The Saddam Tapes

1. The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006

2. Technical Points Audio was segmented to fit the number of words readable per Powerpoint slide. Translation was more literal than otherwise. [Unintelligible] can not be clearly heard. Words in italics are heard but not understood because they are local Tikriti dialect, Baath Party jargon, technical, etc.

3. Technical Points Some items are clear and unambiguous, and others are open to various interpretations. Some of the interpretations are the difference between bad and worse. The tapes need to be further examined by native Iraqi speakers.

4. Removal of Warheads From Tape ISGC-2003-M0003997 Beginning of Tape

5. Unidentified Male I notice, sir, that the people�s resolution to serve the battle is very high. They can not insult our resolve, no matter the time. This brings me to what I notice among them. Despite the pressure of their surveillance, and our not using all our capabilities in the missile area - the time period is not important to them. What is the time period going to be?

6. Unidentified Male For us, the factories mujzab [indistinct] in our fields. The factories are present. How much material do we have? How much equipment do we have? The factories remain, in the mind they remain. Our spirit is with us. Four days ago there was the Said Madari missile, three Hijaba missiles,

7. Unidentified Male We put them out from what was available from what he have done a year ago, two years ago, and five years ago. Based solely on the time period, and they take note of the time period, they can�t account for our will, which grows stronger with each passing day. 

8. Saddam Hussein Allah willing.

9. Unidentified Male Sir, the groups of missiles whose equipment was destroyed, the warheads were removed on cattle trucks that were at the military industrial facility and at the National Communications [indistinct].

10. Unidentified Male Also, we would like to restart our activity in reforming some of the material that was destroyed, such as the advanced technology equipment. We also removed our active warhead groups from Assad Babel [Lion of Babylon]. 

11. Observations Missile warheads were removed prior to unilateral destruction by Iraq. The speaker does not sound defeated, but energized to continue fighting. The speaker suggests reforming the destroyed material into new weapon parts.

12. Observations Iraqis changed their story on warhead destruction to match emerging findings by UNSCOM. See Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Iraq Special Collection, Missile-Related Issues, Examples of Problems. http://cns.miis.edu/search97cgi/s97_cgi?action=View&VdkVgwKey=..%2F..%2Fcnsweb%2Fhtdocs%2Fresearch%2Firaq%2Fjn98msl.htm&queryzip=%22examples+of+problems%22&Collection=CNS+Web+Site

13. Observations Hijaba may not be the name of a missile, but refer to the hidden status. Said Madari may not be the name of the missile. Madari means �orbital� or �tropical.� Assad Babel is the name of a modified tank. It has a another meaning here. This is the only occasion where the term �active warhead group� is used.

14. Forewarning of UNSCOM Inspections Location on Tape ISGQ-2003-M0003997: 06:32 CONTEXT PRIOR TO EXCERPT: Discussion by General Director of Hutin State Establishment regarding reconstituting military industry.

15. Saddam Hussein Thank you [indistinct] who is speaking on facility security?

16. Unidentified Male Sir, Allah willing, [indistinct] of course I am associated with this. We know everything located in the establishments and secure the gates against the enemy. Actually, sir, I have a point on the commission from the United Nations.

17. Unidentified Male Currently there are four groups visiting us; the biological, chemical, missile, and [indistinct]. Coincidentally, sir, we have an operations center working to track everything and of course they cooperate with us, a security and safety system.

18. Unidentified Male Sir I �the security system if for any facility in the military industrial organization. There is a security center in each facility, composed, sir, of military elements. We established a system, sir, on the model of military intelligence.

19. Unidentified Male After what happened at the military industrial organization, this was divided. We reconnected it, sir, incrementally. We reconnected each establishment to the operations center. This is protection for the army, protection for the establishments.

20. Unidentified Male It is called the Directorate [Amariyat] for Facility Security. We only protect the facilities from an operational standpoint. Administrative security falls under the Directorate [indistinct] of Military Operations.

21. Unidentified Male Actually, sir, regarding the UN commission, the four teams for biology, chemical, missiles, and nuclear. We � the four, sir, except the work with Petrochemical Three, your Excellency knows that there were some defects in unifying the actions.

22. Unidentified Male the remainder, Praise Allah and thanks, have excellent security practices. I can assure your Excellency that the workers are good, even though they are military. They have my outlook, and most of them are officers [indistinct]. The possibility exists that Ustaath Qusay will help us, according to the last meeting, and also Colonel Adel. All the channels, sir, are used against thievery. 

