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Slides for Class #4 ASU Technology Standards Seminar February 15, 2010 Brad Biddle. Introduction. Taxonomy / “How”. Business strategy / “Why”. Antitrust. IPR: RAND v. RF. IPR(+): “Openness”. IPR: Patent pools. Policy: private stnds & law. Policy: Role of government. Case study: China.

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Slides for Class #4

ASU Technology Standards Seminar

February 15, 2010

Brad Biddle


Introduction

Taxonomy / “How”

Business strategy / “Why”

Antitrust

IPR: RAND v. RF

IPR(+): “Openness”

IPR: Patent pools

Policy: private stnds & law

Policy: Role of government

Case study: China

Student presentations

Student presentations

Student presentations

*


INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

ANTITRUST / COMPETITION

STANDARDS LAW

Two primary ingredients


IP: monopoly

Standards: joint action by competitors

Antitrust: anti-monopoly

Antitrust: suspicious of joint action

[1]

[2]


PATENT CLAIM A

  • SSO

  • PARTICIPATING FIRMS

PATENT CLAIM B

NON-PATENTENED TECHNOLOGY

  • PATENT OWNERS

PATENT CLAIM C

PATENT CLAIM D

STANDARDS-COMPLIANT PRODUCT

  • SSOs OR PARTICIPATING FIRMS (POTENTIALLY) BEHAVING BADLY

  • Price fixing

  • Monopsony

  • Refusals to deal

  • TRANSACTION COST / COORDINATION ISSUES

  • Anticommons

  • Royalty stacking

  • Disclosure rules

  • Ex ante licensing

  • Patent pools

  • PATENT OWNERS (POTENTIALLY) BEHAVING BADLY

  • Patent hold-up / ambush



“During the standards setting process, Party A deceptively represented that they [had no relevant patents]/[would license on RAND terms] but now is seeking excessive post lock-in royalties.”

“Party B said it would license under certain terms in the past, but now has changed its mind and is demanding more.”


V.

  • FTC wins administrative process, wins in district court, LOSES in appellate court, Supreme Court denies cert.

  • FTC: JEDEC either would have (1) chosen differently, or (2) ensured RAND; in either case, it’s a Section 2 problem

  • DC Cir.: if “(2)” then just a price-for-patents issue; not for antitrust law to decide


V.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1460997

http://biddle.us/uploads/QCOM_v_BCOM_548_F3d_1004.pdf


V.

V.

Apple: Nokia's "false" F/RAND promise "enabled Nokia to obtain the 'hold up' power it now abusively seeks to wield."

http://standardslaw.org/AAPL-NOKCountersuit.pdf



“The SSO has excluded my technology.”

“The SSO is conspiring to set my royalties too low.”






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