Lessons from the Andhra Pradesh Randomized Evaluation Studies (AP RESt). Achieving universal quality primary education in India. M SREENIVASA RAO AZIM PREMJI FOUNDATION 29 April, 2011. Basic concepts, if not mastered early, may never be mastered.
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Lessons from the Andhra Pradesh Randomized Evaluation Studies (AP RESt)
Achieving universal quality primary education in India
M SREENIVASA RAO
AZIM PREMJI FOUNDATION
29 April, 2011
Less than half the students who don’t know single digit addition in 2nd grade, learn it by the end of 5th grade!
Notes: Based on APRESt data for Control schools only, Oct-2009.
Motivation and effort-levels of government school teachers in India are a serious problem
Source: “Teacher Absence in India”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 15-Sep-04
Move the focus of education policy from outlays to outcomes
Focus systematically on institutional incentives for service delivery
Improve evidence base for policy with rigorous (randomized) evaluations
Let’s use mid-day meals (a popular program in India) as our example:
What has been the impact of the mid-day meal program?
1: Define outcomes
2: Measure outcomes
3: Compare to appropriate control
We use a randomised evaluation methodology: the “gold standard” in social science research
Feedback + Monitoring
Feedback + Monitoring
Extra Contract Teacher + Diagnostic Feedback
Individual Incentive + Diagnostic Feedback
Block Grant + Diagnostic Feedback
Group Incentive + Diagnostic Feedback
Business as usual
Outcomes for treatment schools relative to comparison schools
The lack of impact on test scores, despite enhanced teaching activity, suggests that teachers temporarily changed behavior when observed, but did not actively use the feedback reports in their teaching.
Student learning improved in the first year, but not the second
Household spending fell significantly when the grant was anticipated
Students in extra CT schools significantly outperform students in comparison schools
CTs have lower rates of absence and higher rates of teaching activity
Reduction of intrinsic motivation
Teaching to the test
Threshold effects/ Neglecting weak kids
Cheating / paper leaks
Outcomes for bonus schools relative to control schools
Overall, no child in a bonus school was worse off relative to a comparable child in a control school
Strong teacher support for performance pay
Notes: Results reported on the cohort of students that entered class 1 in the first year of the study.
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