Sailing between Scylla and Charybdis

1. Sailing between Scylla and Charybdis Alumnae Continuing Education April 2, 2013

2. Hendrik Spruyt Professor of International Relations Director of the Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies Northwestern University

3. Outline of talk • I. How have things shaped up since the beginning of the Arab Spring? Has the “Spring” turned to “Fall”? • II. Forces shaping the future of the Middle East and North Africa: • Oil and democracy? • The role of the military • III. The U.S position and policy after the revolutions

4. I. How has the “Arab Spring” evolved so far? • A recap • Not that you need one of course • And an update

5. Causes of revolutions in general (historically) • 1. External context and pressure: • 2. Existing internal structural tension • In the Middle and North Africa: • Economic stagnation in the face of globalization (where are the emerging markets of the Middle East? Excepting Turkey) • Corruption, patrimonialism, income inequality

6. B. What is at stake in revolutionary episodes? • “Moments of Madness”(Aristide Zolberg) • Everything appears possible because political events change human consciousness • “The world turned upside down” • (Christopher Hill on English Revolution—the rise of Ranters, Levellers, Diggers)

7. Two important conclusions • 1. Revolutions create space for alternative conceptions of social, political, and cultural order—fundamental transformation of society, culture and politics

8. 2. Revolutions create opportunities for • a) Charismatic leaders • Non-routine, not rule bound, and not beholden to their followers • The leader re-defines the realm of the possible. The leader as “savior.” • (Lenin 1917; Khomeini in Iran 1980)

9. b) Organizations and institutions that have a comprehensive alternative view • Two likely contenders: Military and Islamic organizations

10. Revolutionary stages in general and with reference to MENA • 1st phase: limited demands • 2nd: Possibilities: • 1.Government pays of demands • Oil regimes “sidepayments” • In general economic growth can be used to sustain an authoritarian regime (S. Korea, Taiwan prior to late 1970s, Singapore, China today) • 2. Limited government reform • royal dynasties, Morocco; Jordan

11. 3. Government succeeds in repression • Iran, see upcoming lecture by Golkar • 4. Government falls—moderates win • Tunisia (Turkish model? See Ozel’s lecture) • 5. Governments attempt violent repression • Libya, Syria • Scenario 4 is thus the scenario with a prospect of democratic government succeeding (5 depends on the outcome of the war)

12. ` • 3rd phase: But even moderates might not be able to deliver a democratic government. Rising expectations but what if moderates cannot fulfill demands • Tunisia? Egypt? • 4th phase: Radicals ascend (Mensheviks and Bolsheviks; French terror)

13. 5th phase: Dictatorship but less radical in intent. Attempt to stabilize the regime • Radicals turn on each other (French revolution) • Revolution turns external (nationalist fervor; French, Chinese revolutions) • Who is the external enemy? Israel? U.S? Iran?

14. II. Possible trajectories for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) • Divergent trajectories of the Middle East and North Africa. Not “one size fits all.” • Who are well organized? • Military • Islamist organizations (political, social, religious) • Both Islamic parties and Armed Forces might become obstacles to fundamental democratic reform

15. Why have Islamic groups been successful? • Natural organizational structure (religious leadership; historical roots) • In a vacuum (there were few social political organization permitted beyond the authoritarian institutions), religious groups are “ready to go” institutions • Comprehensive world view in many aspects • Modernity is complex; psychological and material anxieties • Multiple social functions (charities, etc.) • Discipline and voter turn out

16. The Military • Two key features that influence the role of the military in their response to demands for democracy • 1. The degree of institutionalization • Meritocratic principles vs. patrimonialism • Rule bound • Separation of private interests from public function • Focused on the national interest rather than factional or bureaucratic interest • Separate identity from the regime

17. 2. Connection to society • If there are strong links between the armed forces and the population, the military will be less inclined to use force. • Ex. Tiananmen square riots and types of units • Example: U.S. military. Institutionalization: meritocratic; public control and public resources; national interest; not politically identified. Social connection: High, although perhaps lower than with conscript army.

18. Types of civil-military relations • 1. Autocratic –political regimes • Military and government are organically linked • Armed forces retain veto power • Examples: Algeria, Egypt, Syria • The tacit “deal” between military and Muslim Brotherhood with the ousting of Mubarak • Will this last?

19. 2. Tribal monarchies • A) Forces are drawn from select groups or tribes • Examples: Persian Gulf; Morocco, Jordan • B) And/Or forces have strong foreign component • Bahrain, Qatar, Oman,

20. 3. Regimes with multiple military structures • Multiple parallel armed forces (divide and rule) • Reliance on select groups (tribes, clan) or units with ideological fervor vs. regulars • Examples: Iran-military and para-military structure, see Golkar • Iraq under Sadam (revolutionary guards; overweighting of Sunni, family ties) • Libya Qadaffi; family ties; mercenaries; select units

21. Conclusions • If the armed forces have a high level of institutionalization and high level of social embeddedness: the military will will be less prone to violence; stand aside from politics (the ideal type Western conscript army)

22. If the military has a low level of institutionalization and low social embeddedness Armed forces will be more inclined to repress demands for reform; serve the authoritarian state, civil war

