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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY. Zhou Qiujun Private email: zhouqiujun@gmail.com Public email: ggll_sz@163.com. Contents. INTRODUCTION METHODS FOR STUDYING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY REALISM LIBERALISM CONSTRUCTIVISM THE ENGLISH SCHOOL CRITICAL THEORIES OF WORLD POLITICS

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

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  1. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY Zhou Qiujun Private email: zhouqiujun@gmail.com Public email: ggll_sz@163.com

  2. Contents • INTRODUCTION • METHODS FOR STUDYING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY • REALISM • LIBERALISM • CONSTRUCTIVISM • THE ENGLISH SCHOOL • CRITICAL THEORIES OF WORLD POLITICS • INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND GLOBALIZATION

  3. Chapter 3: Realism • Origin and evolution • From Classical Realism to Neorealism • Realist approach to international cooperation • Conclusion: strengths and weakness

  4. Chapter 3: Realism • Origin and evolution • Founders of Realism-1: Thucydides (c.460 BC-c.395 BC), History of the Peloponnesian War, 5th century BC. • The war between Sparta and Athens was inevitable because of the shift in the balance of power: The growth of the Athenians to greatness brought fear to the Spartans and forced them to war.  The unbalance of power caused by one actor incurs fear and suspicion of the others, and (the others) to sustain the status quo, a war is the final solution.

  5. Chapter 3: Realism “The powerful exact what they can, while the weak yield what they must.” - Thucydides  Basis of interstate relations: might rather than right

  6. Chapter 3: Realism • Founders of Realism-2: Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), The Prince, 16th century. • The Prince is about the arts by which a Prince (a ruler), can retain control of his realm. • Three fundamental assumptions:

  7. Chapter 3: Realism • The human nature is inherently evil. “men are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life and children […] when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you.” In this case, princes who rely entirely on their promises and neglected other precautions will be ruined because friendships are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind. “Men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.”

  8. Chapter 3: Realism • Power politics The essence of politics is to gain and preserve power. In that man’s self-desire is endless, a prince, if he wants to control his people and consolidate his dominant position, ought to have no other aim or thought than war and rules. This is the sole art not only for the rulers but also for those who want to rise from a private station to top rank.

  9. Chapter 3: Realism • The arts of ruling Two ways of contesting: one by the law and the other by force — the first method is proper to men and the second is to beasts. However, since the first is frequently insufficient, a prince is “compelled knowingly to adopt the beast.” A proper approach is to choose the fox and the lion at the same time. “Because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. So it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves.” Whatever ruling arts are adopted, to maintain the state interests is the key job for any rulers. In order to achieve the state interests, the rulers may manoeuvre any means even unscrupulously.

  10. Chapter 3: Realism  Basis of interstate relations: • evil human nature • power politics state interests • art of ruling

  11. Chapter 3: Realism • Founders of Realism-3: Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Leviathan, 1651. • 背景:Leviathan was written during the English Civil War which resulted in an exodus of the royalists; thus the book emphases the necessity of a strong central authority to avoid the evil of disorder and civil war. • 核心:The state of nature: men are essentially equal in mind and body, and because of this equality of ability, diffidence easily proceeded among them. If two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; under this condition, they will endeavor to destroy or subdue one another.

  12. Chapter 3: Realism • Three main causes for quarrel: • Competition • Diffidence • Glory In a world where there is a scarcity of resources, men exercise force for gains. They do it to guarantee their survival and safety, but also to make themselves masters of the other men. Meanwhile, men may fight just for reputation, “as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.” In short, when men live without a common power to keep them in awe, they are in the condition of every man against every man,where there is “no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”

  13. Chapter 3: Realism • Solution for the civil society: all men cede partially their natural rights to “Leviathan”, a sovereign body with supreme authority by means of social contracts to avoid the perpetual state of war. Q: • How about the international society?

