The Division of Labour within the household: Is There any Escape from Traditional Gender Roles?

1. The Division of Labour within the household: Is There any Escape from Traditional Gender Roles? Moscow, 2009 Catherine Sofer (Paris School of Economics and University of Paris 1-Panthéon-Sorbonne) & Sayyid Salman Rizavi (University of Paris 1-Panthéon-Sorbonne)

2. Motivation • Gender division of labour is still a mystery : education, wages etc found having small impact • In-depth analysis of sharing of work within the household • Do some couples follow less traditional behaviour and what drives the change in behaviour if any • Our focus on the couples where the wife strongly invests in her career: more egalitarian division of domestic labour, when the wife is a strong investor in career?

3. Previous work • on sharing of household work • Hersch and Stratton, 1994 • Anxo et Kocoglu, 2002 • Aronsson et al, 2001 • Rapoport and Sofer, 2005 • Results seriously challenge efficiency in the sharing of household work

4. Presentation plan • A theoretical background • Some stylized facts about division of labour • The data • Identifying women who invest strongly in career • Man’s participation in household work • Model and results • Conclusion

5. The Collective Model with Household Production.Apps and Rees (1997); Chiappori (1997); Rapoport Sofer, Solaz(2009) • The household is modelled as a pair of individuals with distinct utility functions, who arrive at a Pareto-efficient allocation of individual consumptions and labour supplies, given the market wage rates they face.

6. The Collective Model with Household Production. Subject to

7. Li is leisure; • Ci is consumption; • Y is the vector of domestic goods: Y= g (tf, tm;z), • ti is member i’s household work devoted to household production; • T is the total time available, • z is representing part of the individual heterogeneity • ; y the household’s non-labour income; • wf and wm are the wage rates of f et m respectively. • are weighting factors contained in [0, 1] ; • is the profit function from household production.

8. Decentralisation Li + hi + ti = T (P2.1) (P2.2)

9. Φi is the sharing rule, the part of full income allocated to member I Φ =Φf + Φm = (wf + wm)T + y + Π .

10. = + + + y = + y Φ h w t w Lw Tw i i i i i i i i i y + y = + P y f m y = y ( w , w , y ; s , z ) f f m y = + P - y y f m = y s z z L L ( w , ( w , w , y , , ); ) f f f m m = + P - y s z z L L ( w , y ( w , w , y , , ); ) m m f m Sharing RuleRapoport, Sofer and Solaz (2009) show that identifying the sharing rule over full income is equivalent to identifying a sharing rule over the sum of the household’s exogenous income and of the pofit from household production: Solving the maximisation program yields the Marshallian demands of leisure:

11. Some stylized facts • Women’s participation has increased a lot during the last century. • Besides massive female labor market participation, traditional gender roles still exist (Goldschmidt-Clermont and Pagnossin-Aligisakis,1995, Rizavi and Sofer, 2008)

12. What we show is that the household division of labour does not seem to be driven mainly by the seeking of efficiency in household production, (except if productivities differ enough) and that the respective bargaining power of each partner seems to be more important than cost minimization. • Greater availability of comparable Time Use Surveys & new models of division of labor emerging

13. Some stylised facts • Report of the European Commission(Winqvist, 2004)

14. Some stylised facts egalitarian

15. The DataEnquête Emplois du temps INSEE, 1998-99 • The survey includes: • A base of 8,186 households, of which 7,460 are complete (i.e. in which all household members filled in a time use booklet and an individual questionnaire); • A base of 20,370 individuals, among whom 16,442 are at least 15-year old; • A base of activities, containing one observation per completed booklet line, with 316,097 observations. 144 different types of activities are listed. They have been regrouped on the basis of activities of the same type by INSEE • A sub-sample of 1737 couples both members working in the market kept here

17. Women strongly investing in career: indicators and consequences • Identify couples where the women seems to invest strongly in her career; this would be with reference to her “group” (discussion later) • Do these households deviate from the “norm” ? Egalitarian division of domestic labour? • Effect on man’s housework & man’s share of housework?

18. How to achieve the task • Identification of strong investment in professional life (Few examples) • women whose earning higher in their type of occupational group • women whose earning higher in their type of educational group • Higher salary than partner • Higher education than partner • Higher employment position than partner ReferenceGroup Relative to partner

19. Index based on the above • We created an index based on the above indicators: three dummy variables showing the position relative to partner (better education, higher earnings, better professional position), and : There are six professional status groups. The value of the indicator is based on the mean and standard deviation of hourly earnings of a woman within her type of professional status, specifically if her hourly wage>mean + 1 SD.

20. Work in the household

21. Who invests? Probit estimates of indicators

22. Ordered Probit Results (Index of female investment in career)

23. 2SLS Results for household production of men and women

24. The complete model • A more complete model reflects the simultaneity of the decisions taken in the household concerning the different types of labour of both its members. The model is:

27. The Maximum Likelihood function

30. Estimation results for quadri-normal simultaneous maximum likelihood model (with wages)

31. Estimation results for quadri-normal simultaneous maximum likelihood model (without wages

33. Concluding remarks & further plans • The effect of strong female investment in career on the household division of labour is an important but somehow unaddressed issue. • Women’s tendency to invest in her career is strongly affected by the factors like presence of children in the household, age and educational level. • Gender roles remain traditional in the sense that women continue to do the major part of household work even though they participate in the labour market with a strong intensity.

34. Concluding remarks & further plans • A strong women’s investment in career increases her partner’s household work and decreases hers. She still works more at home than he does, whatever her wage compared to his: the sharing of work within the household does not seem to be efficient (except if large M/F differentials in household productivity). • This could raise problems for the achievement of complete M/F equality in the labor market. • We plan to look specifically at the sharing of child care