23. Observations

24. Reconstitution of Muthenna Chemical Weapons Establishment Location on tape ISGC-2003-M0003997: 09:17.40 Context prior to the excerpt: Saddam request a briefing on the rebuilding of Muthenna Chemical Weapons Establishment. The briefer describes damage from the Gulf War.

25. Unidentified Male The establishment is made up of many facilities. The main facility is large, and is distinguished from other establishments by its geographic expansion. The other sites, we have four toxic sites; one of the sites is within other facilities. 

26. Unidentified Male It is very specialized for filling and other things. There are other, new facilities, the- [indistinct] from the year seventy-seven � eighty-seven.

27. Unidentified Male The strange thing about Muthenna is that the bombardment focused on the workshop, even more than the main building at Muthenna, and the scientific library with the [indistinct].

28. Unidentified Male I didn�t note the remainder of the establishments, since their headquarters are better informed. Sir, the establishment, as a group of cadre, with the situation by the commission incapacitating the activities in the establishment from the viewpoint of inspections and photography, etc., you guidance to Colonel Laqdam, the deputy, and the brigadier general

29. Unidentified Male How is the technical side? Muthenna Establishment is still. . . the cadre surveyed for a building project in Bayji and in QaQa. With that, there were contributions on how to wrestle with the commission with a number of buildings in chloride. Little by little, we are presenting dubakheen in the building campaign. 

30. Unidentified Male Right now, we have a very large building campaign in a number of main sites; three support sites, and the main location [indistinct] the building campaign despite the annoyance presented by the inspection teams.

31. Unidentified Male As Allah wills, we will infahaq as the Military Industrial Organization, in the sweet challenge, as we call it at Muthenna, that the other establishments rebuild and produce. We will rebuild ourselves and with others . . in anything that serves industry, medicine, or mobiles. This is our activity at the present time.

32. Unidentified Male There remains another conflict; how to save the materials from their hands, [indistinct] we have a plan with Deputy Laqdam, directed with your guidance, I mean. Allah willing, sir, Muthenna will stay � Saddam Hussein Don�t be tusaghaneen about your materials .

33. Saddam Hussein . this material can be used for security purposes, but they can confirm that it is used for civilian purposes. . not after confirming that we . . I don�t have any intention of producing in this area, and they don�t have any right to . . . it must go to fertilizer regarding the materials that are . . . they can be for civilian or military purposes before the final production. �

34. Unidentified Male As your Excellency knows, every two months there is a review of the Security Council Resolution Six Hundred and Eighty-Seven. I see that the qatar is still fighting to- 

35. Saddam Hussein Or not before the compliance.

36. Saddam Hussein They only want al-tisbuza in imagining that . . . if they cross the countryside it will come out of a corner of it. This is an occasion for them. I mean, you will follow up, and things will come to a stage, I mean we are more aware, more capable in vision, and in security, and in facilities,

37. Saddam Hussein it is a sure thing that we will [unintelligible] incrementally. I mean, what is the relation to this thing called complying with resolutions in its meaning in the method of conduct for the resolution?

38. Observations Muthenna State Establishment was a widespread organization, and not just one site used to produce chemical weapons. The Iraqis started surveying other building sites for the organization shortly after the Gulf War. Briefer raises the issue of how to keep materials out of the hands of UNSCOM.

39. Observations Saddam points out a major advantage � keep the precursors for chemical weapons separated until needed and they can be explained away as having civilian use. Saddam is confident that Iraq will overcome the inspection program.

40. UNSCOM Technical Advisor Betrays Knowledge of Hidden WMD Program/ Saddam�s Let UNSCOM Confirm False Estimate Location on Tape ISGC-2003-M0003997 20:59:58 Context Prior to Excerpt: Briefer describes technical issues to be resolves before UNSCOM inspections could end.

41. Unidentified Male Lastly, I conclude that this technical report, I mean from the Special Commission formed by the Security Council to ensure the execution of Resolution 687, was written to serve a political goal.

42. Unidentified Speaker We, as technicians, technicians we believe that we have arrived at a stage where all the technical mines, I believe this applies to all the four areas.

43. Unidentified Male The four technical and legal points, for nuclear, missile, chemical and biological, there are still obligations to 687.