  14. Chapter 3: Realism  • On the one hand, the status of sovereign states on the international level is akin to that of men in the civil society; they act similarly as the men do in the “state of nature”. • On the other hand, since there is no supreme authority beyond the states in the international society, the “state of nature” in international relations is still the state of war.  Basis of interstate relations: anarchy of international society [anarchy=disorder+chaos]

  15. Chapter 3: Realism • E. H. Carr (1892-1982), The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, 1939. • 背景:Carr wrote this book at the eve of the WWII. During that time, the idealist ideas represented by the US President Woodrow Wilson’s “fourteen points” after the WWI did not show its success; the incapacity of the League of Nations, the defects of the Versailles system, the national conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe, and the economic crisis in 1929-1933 plagued the world into a chaos. Under these circumstances, Realism which measures the international relations in terms of power showed more explanatory strength.

  16. Chapter 3: Realism • 核心:three major disciplines: • power is the decisive element of politics; “politics in one sense is always power politics.” • Morality is rather relative than universal; it is sometimes created by some power’s coercion. • Both power and morality are indispensable for an international order, yet compared with the effects of power, those of morality, public opinions or international laws are all limited. With these perspectives, Carr became the first to turn Realism into a theoretic system, and the WWII added a convictive footnote to it.

  17. Chapter 3: Realism • Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 1948. • Six principles of political realism: • Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. • The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. • The concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.

  18. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action, but the universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation. They must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. • Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. It believes that every nation will justify its action by applying the moral laws in its own way. • The difference between political realism and other schools of though is real and profound. Though much of the theory of political realism may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political. Hans J. Morgenthau, Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace (6th Edn.) (New York, St. Louis: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1985), pp.4-17.

  19. Conclusion • Key assumptions: • Mankind is inherently evil. Men are born selfish and competitive. • The international system is anarchical. There is no supreme authority above the states to regulate their interactions; the nature of the anarchy is hostile. • Sovereign states are the key units of actions in the international system. • States are all rational actors, acting towards their own interests instead of those of the other states or the world as a whole. • States regard security and survival as their overriding interests and power as the best guarantee to ensure them, so they “seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends”.

  20. Conclusion • Key words: • Human nature (evil) • State of nature (international anarchy) • State interests • Power politics • Competition • Conflict/war …

  21. Chapter 3: Realism • From Classical Realism to Neorealism • Kenneth N. Waltz (1924- ): “Structural Realism” • 代表作:Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis (1959), Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience (1967) and Theory of international politics (1979). • Other Neorealists: Robert Jervis, Stephen M. Walt, Robert Gilpin, John J. Mearsheimer, etc.

  22. Chapter 3: Realism • Waltz’s Man, the State and War (1959) analyses the causes of wars by inserting three “images”(意象): • human nature and behavior “Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity.” • internal structure of states (think about its relations with human nature: water-container) “the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is to keep the subjects in amity one with another, and to this end, to find an enemy against whom they can make common cause.” (Jean Bodin) 让·博丹(Jean Bodin, 1530-1596),法国政治哲学家,以主权理论闻名,代表作《国家论六卷》(Les Six livres de la République, 1576)奠定了近代政治科学的基础。他将“主权”定义为:一个共和国所拥有的绝对和永恒的权力。

  23. Chapter 3: Realism • international system “Each state pursues its own interests defined in ways it judges best. Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy.” • 三“意象”之关系:The first two images are the immediate causes of wars, but their influences can only be determined when the significance of the third has been reconsidered. “without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; while without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.”

  24. Chapter 3: Realism • Waltz’s Theory of international politics (1979) was published at the time when the IRT was experiencing the third Debate over methodology, between traditionalism and science. Absorbing the elements of scientific behaviorism, Waltz constructed his system theory called “structural realism”. • Waltz’s definition: • “system”: a set of interacting units. On one level, it comprises a structure which is the systems-level component making the units form a set rather than a mere collection. On the other level, the system consists of interacting units. • “system theory”: is to show how these two levels operate and interact. Waltz then simplified the international relations to the relations of two variables: the structure of the international system (system-level) and the states interacting in it (unit-level).