23. Various civil military structures in the MENA region • Tunisia • Relative small military (35,000) • Low defense spending (1.4% of GDP) • Attempt to depoliticize by political leaders (Bourguiba, Ben Ali—to limit political rivals) • Conscript army • Conclusion: Relatively well institutionalized, socially embedded. Result sided with reform

24. Egypt • Institutionalization weaker than Tunisia • Organic relation govt. and military • Military as economic actor (10-40% of GDP), thus public and private interlocked • But separate identity from regime (national interest through external war) • U.S. influence • Social embeddedness through conscript army

25. Egypt • Conclusion: military waffles. Early support of Mubarak then pushed him out. Condominium with Islamists (for now)

26. Libya • Institutionalization extremely low • Patrimonial rule not meritocratic • Multiple military structures and disembedded from Libyan society

27. Libya • Multiple military structures • Family connected elite units • Foreign mercenaries • Tribal groups • Weak identity of regular army • People’ s militia as auxiliary

28. Privileged units under direct family control of Qadaffi (Khamis elite brigade)

29. Government by terror

30. East European mercenaries on trial July 2012

31. Result: Fractioning of the army: Civil war between hard core loyalists and segments of the regular military that favored rebels

32. Syria • Somewhat similar to Libyan situation (multiple structures, patrimonialism) • Majority of the military Sunni(conscript army), but most of the military leadership is of the Alawi set • Long standing tradition of using minorities (French) • Alawi supported coup vs. Sunni officers in the 1960s to bring the Ba’ath party and later Hafez al Assad (himself Alawi) to power

33. Alawites 12 percent of the population but constitute 80 percent of the officer corps and 70 % of all non-conscripts. • Elite divisions, the Republican Guard, 4th mechanized division commanded by Bashar al Assad’s brother,exclusively Alawite

34. Conclusion: divided military with Alawite units disembedded from Sunni society, weak institutionalization due to patrimonialism • Armed forces divided, hence civil war.

35. Bahrain • U.S. Interests (5th fleet and airbase support during Iraq 1991, 2003 and Afghanistan) • Tribal monarchy • Weak institutionalization • Highly patrimonial (Khalifa family) • Exclusion of Shia from key military or political posts (Shia not allowed to serve in the armed forces). Not meritocratic advancement.

36. Weak social embeddednes • Shia exclusion despite being a majority • Reliance on foreign troops (Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states) • Outcome: Military reacted with violence to demands for reform

37. III. Trajectories of development-Continued • Natural resources (oil) curse or blessing? • Excepting countries that already have a well established democracy (U.S.; Norway, etc.) • Focus is on countries that are do not have an established democracy but have natural resources in their countries

39. A. Economic consequences of natural resource abundance • “The Dutch disease” (natural gas boom in the Netherlands 1960s, 1970s): • Inflationary pressures (Spanish silver) • Displaces investment in manufacturing, production, etc • Forestalls fiscal adjustment (overly generous welfare payments) • Of 23 developing countries reliant on natural resource exports, only 2 had annual growth rates over 2% between 1970-1995.

40. Political consequences of oil rents • 1. Can lead to conflict if unequally distributed (Nigeria) • 2. Allows for poor economic policy as long as oil prices remain high • (Venezuela; generous side payments to the poor but also alienation of other groups; subsidies to allies) • 3. Can entrench oligarchy

41. Political consequences of oil rents • The link between taxation, parliament, and democracy • As depicted in one of the charters of the Magna Carta (1215 and on): • What??

42. Representation: • The granting of liberties to the barons For the better ordering of our kingdom, and to allay the discord that has arisen between us and our barons,… we give and grant to the barons the following security: The barons shall elect twenty-five of their number to keep, and cause to be observed with all their might, the peace and liberties granted and confirmed to them by this charter.

43. Representation in exchange for taxation • Baronial control over the monarch, the royal council’s prerogative to confer and discuss (from French parler) • No taxation without parliamentary approval

44. No taxation No representation • No taxation of the aristocracy, no baronial representation, no ( or weak) parliament • Baronial tax exemption absolutism • Absolutist France • Spain 16-17th century (silver from the new world)

45. Eastern Europe: Second serfdom in Prussia 1653. Prussian Junkers tax exempt; German authoritarianism up to the 20th century • Compare to co-terminous development in England. Civil War 1640-49 over the issue of parliamentary control and taxation

46. A similar dynamic in the Middle East (and other oil regimes) • Oil rents limit the need for taxation, thus limited demands for input and voice • Oil rents allow rulers to make sidepayments to opponents (Saudi Arabia) or concede economic benefits while limiting political reform • Oil (natural resources) correlates negatively with democracy • S. Arabia, the Gulf, Iran, Nigeria, Indonesia, etc. • No taxation no representation !!

47. Outcomes across the MENA region have and will continue to diverge • Monarchical dynasties with oil, will likely engage in limited reforms

48. IV. Geopolitics and U.S. Policy • Statistical research shows that interventions to bring democracy are very difficult. Not just in the Middle East • Prerequisites: • Some previous unity (otherwise settling of old scores) • Extant state institutions

49. Prerequisites continued: • Common external enemy • Germany and Japan as allies vs. communist threat • Allies (France, Britain, other European states’ interest in “keeping Germany down” • Previous democratic elements • German Weimar Republic

50. Prequisites continued • High commitment of intervening country • Marshall Aid; • Military positioning (U.S. in Europe to keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out).