44. Unidentified Male I wanted to show these to your Excellency, because the presence, although I don�t know anything about the topic of presence [laughs], �

45. Unidentified Male I mean, this means it treats these subjects. We swore that this was all true, and it would be beneficial for your Excellency, despite approving it, that you have the correct assessment of this report. And we -

46. Saddam Hussein The teams that are now searching for them are not doing so to verify the facts as they are. They are doing so to create cover through any means possible, technically, I mean, even through umawiyat, but they write it up technically. 

47. Saddam Hussein The umawiyat are many, but they write it technically, politically, on how to be dignified . . . this is correct . . . I mean they are now more angry at us than before the hostility.

48. Saddam Hussein Before the hostility, they had information and deductions that we were working in the direction we described, a dangerous direction. Now, we can confirm for them this false direction. I mean, according to the explanation. 

49. Saddam Hussein That is, there was a group of these guys and those guys, but this all ended, and with that, the thing they will confirm is our cover story. Good, this is the way it goes . . they are present.

50. Saddam Hussein there isn�t anybody that is going to give away a card . . . well . . . this is - [indistinct] attempt in any se�a. 

51. Unidentified Male This last point, sir, truly is a very important subject for them. This is not a deduction, they say there is intent. They say we are wink at the important things. I believe I told your Excellency this once,

52. Unidentified Male We must study how we can package this cover story so that we can have a program that won�t cause anxiety in the future, and not work in a program that will cause anxiety again.

53. Saddam Hussein Let them wadfu us. Unidentified Male Let them wadfu us. [laughs] really, I mean, this issue, there is no end to it, definitely

54. Saddam Hussein They would refuse, but they would not be able to pay [indistinct] the return is very high . . . not standard [laughs] . . .

55. Observations Subordinates described progress at �eliminating technical mines� to bring the inspection program to a close. Briefer laughingly states he �wouldn�t know anything about the presence [of WMD]� Saddam states Iraq will allow UNSCOM to confirm their erroneous pre-war assessments.

56. Observations The term aqoolna �our understanding, our thinking� occurs twice in this segment and is best translated �our cover story� in this context.

57. Electrical Needs for Uranium Enrichment Program Location on tape ISGC-2003-M0003997 24:03:93 Context Prior to Excerpt: This is the beginning of Jaafar Dhia Jaafar�s briefing. He was the head of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

58. Jaafar Dhia Jaafar Sir, I have an observation; we might possibly speak a little about the electricity from al-Haritha station. I have two other observations, if you will listen to me, we can speak on them sir. 

59. Saddam Hussein Doctor bathroom, how do you say Doctor Jaafar, if one ruins something, he avoids that which he ruined, and it is [laughs], now with the electricity.

60. Saddam Hussein I believe that th- we have four if we close the projects that were destroyed, in spite of the fact that they were destroyed. I surmise that we have gained, because they resorted to conducting the hostility without having experience,�the electricity wasn�t running like this [laughs] . . . yes, doctor. �

61. Jaafar Dhia Jaafar Sir, al-Haritha Station, near Basra, was one of the biggest stations destroyed during the period of hostility. We were thinking of using it for fission bombs and special bombs.� 

62. [All parties discuss the problem of demolishing and replacing one of the chimneys at the Haritha power plant. Excerpt restarts at 29:47:30]

63. Jaafar Dhia Jaafar there are two other points on the building . . we have some issues, even the electricity. I believe that the other establishments are present, in that we are now beyond our building plan.

64. Jaafar Dhia Jaafar I mean, there is technical and specialized equipment to build it, and at least until now, there is no detailed plan. We are going to need � we will possibly need imports so that we can rebuild.

65. Jaafar Dhia Jaafar On the electricity, we have identified situations, sir , where we need imports so we can return the service, but this does not account for more than ten percent of total generating capacity. [tape stops abruptly.]

66. Observations Jaafar Dhia Jaafar, head of the nuclear weapons program, was originally in charge of the concealment program, but flopped. Hence the joke from Saddam. Large amounts of electricity are needed for uranium enrichment, so power from a civilian electrical station for Shi�ite Basra was to be diverted for the nuclear weapons program.

67. Observations Saddam mentions �four� as being intact, but it is unclear whether this refers to nuclear weapons programs or electrical power stations. The descriptor used later is �projects,� which is tied to the weapons program. The term �stations� would refer to electrical power.

