1 / 86

Logical Formalization of intelligent agent systems

Logical Formalization of intelligent agent systems. Cheng-Chia Chen Department of Computer Science, National Cheng-Chi University. Contents. Introduction Review of basic nonclassical logics used in agent theory formalize knowledge, belief and actions of agents

tybalt
Download Presentation

Logical Formalization of intelligent agent systems

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Logical Formalization of intelligent agent systems Cheng-Chia Chen Department of Computer Science, National Cheng-Chi University

  2. Contents • Introduction • Review of basic nonclassical logics used in agent theory • formalize knowledge, belief and actions of agents • Formalize motivational attitudes of agents • Formalize communication between agents • Conclusion

  3. I. Introduction • What is an agent ? • Applications • Why an agent theory?

  4. I. Introduction What is an agent ?

  5. Some definitions Collected from: http://www.msci.memohis.edu/~franklin/AgentProg.html Is it an Agent, or just a Program?: A Taxonomy for Autonomous Agents Stan Franklin and Art Graesser Institute for Intelligent Systems University of Memphis

  6. The AIMA Agent [Russell and Norvig] • Anything that can be viewed as • perceiving its environment through sensors and • acting upon that environment through effectors. • too general such that by the definition, every program is an agent.

  7. The Maes Agent [MIT] • Autonomous agents are • computational systems that • inhabit some complex dynamic environment, • sense and act autonomously in this environment, and by doing so • realize a set of goals or tasks for which they are designed.

  8. The Hayes-Roth Agent [KSL,1995] • Intelligent agents continuously perform three functions: • perception of dynamic conditions in the environment; • action to affect conditions in the environment; and • reasoning to interpret perceptions, solve problems, draw inferences, and determine actions.

  9. The IBM Agent • Intelligent agents are software entities that • carry out some set of operations • on behalf of a user or another program • with some degree of independence or autonomy, and in so doing, • employ some knowledge or representation of the user's goals or desires.

  10. So, what is an agent ? • An autonomous agent is a system • situated within and is a part of an environment that • senses that environment and • acts on it, over time, • in pursuit of its own agenda and • so as to effect what it senses in the future.

  11. Agent Properties • Property Other Names Meaning • autonomous exercises control over its own actions • goal-oriented pro-active does not simply act in response purposeful to the environment • communicative social ability communicates with other agents, perhaps including people • reactive (sensing and acting) responds in a timely fashion to changes in the environment

  12. Agent Properties (cont’d) • Property Other Names Meaning • temporally is a continuously running continuous process • learning adaptive changes its behavior based on its previous experience • mobile able to transport itself from one machine to another • flexible actions are not scripted • character believable "personality" and emotional state.

  13. Applications • Systems and Network Management • Mail and Messaging • filtering of email, news etc. • Information Access and Management: • Information filtering and discovery • Collaboration • Electronic Commerce • Adaptive user Interfaces • Entertainment. • and more...

  14. Why an agent theory ? • For specifications and verification of agent systems • For reasoning about agent systems • For knowledge representation formalisms • for formalizing concepts of interest in philosophy, cognitive science. • Basis for analyzing micro and macro aspects of agent society.

  15. II. Review of basic logics • Classical propositional logic (CPL) • Basic modal logic • logic of knowledge and belief • deontic logic • logic of actions and programs(PDL)

  16. Elements of a Logic • Language • syntax (formal language) • semantics (model theory) • axiomatics (proof theory) • decidability & complexity (computation theory) • automated deduction (Theorem proving)

  17. Classical Propositional Logic(CPL) • The language L: • a set of proposition symbols (PV) : • p,q, r ... means it-is-raining, it-is-cloudy, ... • logical connectives: /\ (and), ~ (negation) • (well-formed) formulas (abstract syntax): P ::= p | P /\ Q | ~P • Definitions: P \/ Q abbreviates ~(~P /\ ~Q) P => Q abbreviates ~(P /\ ~Q)

  18. The semantics for CPL • Goals: • 1. define the contexts in which formulas can be given truth values. • 2. define the truth conditions for formulas. • interpretation (world, state): any assignment of truth value {1,0} to propositional symbols • Truth conditions (or satisfaction relation) |= : • I |= p iff I(p)=T; • I |= P /\ Q iff I |= P and I |= Q • I |= ~P iff not I |= P • If I |= A, then say I is a model of A.