  25. Chapter 3: Realism • “political structure”: defined by three disciplines: first, the principle by which it is ordered; second, the specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; third, the distribution of capabilities across those units. • 国际政治结构三原则: • The ordering principles of international system are decentralized and anarchic which means there is no sovereign authority arranging the interactions of states. But it is not inherently disorder; the system is the outcome of the coexistence of self-regarding states. It is “individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended.”

  26. Chapter 3: Realism • The character of the units in the international-political structures is like that of the economic units in markets. States are “like units” which means that each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit. States are functionally similar; they perform or try to perform the common tasks. What is different among them is the possession of capability. • As the units of an anarchic system are functionally similar; distinctions are made only according to how much capability a state has to achieve its goals. Therefore, “states are differently placed by their power.” Waltz abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities. After doing this, the international-political systems become a positional one, in which we see the placement of like units rather than their own characters.

  27. Chapter 3: Realism  Basis of interstate relations: structure of the international system

  28. Chapter 3: Realism 参考文献 (Waltz): • Waltz, Man, the State and War, 重点三意象(image)/层次分析法,见Marc A. Genest,《冲突与合作:演进中的国际关系理论》,北大影印版,2003年,第11-28页。 • Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 北大影印版;可参照上海人民出版社的中译本(信强译,2003年)。 • Waltz, “ The Stability of a Bipolar World,”Daedalus, Vol.93, No.3 (Summer 1964), pp.881-909. (见Phil Williams et al., 《国际关系经典选读》,北大影印版,2003年,第77-85页。 • Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,”Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp.615-28.(见邮箱) • Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,”International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp.5-41.(见邮箱) • 沃尔兹:《政治结构》,秦亚青编:《西方国际关系理论经典导读》,北京大学出版社,2009年,第40-63页。

  29. Chapter 3: Realism • Neorealist approach to international cooperation Q: • Possibilities of cooperation • Constraints of cooperation • Approaches to cooperation

  30. Chapter 3: Realism • Possibilities of cooperation In an anarchic world, cooperation could happen on a low level. Classical Realism: a “rational” state seeks power as its highest end, which makes the anarchic world be filled with fierce competition.  Neorealism: an anarchic structure is spontaneously formed by the interactions of states rather than a prerequisite of the latter (no causal link). States are possible to cooperate if they have interests in common.

  31. Chapter 3: Realism • Constraints of cooperation • the logic of “individual rationality” and “collective action problem” • states’ sensitivity on interdependence

  32. Constraints of cooperation-1/2: “individual rationality” and “collective action problem” 1. 涵义: In an anarchic world, every state is individualistically rational to maximize its national interests; but when each acts upon its own estimation, the “individualistically rational” will result in a “collective irrational”. 2. 囚徒困境&安全困境 Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), Security Dilemma (SD).

  33. PD: Cooperation or Defect? T>R>P>S R : the reward for mutual cooperation T : the temptation to defect S : the sucker’s payoff P : the punishment for mutual defection

  34. PD: Cooperation or Defect? The ideal case: both players cooperate. This outcome is not only better than the mutual defect (2R>2P), but also better than alternating defection and cooperation (2R>T+S).  The real case: no matter what one player acts, the other will “rationally” choose to defect because defection will gain each player a personal high payoff (DC>CC>DD>CD). If both of the players choose the same strategy, then both of them will defect and attain a payoff of P.  The best choice for individuals is not that for the group. Individual rationality results in a worse outcome for both players. Dilemma

  35. SD: Offense or Defense? PD proves that states have little incentive to cooperate in an insecure world, which yields “security dilemma” in international relations. (arms race) 参考文献:Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,”World Politics, Vol.30, No.2 (Jan. 1978), pp.186-214.