68. Observations Jaafar refers to rebuilding the nuclear weapons program, and the need for specialized imports.

69. The Mother of All Battles is Continuing LOCATION ON TAPE ISGQ-2003-M0003922: 1:20:32 APPROXIMATE TIME FRAME OF THE MEETING: Early 1992 CONTEXT PRIOR TO THE EXCERPT: Saddam and his advisors, probably from the Revolutionary Command Council, are discussing the various books that were published after the First Gulf War.

70. Saddam Hussein We, We have specific people. They are gathering the documents, books, and publications, to show our side. So just leave them, but hizrusna and the others write a lot, and they produce something sometimes right, sometimes wrong.

71. Saddam Hussein But we, when we come out with a book, we are going to prepare The Solution. Unidentified Male We will narrow the field.

72. Saddam Hussein Those who write books, on the Um al-Ma�arik attack, and cover all the angles, but this isn�t possible except by the leader, and I'm busy. So, let there be a plan, when I have a chance to write, I will write. I don�t say right or wrong, the name of hisrasna .

73. Unidentified Male [mumbles] Saddam Hussein Mmmm?

74. Unidentified Male I brought some of the � Saddam Hussein Hala thala [mumbling] Um al-Ma�arik, and I can write [unintelligible], until you have [unintelligible].

75. Saddam Hussein And now, who will we get to write it? Comrade Tariq Aziz, the best writer, there, settled. Okay, what will the Mother of All Battles cover, and who [unintelligible] all ways so that one can go [unintelligible] [mumbling]

76. Saddam Hussein It is ongoing, the drama is continuing, for a while yet. It is not a matter of "we hit them on the second of August, and they embargoed us, then hit us on the sixteenth and seventeenth, and then it ended on the twenty eighth of February. No, it is not like this. This is ongoing.

77. Observations Saddam did not recognize UN Security Council Resolutions as ending the Gulf War. Saddam from interview with Dan Rather: So we have not lost the war. And we were not defeated. You know that the fighting that went on continued -- between us and Iran -- continued for eight years. Iran lost battles to us and we lost battles to them. But how do you calculate things? You measure things by the final results. 

78. Observations If, by his own admission, Saddam was continuing the war, it was axiomatic to pursue it unconventionally after being beaten conventionally.

79. Decontamination at Hakim Bioweapons Facility Location on tape ISCG-2003-M0004244 Beginning through 2:36 Approximate Date of Meeting: After destruction of original Hakim bioweapons facility in June 1996 Overview: An advisor to Saddam discusses the organization of a unit to deal with biological weapon contamination from al Hakim Biological Weapons Factory.

80. Unidentified Male [tape begins abruptly in the middle of the sentence] They defend the Hakim Factory also. Hakim Factory, what is the organizational relationship, possibly there is [unintelligible] with a specific establishment. If there is a spread from Hakim Factory, where is the industrial, administrative relationship with the others,

81. Unidentified Male according to the evaluation of the experts that those areas are capable of being contaminated also. I believe [there should be] a plan for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.

82. Unidentified Male Then, the question is, who is the person in this situation? What is the organizational relationship, and what is the relation in this subject to the Ministry of Defense?

83. Unidentified Male How was the relationship with the Ministry of Defense? Antashtu how much food provision and habiya al-khaliya. Is this from an order from the Ministry of Defense? Where does the order come from?

84. Saddam Hussein What do you mean "Ministry of Defense?�

85. Unidentified Male Sir I. . . I believe that baytakun on this point, their [unintelligible] and their plan is to create a group of reasonable doubts which we have not yet seen. This point was dealt with by this round. The primary care was excellent.

86. Tariq Aziz in biological

87. Unidentified Male Yes in biological. They were given excellent treatment. The reaction by the Iraqi technicians in the Thaka� Area was as it was in truth, sir. My meaning is that the Thaka� Area is at a khubf in how to [unintelligible].

88. Unidentified Male Then what is it with Ekeus, the next time. I would present to Mr. Leader that this will be one of the points to exploit for talil very powerful.

89. Unidentified Male The organizational structure, the relationship between this group and other institutes and factories. The people who will be working in the group, who are the scientists who will be with the group [sentence unintelligible].

90. Unidentified Male Do they operate on orders from the Ministry of Defense? These are some of the questions, Mr. Leader.

91. Observations Saddam later refers to Hakim as being destroyed, so this is another facility. The term jawla literally means round, or trip. In the context of primary care, it can refer to either an exercise or an actual outbreak of biological weapons.