  19. Some logical notions • A formula is satisfiable iff it is true in some world. • A formula is valid (a tautology) (|= A) if it is true in all worlds. • A is a logical consequence of a set of formulas S (S |= A) iff A is true in all models of S. • Problems : How to characterize the set {A | A is a tautology} ?

  20. Calculus and provability • A calculus C over a language L is a finite set of rules, each of the form: • (A1,A2, ..., An, B) • A1,A2,...,An : Premises • B: conclusion • if n = 0 => axioms • Example: (A, B, A /\B), (A, A=>B, B), (A=>B, B, A),...

  21. Provability • Given a calculus C, • The set C = {A | A is C-provable(denoted |-C A)} is defined recursively as follows: • Basis:If (A) is a rule, then A in C ---axioms • Ind: If (A1,..,An,B) is a rule & • A1,...,An in C, then B in C.

  22. An axomatization for CPL • Let CPL be the calculus: (1) Axiom schema: • A => (B => A) • (A=>(B =>C)) => ((A=>B)=>(A=>C)) • (~A => ~B) => (B => A) (2) Inference rule: • from A and A => B infer B (MP) • Theorem: A is valid in CPL iff A is CPL-provable

  23. Basic Modal logic • The logical study of necessity and possibility • The language: • CPL augmented with two modal operators: [] (necessity) and ⃟ (possibility). • P : any proposition , then []P (<>P) means “P is necessarily (possibly) true”. • Meaning of []p: • depends on the context it is used, not only determined by the truth value of p • A family of logics instead of a single logic

  24. Types of necessity • logical necessity: • e.g, p \/ ~p is logically necessarily true. • physical necessity: • F=ma • Epistemic necessity: • e.g., It is believed(known) that ... • Normal necessity: • e.g., It is obligated (permitted, forbidden) that ... • time-related (always, eventual) • Others: • After the programs terminates P must holds,...

  25. Formal Definition • The language: • Alphabet (S): • PV: a set of propositional variables. • logical connectives: ~ (not), /\ (and), [] (necessity) • MF: a set of modal formulas defined inductively: • A ::= p | A /\ B | ~ A | []A • Abbreviations (Macros) • (A \/ B) abbreviates ~(~A /\ ~B); • (A  B) abbreviates ~(A /\ ~B) • ⃟ A abbreviates ~[]~A

  26. Possible-world Semantics for modal logic • Truth conditions for p /\ q, p \/ q, p  q, and ~p . • Let p = “I win the game”, • q = “It is 5 p.m.” • Assume I win the game and • the present time is 3 p.m, • then p/\q: false, p\/q: true and pq: false. • But how about the statement: []p =It must be the case that I win the game. “

  27. Meaning of necessity and possibility: • The game: • Two players A,B, each getting a card from four cards labeled 1,2,3,4 randomly. • rule: • The player who get a card larger than the other’s wins.

  28. Scenario I: A gets “2”. • Then consider the following sentences: • 1. “A may possibly win” • = “It is possibly true that A win” = “⃟A_win” • 2. “A may possibly not win” • 3. “A must win” • 4. “B must not get “2”” • Which is right ? why?

  29. The answer: • Statement 1 is right • since (2,1) may be the real world, in which A wins. • Statement 2 is right • since (2,3), (2,4) are possible, in which A does not win. • statement 3 is false • since there are cases (e.g., (2,3), (2,4)) in which A does not win. • Statement 4 is true since in all possible cases B does not get 2.

