U.S. Policy toward Cross-Strait Relations

U.S. Policy toward Cross-Strait Relations Week 9-10

Week 9-10: Teaching Outline • The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy • U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue • Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？

1. The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy Strategic interest vs. ideological consideration Which one (side) is more important? The Nixon phenomenon Will vs. capability

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy Since the establishment of Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations in 1979, Washington has maintained a virtually semiofficial relationship with Taiwan in economic, political, and even military spheres. The United States claims it would maintain a “one China” policy It refuses to recognize the Taiwan issue as a purely domestic matter of China.

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy • Principle: peaceful resolution • Policy objective • No war (no peace?), no unification • no independence • Subjecting the one-China policy to the principle of peaceful resolution • From peaceful integration to peaceful resolution

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy The bottom line of the U.S. policy is that the Taiwan issue should be resolved peacefully by the Chinese on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, and Washington takes an open attitude to any specific resolution of the issue, willing to accept either reunification or independence. In other words, while the United States is pleased to see a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, it may not enthusiastically accept China’s peaceful reunification in the end.

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy In the late 1980s, the strategic foundation of Sino-U.S. cooperation in dealing with the Soviet Union was gradually loosening due to the detente of U.S.-Soviet relations and the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy With the dramatic changes within former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in the early 1990s, the world entered into the post-Cold War era Consequently, there was a want of a solid foundation of Sino-U.S. strategic cooperation and a new one was yet to be found

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy In this transitional period, the United States no longer took China’s core interests, including cross-strait reunification, so seriously as in the past. U.S. officials avoided talking about peaceful reunification

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy They deliberately interpreted peaceful settlement as a broad concept referring either to peaceful reunification or peaceful separation They replaced the term “one China” principle frequently used in the past with the “one China” policy, which was subject to the “peaceful solution” principle (the supreme principle)

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy Dual-track policy Maintaining a balance between the two sides Periodical shift of its preference Using China to check the Soviet Union/Jiang Nan incident (70-80s) Tiananmen/end of the Cold War (early 90s) U.S. –China interest redefined (late 90s) Even-handed policy/co-managing the Taiwan issue (2000s)

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy Strategic ambiguity Double deterrence Aggressive diplomacy Toward strategic clarity? conditional commitment to T’s security Not support vs. oppose Opposing referenda on Taiwan’s bit for UN Intervening in Taiwanese domestic policies

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy • The most important goal of the United States in the Taiwan Strait is “to serve as a reliable friend to a longtime partner that shares many American values and is acting responsibly in international politics” and the second goal is to avoid war, particularly large-scale war （Christopher Twomey）

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy • Some people may mistake the second goal as the first goal and others may think a Taiwan that “remains militarily separated” from the mainland as in the U.S. national interest • Isolationalism vs. hard realism

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy • Most American views would “cede the initiative” to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, believing that American interests are “fundamentally about the nature of interaction between the two sides rather than the outcome that comes out of that interaction.” • Realism or liberalism?

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy • Christopher Twomey, “Limits of Coercion: Compellence, Deterrence, and Cross-Strait Political-Military Affairs,” in Roger Cliff, Phillip Saunders, Scott Harold, New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s Security (Washington, DC: Rand Corporation, 2011), p.52.

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy • Beijing’s increasing military capability can deter Taiwan from moving toward independence • It cannot obtain compelling success in forcing Taiwan to accept unification without the ability to conduct a viable amphibious offence prior to 2020.

1.The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy • In terms of military capabilities, Taiwan is able to maintain a status quo of no unification and no independence within 10 years. • From a non-military perspective, the United States is divided on the possibility of Taiwan’s acceptance of unification under certain pressures (Christopher Twomey)

Chinese Embassy in the United States

The Role of Taiwan in US strategic rebalance or pivoting to Asia At National Committee on American Foreign Policy, June 5-6, 2012

Beijing, Taipei, and Washington U.S. Policy Objective Peaceful separation No unification and no independence Peaceful unification Peaceful development Unificaiton by force Radical TI Status quo Taibei’s Policy Beijing’s Policy

2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue The severer tension between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the more likely that the United States would encourage them to conduct constructive dialogues and build a peace and stable framework From the three no’s (no encouragement, no intervention, no mediation）to interim agreement

2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue Kenneth Lieberthal’s Interim Agreement Interim agreement presupposes some sort of loose unification (confederation) in the future Taipei should negotiate with Beijing for a stable relationship (Ken Lieberthal, 2001) Harry Harding’s Modus Vivendi Maintaining the status quo Any resolution should be accepted by the Taiwanese people

2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue • The closer of cross-strait relations, the more likely that the United States would take a cautious position on political negotiations between the two sides, worrying that China’s possible unification might affect American strategic interest in the Taiwan Strait?