92. Observations

93. Tens, Hundreds Working in Missile and Chemical Fields Location on Tape ISCG-2003-M0004244 07:07 Context prior to the excerpt: Tariq Aziz discussing with Saddam Hussein the problems with explaining to UNSCOM the previous commercial relationships for military imports.

94. Tariq Aziz They are enemies, the Special Commission is the enemy. Every day they come with things, but this is the summary sir. They are arranged. In the areas of missiles and chemicals, they are arranged.

95. Saddam Hussein [unintelligible] five years. Tariq Aziz They Came, Of course, of course, there is work.

96. Saddam Hussein Mulhi, five years. Tariq Aziz Really, the military industry group, may Allah help them, people, in tens, in hundreds, work daily for twenty hours, from the break of dawn, all of them for the sake of these issues.

97. Tariq Aziz One day there came to me, Amer said it would affect us, from the first meeting, issues, �you have a relationship with Britain, Poland, Brazil, and . . . I don't know the fourth county. .

98. Unidentified Male Egypt Tariq Aziz And Egypt.

99. Observations Tariq Aziz inserts comments on ongoing WMD production into the middle of a brief on relations with UNSCOM. The term safat can come from a number of root words, and mean either �arranged, aligned, dispersed (by wind), liquidated, swallowed, clarified, settled.�

100. The Iraqi Plasma Program Location on Tape ISGQ-2003-M0007379: 02:06:27 Context Prior to the Excerpt: Introduction by a senior official before the briefings by scientists from the Military Industrial Commission and the Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency.

101. Saddam Hussein [unintelligible] reading on it,. . how , , , [unintelligible] ... plasma, what is it? . . [other speakers] SH - the specialists, yes, we are ready for this. Each one, each speaker, stand and speak into the microphone.

102. Doctor Thamir Doctor Thamir Ma'aman Mawdud, from the the Theoretical Application Center, sir, the Military Industrial Commission. Plasma, really, is one of the applications used in the World's countries. an industrial application, used in materials, coating materials, and tardeeth. [He gives a general background briefing, then addresses the Iraqi Plasma Program.]

103. Doctor Thamir [Starting at 04:35:46] Iraq's National Laboratory for plasma started in the eighties, sir. as you know. We started with the sources of plasma. In 1981 we started to create sources of plasma, which were used in the Iraqi nuclear program.

104. Doctor Thamir The source of plasma that we created, started in . . the first start, through research and development, then simple test production, the first batches, then tests done through mathematical systems, then the production we achieved in the advanced stages at the end of the Nineties.

105. Doctor Thamir These plasma sources had - were used through - used in the beginning for specific production. We created plasma in the Eighties, and we started with the principles of building the. . .

106. Doctor Thamir the. . .theoretical knowledge of plasma to broaden the capability at that time. We began to gain capability, and the Iraqi National Laboratory, we built competence, and we made experiments with plasma, arriving at mathematical measurements, and then production.

107. Doctor Thamir Now, at present, after the 30 state aggression against us, some of the activities with plasma were threatened as a result of the tyrannical resolutions. Today, activity is restricted to qawaya tests and experimental and industrial measurements.

108. Doctor Thamir Activity hasn't died in plasma because it is allowed in some of the tests which we use. Then, sir, according to what we have done in the Iraqi National Laboratory in building plasma activity, we have a very large industrial base.

109. Doctor Thamir We have built a factory to produce plasma systems. We have built a number of factories with Military Industry, who produced specialized factories for us during this time. [Context after Excerpt: He discusses practical issues with working with a university plasma center.]

110. Amer Rashid al-Ubaydi [After a discussion with a representative of the Ministry of Education regarding the role of the university plasma center.] Sir, the summary, the truth is the applied activity is present and found in the industrial sector, and not only in the Military Industrial Commission, but in the Atomic Energy Agency, under Dr. Amer.

111. Amer Rashid al-Ubaydi He is responsible for the plasma activity in Atomic Energy, he is competent for the activity. We in the Military Industrial Commission are present, but have less personnel than they do, that is, Dr. Thamir.

