w/UN Resolution 1441 would be “easier” for Iraq than suffering UN sanctions • Regional power stemmed from history of using WMD and ‘illusion’ of maintaining capability • Traditional enemy (Iran) ‘restrained’ by WMD rumors… • Prestige of standing up to Western powers… • Sanctions were circumvented for the regime

Faulty Logic and Information • “Human Sources” told the truth • “Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving not just document and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction…” • “…we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent to various locations…” • Detailed descriptions can be lies!

Faulty Logic and Information Analytical Issues Current activity at Former chemical munitions bunkers doesn’t necessarily mean it’s the SAME activity

Faulty Logic and Information • Aluminum Tubes • Centrifuge Tubes or Rocket Bodies? • US Intelligence Community elements disagreed on use of tubes • Worst (and wrong) case won out • Unmanned Aerial Vehicles • Iraq was developing them, but not to use as delivery devices for biological/chemical weapons • Terrorism nexus • Iraq did support Palestinians w/training and money • No significant level of support to al-Qaida

Rejected Evidence Hyp: Iraq has No WMD – disprove that… • Analytical Logic • Analysts sought evidence to prove that Iraq DID NOT have WMD (p49) • Rejected evidence not supporting premise • Inferred Absence of evidence as Confirmation • Complicating factors • Iraq “Cover Story” provided alternative (p49, p145) • Evidence is known with only fractional certainty • Present rationale for estimates of fractional certainty (p50)

Rejected Evidence • High Strength Aluminum Tubes • Evidence that the 81-mm tubes were better suited for use in rockets than in Uranium centrifuges • Iraq had known stockpiles of missiles of this type (p63) • Iraq possessed 500 tons of 120-mm tubes (better for gaseous diffusion (p64))

Rejected Evidence • Biological warfare trailers (p105) • Central tenet of BW theory • Suspicions about source not relayed to decision-makers prior to Powell speech • Source discredited fully in March 2004

Rejected Evidence K-25 Plant in Oak Ridge, TN • Uranium Yellowcake from Niger • Comparatively light / powdery • Composed of 80% Uranium oxides • Needs gas-diffusion infrastr. to isolate U-235 • Astronomical quantities needed to isolate sufficient U-235 for weapons • Initially unconfirmed; later discredited (p75) • Central tenet of Nuke theory • Disproved in April 2003

Non-Rejected Evidence • UN Inspectors missing from Iraq • Reconstitute the Personnel from its pre-GW1 Uranium-enrichment facility • Presence of CW-capable trucks at former CW-sites (p123) • “Imagery alone can neither prove nor disprove…” • 3rd hand reporting is not a source (p129) • Commercial mapping software for US (p132) • Purported UAV attacks with BW on CONUS • Purchasing reconnaisance equipment

Alternative Hypotheses Purpose: To present alternative hypotheses that would explain the current body of information available to the analysts. • Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)1: • - Nuclear Weapons • - Biological Weapons • Chemical Weapons • Presentation Outline: • Background • Primary hypotheses • Facts • Alternative hypotheses • Key findings • Key Organizations: • - NIE - National Intelligence Estimate, pre war report • - ISG - Iraq Security Group, post war assessment • - JAEIC - Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Community, pre war report • - NGIC – National Ground Intelligence Center, Army pre war report 1The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 2005

Nuclear Weapons • 1998 marked the end of international inspections in Iraq- Due to Saddam • Hussein’s preventing inspectors from doing their work • Increasing concern amongst Intelligence Community (IC) analysts that Iraq would • reconstitute it’s nuclear weapons program • Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Community (JAEIC) noted that although it had no specific • evidence of reconstitution that the absence of inspectors presented the opportunity • Fact: March 2001 – IC reporting indicated Iraq was seeking high strength tubes made of 7075 • T6 Aluminum Alloy (intercepted shipment) • Primary hypotheses: CIA - most likely for gas centrifuges used for uranium enrichment • NGIC offered the tubes could be used for conventional rockets but backed CIA’s hypotheses • Alternative hypotheses: DOE (expertise on nuclear matters) indicated that although the tubes • could be used for gas centrifuges they were not well suited and most likely for use by Iraq’s • Multiple Rocket Launcher Program Key finding: Error was a result of poor analytical tradecraft & failure to do proper technical analysis

Biological Weapons • Primary hypotheses: In 2002 the IC assessed with “high confidence” that • Iraq has biological weapons (transportable facilities) and that all key aspects • of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most key elements are larger • and more advanced than in the Gulf War • Judgment based solely on information obtained from one human intelligence source • (HUMINT) codenamed “curve ball” • Alternative hypotheses: Trailers might not be associated with BW and should be verified by • multiple sources. • HUMINT source could be mistaken or misleading • Very risky to rely on one source • ISG reported that evaluation of two trailers seized by coalition forces believed to be BW • facilities were most likely developed to produce hydrogen and were no part of a BW program Key finding: The DIA’s Defense HUMINT Services failure even to attempt to evaluate Curveball’s reporting was a major failure in operational tradecraft

Chemical Weapons • Primary hypotheses: National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 2002 • Iraq had large stock piles of CW (100 – 500 metric tons) • Iraq had restarted it’s CW production • NIE judgment of restarting CW production was primarily based on imagery • analysis • Sumarra type trucks at weapons site • the presence of Sumarra type trucks indicates CW activity • the scale of Sumarra type trucks indicates CW deployed w/ forces • for CW to be deployed it must have restarted production • Alternative hypotheses: Sumarra type trucks were being used for some other • purpose • if so, this whole argument falls apart Key finding: Too much emphasis on Sumarra type trucks, imagery alone can neither prove nor disprove a CW association

Conclusions http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ wmd/pdf/full_wmd_report.pdf • Challenge Key Assumptions • Faulty Logic & Information • Overreliance on ambiguous imagery indicators • Poor vetting of human sources • Evidence can be used to disprove hypotheses • Proving a negative is problematic • Credible alternative hypotheses should be thoroughly investigated • proven/disproven based on facts • Initially should be given the same weight as the primary hypotheses

The Case for War 2003: An Alternative View