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EOA 17 : THE CAMBODIAN CAMPAIGN, ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN & ART, GEN. ABRAMS

EOA 17 : THE CAMBODIAN CAMPAIGN, ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN & ART, GEN. ABRAMS. End state: Vietnamization (success); buy time for a successful and deliberate withdrawal program; uphold U.S. ideals and credibility within the international community and U.S. allies (Peace with Honor)

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EOA 17 : THE CAMBODIAN CAMPAIGN, ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN & ART, GEN. ABRAMS

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  1. EOA 17: THE CAMBODIAN CAMPAIGN, ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN & ART, GEN. ABRAMS End state: Vietnamization (success); buy time for a successful and deliberate withdrawal program; uphold U.S. ideals and credibility within the international community and U.S. allies (Peace with Honor) Conditions (P/M): ARVN able to defend South Vietnam (P/M); disruption of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) equilibrium. *COG: Enemy- Sanctuaries (S); North Vietnamese Army, NVA (O). Friendly -American People (S); U.S. ground forces (O). *OP Approach (I/D): Direct approach. Destroy the sanctuaries and remove the ability of the enemy to conduct major combat operations. Decisive Points: Seize Angel’s Wing, Parrot’s Beak, and Fishhook. Basing: Saigon, U.S. FOBs/BSAs, Corps Tactical Zones (CTZs) I-IV *LOO/LOE: LOO:-multiple operations (TOAN THANG 42/43) against NVA Cambodian sanctuaries. LOE- conduct elements of WAS (establish governance, distribute capture rice, set-up medical clinic, and build community structure). OP Reach: Constrained by aerial resupply Tempo (S/O/T): U.S. and ARVN forces maintained the tempo throughout all phases of the campaign. *Effects (S/O/T): MOE- drop in American causalities, pre/post Cambodia Campaign (S/O); reopening of Michelin plantation (S); decline in enemy activity (O/T); 50-80% reduction in enemy materiel (S). Phasing/Transitions: Transition from seizure of key terrain to search and destroy enemy cache and bases. Culmination. Dictated by President Nixon (U.S. forces out of Cambodia no later than 30 June 1970) Risk (S/O/T):Conducting combat operations focusing on seizure and destruction of enemy assets with minimum manpower (O/T). Mitigated by mass firepower from multiple platforms (fixed/rotary wing, and artillery), consolidation intelligence and responsive supply system. Destruction of enemy threat NLT 30JUN70 (S); Mitigated by integrating ARVN forces. Theorist Assessment: Strategic bombing (Mitchell/Douhet), Concept of strategy, emergent vs. deliberate (Mintzberg) Timeline: Cambodian Incursion 18 March 1969: President Nixon authorizes strategic bombing on NVA Cambodian sanctuaries 18 March 1969: Lon Nol disposes Sihanouk 07 July 1969: President Nixon formally changes mission 14-17 April 1970: Operation TOAN THANG 41 20-23 April 1970: Operation CUU LONG/SD9/06 28-30 April 1970: Popular forces raid 29 April 1970: Cambodian Incursion commences (Operation TOAN THANG 42) 01 May-30 June 1970: Operation TOAN THANG 43 06 May 1970: Operation TOAN THANG 45 06 June 1970: Operation FREEDOM DEAL 30 June 1970: Withdrawal of U.S. personnel from Cambodia

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