112. Amer Rashid al-Ubaydi We don't feel that there is interference with the center, it if were permitted, within the understanding governing the scientific research in the university. [He goes on to discuss the pros and cons of interaction with the university plasma center]

113. Saddam Hussein [Beginning at 21:31:80] let the specialist brothers that are ready . . . Yes . . . go ahead.

114. Doctor Amer Mr. Leader, I see from the people Ibn Awda to bring forth the event regarding plasma, and I believe it is necessary to add some subjects to what was discussed by Dr. Thamir -

115. Saddam Hussein What is your name and your specialty?

116. Doctor Amer Doctor Amer Abbas, Director of the Plasma Section in Atomic Energy. Plasma started to be used in the Nineteenth Century, at the end of the Nineteenth Century, when there was a need to produce parallel tubes capable of passing electrical circuits within the range of amps to kilo amps.

117. Doctor Thamir The need arose from the requirement to produce light. In that the power of use from plasma was in the area of producing light, and until now there is a relationship.

118. Doctor Amer [murmurings] light, light, illumination, light is one of the simple practical applications for plasma. After this, in 1950 approximately, it became possible, it was known, that plasma could be used to control nuclear fusion reactions, that is, control hydrogen bombs.

119. Doctor Amer After that, the United States began a program called "Shermut." It was a closed program. In approximately the same year, The Soviet Union on its own, and Britain also, started similar programs. These programs are known to this day as TOKOMAK, as mentioned by Dr. Thamir.

120. Saddam Hussein What�s the name? Doctor Amer TOCOMAK . . . TOCOMAK . . . from a Russian word, Mr. Leader. Beginning in 1950, and opening in 1956, was the first laboratory to use TOCOMAK.

121. Doctor Amer [He discusses other commercial applications for plasma.] [25:45:73] . . . . . . In the beginning of 2000, transfer became possible, through systems that are international intu, from what is called a sufriya system [unintelligible] the energy that goes in is the energy that goes out. What they call in English "break even."

122. Observations The main intent of the meeting appears to be determining the role of a "proposal center" that had been opened six months previous to the meeting. The topic also involves the relationship between academic aspects of plasma and practical application. In addition to controlling nuclear explosions, certain plasma discharges are used for nuclear weapon simulations.

123. Observations Two Programs and a University Center. Iraqis admitted to University Center, but stated practical program ended in 1988 for ISG report. Both briefers want to expand their capability beyond the original intent of nuclear weapons development.

124. Observations Iraqi press claimed new developments with the Nuclear Mujahideen in March and April 2002. The Guardian ran a story in September 2002 on illicit purchases by Iraq: �They carried a shopping list of high-specification machine tools, including diamond cutters, a powder-metal production line and a plasma-spray machine - all potentially components for nuclear weapons and a ballistic-missiles programme.�

125. Foreign Help to Answer UNSCOM, and Ideas for Attacking America Location on tape ISGQ-2003-M0004244: 10:07 through 15:32 Context prior to excerpt: Tariq Aziz was discussing how to answer UNSCOM in order to close inspections for each of the specific areas.

126. Tariq Aziz I said, the Brazilians, we don�t have anything to do with them, Egypt, I told them Egypt, Yeh? Unidentified Male [unintelligible]

127. Tariq Aziz qashmari, this was also the case sir. I answered them, and said this subject, and repeated it many times. The purchases of chemicals in 88, 89, and 90 are a remaining point. Also to be solved.

128. Tariq Aziz I mean, there isn't anything remaining in missiles and chemicals, anything . . . critical, [unintelligible]. In the second meeting, they said on these subjects, the problem is the biological.

129. Tariq Aziz Biological, in my estimation, I don�t want to get into explanations, in my estimation, we have a solution. Unidentified Male [unintelligible]

130. Tariq Aziz We can. Unidentified Male What?

131. Tariq Aziz We can, we can find a solution. But, on this subject the Russians and Brazilians must cooperate with us. I have asked General Amer and Riyadh that they get involved with [unintelligible] because the tangible thing is that the working gap, the factories that . . ah

132. Saddam Hussein There must be doubts about them under the kathirat?

133. Tariq Aziz Yes Saddam Hussein After the -

134. Tariq Aziz Yes. I mean there is nothing big left on this subject, except for the doubts of the Americans, that Iraq can produce biological weapons and use them for terrorism.

135. Saddam Hussein What is the � Tariq Aziz No, this sir.

136. Saddam Hussein [unintelligible] official. Tariq Aziz Yes.

137. Saddam Hussein They say that Iraq has such-and-such missiles and such-and-such whatever. Tariq Aziz No, this is not official, this is talk from Wafiq Samarrai, [unintelligible] Wafiq Samarrai

138. Saddam Hussein No, other than this, other than this, before it . . . a while before it. I read a statement from one of the Americans � Tariq Aziz Yes but the Special Commission does not acknowledge it.

