Politics and Reconstruction in Post-genocide Rwanda: A Re-appraisal

1. Politics and Reconstruction in Post-genocide Rwanda: A Re-appraisal “Peace, Security and Development” Conference, Mbarara University of Science and TechnologyMay 23-25, 2013

2. In 1994 the RPF inherited a devastated country • Even the most optimistic analysts doubted it would be anything but a failed state for the foreseeable future • Extraordinary situation that called for an extraordinary response The RPF took to thinking ‘outside the box’ of conventional politics

3. Only armed and well resources political group in the country • Motivated to share power rather than monopolise it and shut other groups out • Gov’t of national unity: with pre-existing political parties • Only MRND & CDR excluded – but individual, untainted members free to participate Urugwiro consultations: gacaca courts, decentralisation, new constitution

4. The 2003 National Constitution based on several rounds of grassroots consultations. Highlights: • Power sharing entrenched – RPF versus other parties – 50/50 cabinet • Other positions: President, President of the Senate, Speaker of Parliament, Prime Minister, Supreme Court President • National consultative forum of political parties Post-genocide political settlement therefore highly inclusive

5. Foundation stones of the political settlement: • Commitment against a revival of ethnic sectarianism • Belief in development as the principal path to reconciliation • Pursuit of formally ruled-governed rather than clientelistic political competiton The 10-party consensus resting on these foundation stones & the rejection of winner-takes-all politics explains the exclusion of some political organisations

6. The consensus also underlies the post-1990s internal political stability • The stability has in turn facilitated the pursuit of development and social change, of which achievements include: rapid declines in maternal & child mortality; expansion of access to health, education, safe water & electricity; increased food security; reduction in poverty rates; etc. Key questions: will social change eradicate ethnic sectarianism? How long will political consensus last? Jury still out.

7. Media in Rwanda • More than 10 radio stations; more than 15 newspaper titles • Few newspapers publish regularly - limited readership; lack of financial sustainability • Limited readership, lack of skills and of financial viability greater (print) media enemies than government hostility • Fair amount of self-censorship in electronic & print media – progressively declining, though New media-friendly legislation: access to information, self-regulation

8. Civil society • There are thousands of civil society groups (if cooperatives are included) • History of fraught relations with the government, especially human rights NGOs (seen as too much under foreign influence) • In recent years development NGOs have abandoned adversarial contestation with the government & opted for collaboration – increasingly in service provision, advocacy & policy influence via round-table consultations Lack of financial resources, skills, and capacity for engagement greater hindrances than GoR hostility

9. Conclusions • Rwanda hardly a democracy in a conventional sense – but also not the iron-clad dictatorship of popular imagination • Ample space for political parties, media organisations and civil society to influence policy than claimed by enthusiastic GoR/RPF/Kagame critics Most important: GoRcommitted to democratisation – but not through the route most familiar to democracy exporters & activists – great learning of East Asian lessons