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Reconnaissance. Attack Phases. Phase 1: Reconnaissance Phase 2: Scanning Phase 3: Gaining access Application/OS attacks Network attacks/DoS attacks Phase 4: Maintaining access Phase 5: Covering tracks and hiding. Recon. Before bank robber robs a bank… Visit the bank

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Presentation Transcript
attack phases
Attack Phases
  • Phase 1: Reconnaissance
  • Phase 2: Scanning
  • Phase 3: Gaining access
    • Application/OS attacks
    • Network attacks/DoS attacks
  • Phase 4: Maintaining access
  • Phase 5: Covering tracks and hiding

Recon 2

recon
Recon
  • Before bank robber robs a bank…
    • Visit the bank
    • Make friends with an employee (inside info)
    • Study alarm system, vault, security guard’s routine, security cameras plscement, etc.
    • Plan arrival and get away
  • Most of this is not high tech
  • Similar ideas hold for info security

Recon 3

social engineering
Social Engineering
  • Hypothetical examples
    • New “admin” asks secretary for help
    • Angry “manager” calls employee/admin asking for password
    • “Employee” in the field calls another employee for help with remote access
  • Real-world examples
    • Employees help white hat guy steal company IP
    • Person turns over secrets to trusted “friend”

Recon 4

social engineering1
Social Engineering
  • Social engineering
    • Defeats strongest crypto, best access control, protocols, IDS, firewalls, software security, etc., etc.
  • Attacker may not even touch keyboard
  • Ultimate low-tech recon/attack method

Recon 5

social engineering2
Social Engineering
  • Telephone based attacks
    • Company phone number may give attacker instant credibility
  • Attacker might ask for voice mail service
  • Spoofed caller ID
    • Appears attacker has company phone number
    • Online services: Telespoof, Camophone
    • Some VoIP software
    • Phone companies also sell such services

Recon 6

camophone
Camophone
  • Spoofed caller ID
  • Cost?
  • 5 cents per minute

Recon 7

social engineering defenses
Social Engineering Defenses
  • Hard to defend against
    • Rooted in human nature
    • Many legitimate uses of “social engineering” (police, sales people, etc.)
  • User education helps
    • Do not give out sensitive info (passwords)
    • Do not trust caller ID, etc.
  • May not want totally paranoid employees

Recon 8

physical security
Physical Security
  • If Trudy gets physical access…
  • Might find logged in computer, post-it note with passwords, etc.
  • Might install back door, keystroke logger, access point to LAN, etc.
  • Could steal USB drives, laptop, computers, CDs, etc.

Recon 9

physical access
Physical Access
  • How can attacker gain physical access?
    • Ask for it
    • Fake it
    • Physical break in
  • Or attacker might be employee
    • Then Trudy already has access
    • Limit employee’s physical access?

Recon 10

defenses
Defenses
  • Require badges for entry
    • What if someone forgets badge?
  • Biometrics for entry are useful
    • Iris scan, hand geometry, …
  • Monitor what people take in/out
    • Laptop, USB drive, CD, Furby?
    • Miniaturization makes this difficult

Recon 11

defenses1
Defenses
  • Use locks on file cabinets
    • Don’t leave key in the lock…
  • Automatic screen saver with pwd
  • Encrypted hard drives
    • Especially for those who travel
    • Need a way to recover encrypted files
    • But there are attacks…

Recon 12

dumpster diving
Dumpster Diving
  • What might Trudy find in trash?
    • CDs, DVDs, discarded machines, USB, …
    • Diagrams of network architecture
  • Defenses
    • Destroy hard drive before discarding
    • Destroy media (degaussing is not enough)
    • Shred paper, etc.

Recon 13

search the fine web
Search the “Fine” Web
  • “Fine” is placeholder for another word
    • As in “Read the ‘Fine’ Documentation”
  • Huge amount of info available on Web
  • Google it!
    • For example Google the MD5 hash value
    • 20f1aeb7819d7858684c898d1e98c1bb

Recon 14

google hacking
Google Hacking
  • Using Google to help in attacks
    • Not “hacking Google”
  • See, for example
    • Johnny Long’s Website
    • Google hacking 101
  • Google selected as “favorite hacking tool” by some infamous hackers

Recon 15

google
Google
  • Four important elements of Google
  • Google bot
    • Crawls Web looking for info to index
  • Google index
    • Billions served…
    • Ranked using (secretive) algorithm
    • Why so secretive?

