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HEALTH CARE SPENDING OUT OF CONTROL? IT’S THE INCENTIVES—STUPID!

HEALTH CARE SPENDING OUT OF CONTROL? IT’S THE INCENTIVES—STUPID!. SIEPR-FACS CONFERENCE STANFORD UNIVERSITY SEPTEMBER 10, 2003 ALAIN ENTHOVEN. DEFINITION OF TERMS. PPO HMO CARRIER HMO PREPAID GROUP PRACTICE POS. EMPLOYER A PAYS 90% (2003 FAMILY MONTHLY PREMIUMS). EMPLOYER B PAYS 100%.

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HEALTH CARE SPENDING OUT OF CONTROL? IT’S THE INCENTIVES—STUPID!

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  1. HEALTH CARE SPENDING OUT OF CONTROL?IT’S THE INCENTIVES—STUPID! SIEPR-FACS CONFERENCE STANFORD UNIVERSITY SEPTEMBER 10, 2003 ALAIN ENTHOVEN

  2. DEFINITION OF TERMS • PPO • HMO • CARRIER HMO • PREPAID GROUP PRACTICE • POS

  3. EMPLOYER A PAYS 90%(2003 FAMILY MONTHLY PREMIUMS)

  4. EMPLOYER B PAYS 100%

  5. EMPLOYER C PAYS 80%

  6. EMPLOYER D DROPPED THE HMOs

  7. EMPLOYER E PAYS ALL BUT $100

  8. EMPLOYER F HIRES ONE CARRIER TO OFFER 3 PLANS

  9. STANFORD, WELLS FARGO, U.C. AND H-P FIXED AMT

  10. HOW MANY EMPLOYEES IN EACH?

  11. STANFORD et.al. AFTER TAX

  12. WHY A SINGLE CARRIER? • HISTORY • ADMINISTRATIVE COST • ADVERSE SELECTION • EFFECTIVE MANAGED CARE MAY NOT EXIST IN THEIR AREA

  13. WHY CHOICE OFFERING EMPLOYERS SUBSIDIZE MORE COSTLY CARE? • HISTORY • “GIVEAWAY-TAKEAWAY” DILEMMA • FEAR NEGATIVE EMPLOYEE REACTION

  14. CUTTING COST w/o CUTTING QUALITY OF CARE I • REGIONAL CONCENTRATION OF COMPLEX SURGERY • DISEASE PREVENTION, EARLY DETECTION • CHRONIC DISEASE MANAGEMENT • PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING

  15. CUTTING COST w/o CUTTING THE QUALITY OF CARE II • TOTAL VALUE DRUG SELECTION AND PURCHASING • EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE GUIDELINES • ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS • CQI: MISTAKES COST MONEY

  16. CUTTING COST w/o CUTTING THE QUALITY OF CARE III • SAFETY CULTURE & ERROR REDUCTION • ALLIED HEALTH PROFESSIONALS • MATCH RESOURCES TO NEEDS • STANDARDIZE EQUIPMENT, etc.

  17. EFFECTIVE MANAGED CARE • COHESIVE GROUPS OF MDs UNDER COMMON MANAGEMENT • SELECT PHYSICIANS FOR QUALITY, EFFICIENCY AND TEAMWORK • PHYSICIANS AND PATIENTS THERE BY CHOICE • INTEGRATE FINANCING AND DELIVERY

  18. EFFECTIVE MANAGED CARE • INTEGRATE FULL SPECTRUM OF CARE • EVIDENCE-BASED GUIDELINES • SHARED COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL RECORD • CQI/TQM: PROCESS IMPROVEMENT

  19. EFFECTIVE MANAGED CARE MUST BE A MATTER OF CHOICE FOR DOCTORS AND PATIENTS

  20. WHAT MUST BE DONE? EVERYONE IN: • WIDE CHOICE • RESPONSIBLE CHOICE • INDIVIDUAL CHOICE • INFORMED CHOICE • MULTIPLE CHOICE

  21. EXCHANGES ARRANGE MULTIPLE CHOICE • CalPERS • CALIFORNIA CHOICE • PacADVANTAGE

  22. PUBLIC POLICY • INCENTIVES FOR EMPLOYERS TO CREATE EXCHANGES AND OFFER MULTIPLE CHOICE • ERISA EXEMPTION FOR EXCHANGES • REQUIRE FIXED DOLLAR CONTRIBUTIONS • LIMIT THE TAX BREAK

  23. IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICARE • COST BURDEN WILL BECOME INTOLERABLE • MEDICARE IS LOCKED INTO FFS COSTS • MUST BE TRANSFORMED INTO A MARKET DRIVEN MODEL

  24. IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICARE • TRANSITION A LOT EASIER IF PRIVATE SECTOR WERE THERE • TAX BREAK SUBSIDIZES ABILITY OF PRIVATE SECTOR TO COMPETE WITH MEDICARE • WE NEED BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS IN A MANAGED COMPETITION MODEL

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