  30. (3,4) The Rule: (2,1) A_win ~B_2 (2,4) ~A_win ~B_2 (2,3) ~A_win ~B_2 Impossible worlds ~[]A_win ⃟ A_win ⃟ ~A_win [] ~B_2 (2,?) Possible worlds Real world

  31. The Possible-world Semantics: • Let W = the set of worlds • e.g, {(x,y) | x = 1..4, y =1..4 & x ¹ y} • Let V : W x PV -> {0,1} be a valuation function s.t., V(w,p) =1 iff p is assigned true at world w. • e.g, V((2,1), A-win) = 1 • R be a binary relation (I.e., subset of WxW) s.t. wRw’ iff w’ is a possible world of w. • e.g, (2,x)R(2,1), (2,x)R(2,3), (2,x)R(2,4). • The triple M=<W,R,V> is called a (possible-world) structure.

  32. Truth-conditions for modal formulas M = <W,R,V>: a possible world structure; w: a world ∈ W, • The statement : “A is true at world w in structure M” is defined as follows: • M,w |= p iff V(w,p) = 1 • M,w |= A /\ B iff M,w |= A and M,w |= B • M,w |= ~A iff not M,w |= A. • M,w |= ⃟ A iff • A is true at some possible world of w. • M,w |= [] A iff A is true at all possible worlds of w.

  33. Some definitions • A: modal formula, M: structure, • C: a class of structures • A is valid iff it is true in all worlds of all structures. • A is C-valid iff it is true at all worlds of all structures of C. • Problem: Given a class of structures C, • {A | A is C-valid } = ?

  34. Interesting classes of structures • Class name Property of R • T reflexive: wRw. • D serial: for all w, there is w’ s.t. w R w’. • 4 transitive: wRw’ & w’Rw’’ ⇒ wRw’’. • 5 Eulidean: wRw’ & wRw’’ ⇒ w’ R w’’. • B symmetric: wRw’ ⇒ w’Rw. • r: any string from {T,D,4,5,B} without repetition. • Kr = the class of the structures whose R satisfying all properties mentioned in r. • (I.e., Every theorem of the logic Kr is valid in all Kr-struture, and vice versa.)

  35. Axiomatization of modal logics • Axioms definitions • PC all truth-functional tautologies • K [](PQ) ([]P []Q) • T []P  P • D []P  ~[]~p • 4 []P [][]P • 5 ~[]P []~[]P • B ~P []~[]P. • Inference rule: MP: from P, P  Q infer Q Nec: from P infer []P

  36. Axiomatizations of modal logic • r: any subset {T,D,4,5,B}. • Kr = the axiom system (calculus) including axioms K, PC and all of r and inference rules MP and Nec. • Kr-provable formulas are defined recursively as follows: • 1. Every axioms of Kr is Kr-provable. • 2. If P, P  Q are Kr-provable then so is Q (MP) • 3. If P is Kr-provable, then so is []P (Nec). • Theorem[Chellas80]: • A is Kr-valid iff A is Kr-provable.

  37. · w Å · Some useful modal logics • Logical system Property of R usage • S5 (KT45) equivalence logic of knowledge • KD serial deontic logic • KD45 almost equ. logic of belief • S4 (KT4) ref. tran. Intuitionistic logic • S4.3 linear(total) temporal logic {w’ | w R w’} w · · Å Worlds inside are fully connected · • real world must be possible • real world may and may not be possible

  38. Logic of Knowledge and Belief • Modal logic of knowledge : KT45(S5) • Modal logic of belief: KD45( weak S5) • Epsitemic interpretation of knowledge&belief axioms • KA means A is known; BA means A is believed. • T: []A  A (knowledge axioms) • D: []A  ~[]~A (belief axiom) • 4: []A [][] A (positive introspection) • 5:~[]A []~[]A (negative introspection) • K:[]A /\ [](A  B) []B (distribution axiom) • Nec: From p infer []p -- agent knows the logic

  39. Extensions to multimodal logics: • S5 (KD45) can model only one single agent’s knowledge (believes) • Multi-agent cases: n agents: 1,2,3,...,n; • 2n knowledge(and belief) operators K1,B1,...,Kn,Bn: • KiA ( BiA ) means agent i knows(resp. believes) A. • Resulting logic: S5nWS5n • N copies of S5, and N copies of KD45, each for one agent.e.g., Tj: KjAA where j =1,..,n. • semantics: Structure M=<W,{Ki,Bi}i=1..n, V> • Each Ki is an equivalence relation on W and Bi is a serial,trans. and euclidean relation.