Recon 16

google1
Google
  • Google cache
    • Copy of data that bots found
    • Includes html, doc, pdf, ppt, etc., etc.
    • Up to 101k of text each, no images
    • See also, Wayback Machine
  • Google API
    • Program need to Google too
    • Requires API “key” (free from Google)
    • Limited to 1k searches per day

Recon 17

google2
Google
  • For any Google search…
    • Max number of results limited to 1,000
    • Limits data mining capabilities
  • So searches must be precise
  • Use “search directives”
    • No space after directive, searches case insensitive, max of 10 search terms

Recon 18

google search directives
Google Search Directives
  • site:[domain]
    • Searches particular domain
    • site:cs.sjsu.edu stamp
  • link:[web page]
    • All sites linked to a given web page
    • link:www.cs.sjsu.edu
  • intitle:[term(s)]
    • Web sites that include “term(s)” in title
    • site:cs.sjsu.edu intitle:”index of” stamp

Recon 19

google search directives1
Google Search Directives
  • related:[site]
    • Similar sites, based on Google’s indexing
    • related:www.cs.sjsu.edu
  • cache:[page]
    • Display Web page from Google’s cache
    • cache:www.cs.sjsu.edu
  • filetype:[suffix]
    • Like ppt, doc, etc.
    • filetype:ppt site:cs.sjsu.edu stamp

Recon 20

google search directives2
Google Search Directives
  • rphonebook:[name and city or state]
    • Residential phone book
    • rphonebook:Mark Stamp Los Gatos
  • bphonebook:[name and city or state]
    • Business phone book
  • phonebook:[name and city or state]
    • Residential and business phone books

Recon 21

other search operations
Other Search Operations
  • Literal match (“ ”)
    • “metamorphic engines” site:cs.sjsu.edu
  • Not (-)
    • Filter out sites that include term
    • site:cs.sjsu.edu -ty -lin
  • Plus (+)
    • Include (normally filtered) term
    • Not the opposite of “+”
    • site:cs.sjsu.edu stamp +the

Recon 22

interesting searches
Interesting Searches
  • From the text
    • site:mybank.com filetype:xls ssn
    • site:mybank.com ssn -filetype:pdf
    • site:mybank.com filetype:asp
    • site:mybank.com filetype:cgi
    • site:mybank.com filetype:php
    • site:mybank.com filetype:jsp
    • site:cs.sjsu.edu filetype:xls

Recon 23

google hacking database
Google Hacking Database
  • Google Hacking Database (GHDB)
  • Interesting searches
    • intitle:”index of” finance.xls
    • “welcome to intranet”
    • intitle:”gateway configuration menu”
    • intitle:”samba web administration tool” intext:”help workgroup”

Recon 24

slide25
GHDB
  • Intitle:”welcome to IIS 4.0”
  • “… we find that even if they\'ve taken the time to change their main page, some dorks forget to change the titles of their default-installed web pages. This is an indicator that their web server is most likely running … the now considered OLD IIS 4.0 and that at least portions of their main pages are still exactly the same as they were out of the box. Conclusion? The rest of the factory-installed stuff is most likely lingering around on these servers as well. … Factory-installed default scripts: FREE with operating system. Getting hacked by a script kiddie that found you on Google: PRICELESS. For all the things money can\'t buy, there\'s a googleDork award.”

Recon 25

google3
Google
  • Suppose sensitive data is accessible
    • Removing it does not remove problem
    • Google cache, Wayback Machine
  • What about automated searches?
    • Google API
    • SiteDigger and Wikto

Recon 26

sitedigger
SiteDigger
  • User provides Google API key
  • One search…
    • Uses GHDB
    • Does 1k Google searches
    • Your daily limit
    • There’s always tomorrow…

Recon 27

google4
Google
  • Lots of other interesting Google searches
    • Track current flights
    • Look up auto VIN
    • Look up product UPC
  • Google filters some sensitive data
    • SSNs, for example
  • Yahoo and MSN Search do less filtering

Recon 28

newsgroups
Newsgroups
  • “Listening in at the virtual water cooler”
  • Employees submit detailed questions
    • How to configure something
    • How to code something
    • How to troubleshoot a problem
  • Reveals info about products, config, etc.
    • “sensitive information leakage on a grand scale”
  • Attacker could even play active role
    • Give bad/incorrect advice

Recon 29

newsgroups1
Newsgroups
  • To search groups
    • groups.google.com
    • Repackaged version of DejaNews

Recon 30

organization s website
Organization’s Website
  • Web site might reveal useful info
    • Employee contact info
    • Clues about corporate culture/language
    • Business partners
    • Recent mergers and acquisitions
    • Technology in use
    • Open jobs

Recon 31

defenses against web recon
Defenses Against Web Recon
  • Limit what goes on Web pages
    • No sensitive info
    • Limit info about products, configuration, …
  • Security by obscurity?
    • “…no sense putting an expensive lock on your door and leaving milk and cookies outside so the lock picker can have a snack” while he breaks in

Recon 32

defenses against web recon1
Defenses Against Web Recon
  • Have a policy on use of newsgroups
  • Monitor publicly available info
  • Google/Wayback will remove sensitive data
  • Use robots.txt so Web pages not indexed
    • Tags: noindex, nofollow, noarchive, nosnippet
    • Well-behaved crawlers will respect these, but…
    • …a sign to bad guys of sensitive data

Recon 33

whois databases
Whois Databases
  • Internet “white pages” listing
    • Domain names, contact info, IP addresses
    • .com, .net, .org, .edu
  • ICANN oversees registration process
    • Hundreds of actual registrars

