DESIGN FOR SAFETY

1. DESIGN FOR SAFETY HAZARD & OPERABILITY STUDIES -HAZOPs

2. RISK ANALYSIS METHODS • HAZOP - (HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY) • PETERS & TIMMERHAUS, P. 29 AND PERRY’S, 26-10 • EXAMINES CONDITIONS AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS IN THE FACILITY • RESULTS IN A REPORT • WITH • LIST OF CHANGES FOR PROCESS • DEFINITION OF PROCESS HAZARDS • CLARIFICATION OF OPERATING PROCEDURES

3. SAFETY IN PLANTS • MORE THAN JUST A PHRASE • THE COMBINATION OF CHEMICALS AND PROCESSES CAN RESULT IN HAZARDS • THE SIMPLEST HAZARDS ARE THE SAME AS IN ANY OTHER INDUSTRIAL OR OFFICE SITUATION • TRIPPING OR FALLING • ELECTRIC SHOCK, • CHOKING • JUST GETTING TO WORK

4. CAUSES OF DEATHS National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 61, No. 7, October 26, 2012

5. CAUSES OF DEATHS National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 61, No. 7, October 26, 2012

6. BREAKDOWN FOR ACCIDENTSAGES 35 – 44, 2004 DATA http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/leadcaus.html

7. LOCATION OF INJURIES • http://www.nsc.org/library/report_injury_usa.htm • THE SAME REPORT INDICATES THE LOCATIONS OF MOST DEATHS AND INJURIES

8. RELATIVE RATES FOR CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES • http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshc_d99.htm#first.link • 188.3 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE COUNTRY • 111.4 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY • 124 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY • 85 PER 10,000 WORKERS FOR THE DRUG INDUSTRIES

9. OBJECTIVE FOR ENGINEERS • ANTICIPATE THE POSSIBLE HAZARDS AND • DESIGN THEM OUT OF THE SYSTEM • DESIGN THE SYSTEM TO MINIMIZE THE FREQUENCY AND THE INTENSITY • REDUCE THE RISK AS LOW AS PRACTICAL WHILE STILL KEEPING AN ECONOMICALLY SOLVENT OPERATION

10. RISK AVERSION • http://www.nsc.org/lrs/statinfo/odds_dying.jpg

11. IDENTIFY INHERENT PROBLEMS • METHODS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED WITH OBJECTIVES: • DEFINE PROCESS HAZARDS • HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS • SAFETY & HEALTH IMPACTS OF LOSS OF CONTROL • DETERMINE HISTORY OF INCIDENTS IN RELATED FACILITIES • CONFIRM ADEQUACY OF OPERATING, ENGINEERING AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS • EVALUATE IMPACT OF FACILITY SITING

12. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS • ANALYSES ARE NOW REQUIRED FOR PROCESSES AS PART OF: • SARA TITLE III - COMMUNITY RIGHT TO KNOW AS PER EPA DEVELOPED 40CFR67, RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/law/sara.htm) • OSHA REGULATION CFR 1910.119 (http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_id=9760&p_table=STANDARDS

13. HAZOPS FLOW CHART

14. ASSEMBLE ANALYSIS TEAM • WHO HAVE NECESSARY PROCESS EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE • DESIGN ENGINEERS • OPERATORS • MATERIALS SPECIALISTS • EH&S SPECIALISTS • MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

15. COLLECT DATA • PFD’S, P&ID’S, ONE-LINES, LOGIC DIAGRAMS, & OTHER DESIGN DRAWINGS • EQUIPMENT DRAWINGS, CALCULATIONS AND SPECIFICATIONS • MAINTENANCE INFORMATION • MSDS

16. DEFINE PROCESS NODES • WALK THROUGH THE PROCESS AND BREAK IT INTO AREAS FOR ANALYSIS • LOCATE THESE ON P&IDs http://www.tisec.com/images/reliability/refinery.jpg http://www.mne.psu.edu/me415/spring06/AP1/PID.jpg

17. ANALYZE PARAMETERS FOR EACH NODE • PURPOSE OR INTENT • PROCESS FUNCTIONS INCLUDE: • HEATING/COOLING, PRESSURIZATION, SEPARATION, MIXING, REACTION, INVENTORY, TRANSPORT, ETC. • PROCESS VARIABLES INCLUDE: • PRESSURE, FLOW, TEMPERATURE, LEVEL, COMPOSITION, MIXING, SEPARATION, CORROSION, EROSION, ETC. • HUMAN INTERACTION: • HOW IS THE OPERATOR INTEGRATED INTO THE OPERATION OF THE PROCESS AT EACH NODE.

18. NO OR NOT MORE LESS AS WELL AS REVERSE OTHER THAN FLUCTUATION EARLY LATE POSSIBLE PROCESS DEVIATIONSPREDICT RESULTS IF NON-STANDARD CONDITIONS ARISE, WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF SOURCE

19. DEFINE RISK • SEVERITY AND PROBABILITY • DETERMINE CAUSE • EQUIPMENT FAILURE • OPERATOR ERROR • ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES • EXTERNAL IMPACTS http://www.qualityamerica.com/QAProducts/images/fishbone.jpg

20. ESTIMATE SEVERITY

21. PREDICT EVENT FREQUENCY

22. COMPLETE REVISION RECOMMENDATIONS • EXAMINE EXISTING SAFEGUARDS • DEFINE REVISIONS AND ESTABLISH CHECK LIST TO IMPLEMENT • ACTIONS THAT CAN REMOVE THE CAUSE – • INHERENT FAIL-SAFE DESIGN ACTIONS TO MITIGATE OR ELIMINATE CONSEQUENCES