  40. Related Issues[Halpern85] • Logical Omniscience Problem: • Agents with S5 (KD45) ability are perfect logical reasoners, but human never be. • Common knowledge, Distributed knowledge • [E]P = [1]P /\ [2]P.../\[n]P • [C]P = [E]P /\[E][E]P /\ [E][E][E]P /\ ... = [E]P /\[E][C]P • [D]P = P can be known by an agent who knows all what others known (the wisest man). • Needed and useful in many fields (Economics,distributing sys,AI ...)

  41. Deontic interpretation of modal logic • Deontic logic (D or KD) • PA means A is permitted; OA means A is obligated; FA means A is forbidden. • A is (strongly) forbidden = • Doing A or bringing about A will result in punishment (dangerous, disastrous) worlds. • A is obligated = not doing A or not bring about A will result in punishment. = ~A is forbidden. • A is (weekly) permitted = A is not forbidden = doing A may not result in punishment. • Another possible pairs: • weekly forbidden/strongly permitted

  42. Semantic analysis of forbidden, obligation and permission ~drive-car murder ~pay-tax ~dead ~drive-car ~pay-tax dead ~murder drive-car ~dead pay-tax ~ murder ~drive-car pay-tax ~murder ~dead current world drive-car murder pay-tax dead sets of worlds which may become the real world commit-crime or dead (undesired world) F murder : since all murder-worlds are red. O pay-tax: since all ~pay-tax world are red. P drive-car: some drive-car-world is white. Permitted worlds

  43. Formalization of Deontic logic • W: The set of all possible worlds • D: A set of undesired, punishment world • V: WXPV -> {0,1} with the constraint that • V(w,v) = 1 iff w ∈ D. • I.e., we use v to denote all sanction or punishment worlds. • R: a binary relation on W, s.t. • wRw’ means w’ is a possible world that the agent may choose to become the real world from w.

  44. Truth conditions for PA,OA, &FA • M,w |= FA iff M,w |= [] (Av) • ie., for all w’, if wRw’ & M,w|=A then M,w |= v. • M,w |= OA iff M,w |= F~A iff M,w |= [](~A v) • M,w |= PA iff M,w |=~FA iff M,w |= ⃟(A/\ ~v) • I.e., there is a world w’ s.t. wRw’ & M,w |= A /\ ~v.

  45. Properties of the deontic logic: • By definition: • FA = [] (A v) ; • OA = F~A = [](~A  v); • PA = ~FA = ⃟ (A /\ ~v); • All KD axioms(K, D) • Desirable property: OA => PA: not valid in K but valid in KD (I.e., R must be serial)

  46. possible past now real history real past real future possible future Temporal interpretation of modal logic • Taxonomy of temporal structures: • linear v.s. branch-time, • past time v.s. future time v.s. past&future • continuous v.s. discrete

  47. Linear discrete time temporal logic • Temporal operators: • FA means A is eventually true • GA means A is always true • A U B means A is true until B becomes true • 0A: A is true at the next time.

  48. Meaning of temporal formulas • Linear discrete-time temporal structure: 0 1 2 3 ..... n n+1 m initial world Fp p Gq q q q q .... q..... q 0r r AUB A A A A B

  49. Meaning of temporal formulas • linear discrete temporal logic: • W = N = {0,1,2,3,...} :time point set • V:NXPV -> {0,1} • Truth conditions: • M,n |= 0A iff M,n+1 |= A. • M,n |= FA iff there is m  n s.t., M,m |= A • M,n |= GA iff for all m  n, M,m |= A. • M,n |= A U B iff there is m  n s.t., M,m|= B & for all m > s  n, M,s |= A.

  50. Logic of programs and actions • Modal logic of programs (Dynamic Logic) • PDL: propositional version of DL • The language: • Primitive programs: a,b,c,... • Primitive propositions: p,q,r... • program constructs: “ ;”, “|”,”*”,”?”. • logic connectives: /\,~, [A] for each program A.

More Related