2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue • “conditional encourage” • Unlikely to push for the interim agreement as much as it did in the past • Unlikely to oppose peace talks between the two sides • More worrying the loss of the momentum for peace • Positive development better than strait crisis • Overburdened with other global issues

2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue • Maintaining the positive momentum in the development of U.S.-China relations (James Jones, US National Security Advisor） • Engaging and cooperating with China positively, handling the Taiwan issue cautiously （Jeffery Bader, Senior Director for Asia-Pacific Affairs, NSC） • Welcoming the improvement of cross-Strait relations（James Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, DoS) • Richard Bush, Ken Lieberthal, Bonnie Glasser

2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue • Improvement of Cross-Strait Relations Should Not Affect Washington-Taiwan Ties in a Negative Way • U.S. is confident in maintaining a strong relationship with Taiwan, never worrying too close ties between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait; cross-Strait dialogue is in the interest of Washington and Taipei, as well as in the interest of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, which is a win-win game（Dennis Wider，2008, Former Senior Director for Asia-Pacific Affairs, NSC）

2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue The Obama administration will seek to change the trilateral zero-sum game into a positive-sum game, encouraging the improvement of cross-Strait relations (Bonnie Glaser, CSIS, 2009）

2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue If the new development goes beyond the scope allowed by the US, new countermeasures are necessary (Robert Sutter, 2009) The Ma administration has given too much to the mainland in economic, diplomatic and defensive areas, resulting an unbalanced game manipulated by Beijing

2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue • Taiwan may no longer serve as a strategic partner of U.S. in hedging against China • The U.S. might consider to deal with China directly, even at the cost of Taiwan’s interest, to ensure U.S. interest in the Taiwan Strait will not be hurt (Robert Sutter, 2009)

2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue • Debate between Robert Sutter and Richard Bush/Alan Romberg • Washington’s long policy goal in the Taiwan region is to maintain a power balance favoring the U.S. and Taiwan, which has been weakened by the increasing influence of the mainland on Taiwan (Sutter, 2009) • Washington’s policy goal is to maintain peace and stability in the region, which can be achieved not only by balance of power, but also by diplomatic resolution of dispute, encouragement of cooperation, a healthy U.S.-China relations, and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue (Bush & Romberg)

2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue Mainland China has not changed the balance of power cross the Taiwan Strait, unable to force Taiwan to give in Using military power is counterproductive to China’s final goal

2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political Dialogue • Ma claims that reducing Beijing’s suspicion and expanding cross-Strait cooperation can better guarantee Taiwan’s prosperity, international dignity, and security • If Taiwanese voters feel that Ma fails to keep his promise during the election, they can use votes to punish him（Bush & Romberg, 2009）

3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？ • In the beginning of the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, especially from 1972 to 1982, the U.S. officials had accepted the prospects of peaceful reunification of China because of their strategic needs of “allying China to counterbalance against the Soviet Union”

3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？ • The United States expressed its respect and understanding of Chinese interest in national unity soon after the two countries decided to launch the normalization process

3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？ On July 9, 1971, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai told visiting National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that “Taiwan Province is an inalienable of Chinese territory which must be resorted to the motherland.” Kissinger answered:

3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？ As for the political future of Taiwan, we are not advocating a “two Chinas” solution or a “one China, one Taiwan” solution As a student of history, one’s prediction would have to be that the political evolution is likely to be in the direction which Prime Minister Chou En-Lai indicated to me One China solution

3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？ In May 1978, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski told Deng Xiaoping that the United States hoped the Taiwan question would be solved peacefully and eventually one China will become a reality

3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？ On September 30, 1981, Ye Jianying, chairman of National People’s Congress Standing Committee of the PRC, made the “nine-point proposal” on China’s peaceful reunification. • U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig openly appreciated it and even suggested Taipei to respond to it positively

3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？ “The reunification would occur by peaceful means, and we have encouraged the cross-strait dialogue to achieve that” -- Bill Clinton, 1998 Susan Shirk’s formula of one country, three systems (1999）

With Susan Shirk

3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？ • If the two sides choose reunification, the U.S. has no objection -- Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, 2002 • If Taiwan wanted to accommodate the mainland’s request for unification, Washington could do little to prevent it --Thomas Christensen, 2002

3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？ Peaceful unification is in the U.S. interest, because the United States has long-term security and moral interests in the political liberalization of the mainland Taiwan’s status as a Chinese democracy —holding out the prospect of unification with the mainland under the right set of conditions—can be a powerful force for liberalization on the mainland” --Thomas Christensen, 2002

3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？ Richard Bush proposed that the two sides accept some type of confederation that would satisfy the minimum objectives of each side—Beijing would get a form of unification and Taiwan would preserve its claim that its government retains sovereignty within a national union

3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful Unification？ James Lilley, former AIT Chairman and U.S. ambassador to China also believed that Taipei should not seek independence unilaterally, but negotiate with Beijing for peace coexistence. In addition to many examples of multi-countries coexisting in Chinese history, the EU model has provided a good experience in economic and political integration The two sides could find a mutually acceptable formula for their coexistence (2006)

With Raymond Burghardt, AIT Chairman, June 5, 2012

With Douglas Paal, Vice President of The Carnegie Endowment

U.S. Policy toward Cross-Strait Relations