Recon 34

internic
InterNIC
  • InterNIC (Internet Network Info Center)
    • First place to look
    • Info on domain name registration services

Recon 35

internic1
InterNIC
  • Whois info available from InterNIC
    • com,net,org,edu
  • Other sites for other top level domains

Recon 36

whois
Whois
  • Once registrar is known, attacker can contact it
    • More detailed Whois info
    • Network Solutions in this example

Recon 37

whois1
Whois
  • Info includes
    • Names
    • Telephone numbers
    • Email addresses
    • Name (DNS) servers
    • And so on…

Recon 38

ip address assignment
IP Address Assignment
  • ARIN (American Registry for Internet Numbers)
    • Info about who owns IP address or range of addresses
  • Similar organizations for Europe, Asia, Latin America, …

Recon 39

defense against whois search
Defense Against Whois Search
  • Bad idea to put false info into databases
    • Important that people can contact you
    • For example, if attack launched from your site
  • No real defense against Whois
  • Anonymous registration services exist
    • Author is not fond of these
    • Better to train against social engineering

Recon 40

domain name system
Domain Name System
  • DNS
    • A hierarchical distributed database
    • Like a (hierarchical distributed) telephone directory
    • Converts human-friendly names into computer-friendly IP addresses
  • Internet is impossible without DNS

Recon 41

slide42
DNS
  • 13 root DNS servers
    • A “single point” of failure for Internet

Recon 42

slide43
DNS
  • DNS example
    • Recursive and iterative searches
    • Resolved locally, if possible
    • Lots and lots of caching

Recon 43

slide44
DNS
  • DNS cache on Windows machine

Recon 44

slide45
DNS
  • Gives IP address of a domain
  • Lots of other info
  • DNS record types
    • Address: domain name/IP address (or vice-versa)
    • Host information: info about system
    • Mail exchange: mail system info
    • Name server: DNS servers
    • Text: arbitrary text string

Recon 45

interrogating dns
Interrogating DNS
  • Attacker determines DNS servers
    • From registrar’s Whois database
  • Use nslookup (or dig in Linux) to interrogate name servers
    • Zone transfer (all info about domain)
    • See example from text --- IP addresses, mail server names, OS types, etc.

Recon 46

dns recon defenses
DNS Recon Defenses
  • Remove info on OS types, etc.
  • Restrict zone transfers
    • To primary and secondary name servers
  • Employ “split DNS”
    • Allow outside DNS activity related to Web, mail, FTP, …, servers
    • No outside DNS directly from internal network

Recon 47

split dns
Split DNS
  • Internal DNS server acts as proxy
    • Relays requests to external DNS
    • Internal users can resolve internal and external

Recon 48

general purpose recon tools
General-Purpose Recon Tools
  • Sam Spade
    • Detective character in Dashiell Hammett’s novel, The Maltese Falcon
    • Humphrey Bogart
    • Also a general Web-based recon tool
  • Research and attack portals
    • For more specific info

Recon 49

sam spade
Sam Spade
  • All the bells and whistles
  • Some of Sam Spade’s capabilities
    • ping, whois lookups, IP block whois, nslookup, DNS zone transfer, traceroute, finger
    • SMTP VRFY --- is given email address valid?
    • Web browser --- view raw HTTP interaction
    • Web crawler --- grab entire web site

Recon 50

sam spade1
Sam Spade
  • “The incredibly useful Sam Spade user interface”

Recon 51

other general recon tools
Other General Recon Tools
  • Active Whois Browser
    • Whois and DNS tool, $19.95
  • NetScanTools Pro
    • Costs $249+
  • iNetTools
    • Feature-limited, but free

Recon 52

web based recon tools
Web-based Recon Tools
  • Some “run by rather shady operators”
    • www.samspade.org
    • www.dnsstuff.com
    • www.traceroute.org
    • www.networktools.com
    • www.cotse.com/refs.htm
    • www.securityspace.com
    • www.dlsreports.com

Recon 53

attackportal
AttackPortal
  • AttackPortal
    • Helps attacker remain anonymous
    • This site is moribund (2005)

Recon 54

conclusion
Conclusion
  • Attacker can gain useful info from variety of sources
    • From social engineering to automated tools…
    • …and everything in between
  • Useful info might include
    • Contact info, IP addresses, domain names
    • Possibly system details, technologies used, …
  • Building blocks for actual attacks

Recon 55

summary
Summary
  • Sophisticated attacks likely to start with recon phase
  • Low-tech recon techniques
    • Social engineering
    • Spoofed caller ID
    • Physical access
    • Dumpster diving

Recon 56

summary1
Summary
  • Higher-tech techniques
    • Google hacking, SiteDigger, GHDB
    • Whois databases, InterNIC, ARIN
    • DNS, nslookup, dig
    • Sam Spade, client-side recon tools
    • Web-based recon tools

Recon 57

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