139. Saddam Hussein Official. Tariq Aziz They don�t acknowledge it . . . they don�t acknowledge it. Sir, they don�t talk about it, because the numbers of the missiles, to the limit of the missiles, were clear that the equipment we had was Russian, Soviet.

140. Tariq Aziz We have missiles natatawayla Russian missiles that we bought. There are the clear lists of the Russian purchases, and the nabat of Russian remains, so we said check, they checked, and it was finished. This way, one hundred missiles, this is all our evidence. They can't say a -

141. Saddam Hussein It is a pity that the war ended so quickly, otherwise they would have found them on Israel�s head.

142. Tariq Aziz Well, on the subject of biological which still remains, the French and the Russians, if they help us, we can reach a solution, I mean, I don't think it is unlikely that [unintelligible].

143. Tariq Aziz This talk that Iraq produces . . or uses for terrorism, this is an empty allegation. Somebody could say any country can �

144. Saddam Hussein Terrorism is coming . . . with the Americans, two years ago, not a long while ago, with the English I believe, there was a campaign [unintelligible] with one of them, that in the future there would be terrorism with weapons of mass destruction . . . . . ..

145. Saddam Hussein what is it that we . . . consider this technique . . and use people involved with smuggling. . there were stories on smuggling.

146. Unidentified Male But sir, germ warfare � Saddam Hussein Before a little, in 89, . . they said in the future they would see a car [unintelligible] a nuclear explosion in, for example, Washington . . or germ, or chemical.

147. Tariq Aziz Sir, germ, biological, we can arrange a house, we can arrange a truck, with �

148. Saddam Hussein This is coming, this story is coming, but not from Iraq . . Tariq Aziz Sir, they can�t do it. Saddam Hussein It is coming from others.

149. Tariq Aziz biological, this is simple to arrange. This is easy. With any biological [weapon], you can use a truck with germ . . and fill the water tank and kill [unintelligible]. And this not a country, it is not necessary to suspect a country, anyone can do it.

150. Tariq Aziz Anyone can do it, an American, in a house near the White House. They would not have much reason, except the institutes. They have big institutes, like Hakim. [unintelligible] Hakim, and it is known that it was destroyed.

151. Tariq Aziz They, if they can convince the others also, that this institute has the equipment, I don't think there would makayin [unintelligible]. There would be. [mumbling] Yes? Unidentified Male The reaction?

152. Tariq Aziz Yes, care with all the shibabish. I mean, if actually, there is going to be destruction, I think our position is not going to be strong. The others are going to say that this is true, the five are not going to accept �

153. Saddam Hussein Yes, that is like all, enough of [unintelligible]. Unidentified Male [a speaker at a distance from the microphone raised concerns about such an attack]

154. Saddam Hussein [unintelligible] I know that biological is the farthest thing away from there being a story. Wadiyan [friendly?], they ended it, their work and [unintelligible]

155. Unidentified Male [Mostly unintelligible, but mentions a window and air conditioning]. Tariq Aziz [mostly unintelligible sentence]

156. Observations Regarding an attack by others, Saddam can be referring to another country or group with plans to attack America, or to the use of proxies. Given the context and other evidence of collaboration with jihadists, the use of proxies makes more sense.

157. Observations When discussing the use of biological weapons, Tariq Aziz refers to the U.S. Bioweapons institute similar to Hakim (Fort Detrick) as a possible red herring. Stephen Hatfield, temporarily a subject in the Anthrax case, had previously worked at Fort Detrick.

158. Still to Come Briefings on Plasma Program for Nuclear Weapons Development. Hosni Mubarak � King Fahd Conspiracy Against Iraq, Getting Revenge. Saddam on Planting Fake Documents to Justify Invasion of Kuwait. Diversion of UNICEF and Red Cross Aid to Military Industrial Commission.

159. Still to Come Jaafar on Retaining Nuclear Weapons Personnel Not Already Involved with Projects. Briefing on Obtaining Parts for Biological Weapons Program After the Destruction of the Hakim Bioweapons Facility. Hundreds, If Not Thousands, Of Other Tape Recordings Of Saddam�s Meetings.

160. General Observations Inspection programs do not work if the subject country has a desire to have weapons. The U.N. method of crisis management does not work. WWII is a much better model, especially to meet the threat of Jihad. Saddam waged a war against us, while we litigated a legal process against him.