  36. Constraints of cooperation-1/2: “individual rationality” and “collective action problem” 3. 绝对收益&相对收益: • “absolute gains”:how well they fare themselves • “relative gains”:how well they fare compared to other states  The relationship among states is a zero-sum game and cooperation is difficult to realize.

  37. Constraints of cooperation-2/2: states’ sensitivity on interdependence Waltz (2000) affirmed that among the forces that shape international politics, interdependence has weak effects. Interdependence in some ways promotes peace by multiplying contacts among states and contributing to mutual understanding. However it also multiplies the occasions for conflicts that may promote resentment and even war. To some extent, a good cooperation means close interdependence which requires the partners to share their individual information, goods and service. In this case, one cannot sensibly pursue an interest without taking others’ interests into account and it will be inclined to treat the opposite’s acts as events within its own polity and to attempt to control them.  The sensitivity of interdependence makes states fear and reluctant to cooperate.

  38. Chapter 3: Realism • Approaches to cooperation great powers c. power cooperation hegemonic c. balance of power c. 核心区别:the number of states which is most proper for cooperation.

  39. Great powers cooperation 代表人物:Kenneth N. Waltz 主要观点: • As long as the structure of international politics remains anarchic, one can never know whether today’s friend will be tomorrow’s enemy, so the only way for global governance is the dominance by great powers. • The smaller the number of great powers, the better it is for the world stability, because it is easier for the state to understand the other’s behavior and manage to achieve mutual benefits. When the number increases, uncertainties will also increase. Waltz prefers a bipolar system where “the big two” (“frère ennemi”) aim to: first, insure the two powers’ own autonomy and mobility in action; second, guarantee the maintenance and transformation of the system; third, contribute efforts on solving common problems (4P—poverty, population, pollution and proliferation).

  40. Hegemonic cooperation 代表人物:Robert Gilpin 主要观点: • “logic of collective action”: the problems of public goods—free ride—market failure—necessity of a supreme authority. This authority has two features: first, it is sufficiently large relative to all others that it will capture a share of the benefit of the public good larger than the entire cost of providing it. Second, it has sufficient interest in the good to be willing to bear the full costs of its provision. In the civil market, it is the central government that can play such role of market intervention. In the international society, the analogous role is played “by empires, hegemonies, and great powers that have risen and fallen over the millennia.” • The “theory of hegemonic stability” argues that the presence of a single, strongly dominant actor (a hegemon) in international politics leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the international system. Either without such a hegemonic state or the hegemon is in decline can drag the international system into chaos and even wars.

  41. Three objectives of the hegemon (Gilpin) • To increase its wealth and power by increasing its control over territory and conquering other peoples. • To gain political dominance over other states by using threats and coercion, the formation of alliances, and the creation of exclusive spheres of influence. • To control or at least exercise influence over the world economy (more properly, the international division of labor).

  42. Balance of power cooperation 代表人物:John J. Mearsheimer 主要观点: • “offensive realism” The structure of the international system forces states to act aggressively toward each other rather than just seek security and maintain status quo. This derives from three features of the international system: • the absence of a central authority • states always have some offensive military capability • states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. It is this “fear” compels states to strive for more power and compete for more share of world power. • The great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great power but to be the only great one in the system—the hegemon.

  43. The major Realist theories:

  44. Chapter 3: Realism • Conclusion: strengths and weakness  (--1990) Joseph M. Grieco: • it helps us appreciate the impact of the anarchical structure of the international system on the preferences, strategies, interactions, and domestic institutions of states; • it helps us appreciate the impact of inequalities on international affairs, and in particular inequalities in power; • it helps us appreciate the importance of continuity in international affairs, but it also alerts us to the pervasiveness of change.

  45. Chapter 3: Realism  (1990--) John J. Mearsheimer: “The world has not simply moved from bipolarity to multipolarity, but instead we have entered an era where there is little prospect of security competition among the great powers, not to mention war, and where concepts such as polarity and the balance of power matter little for understanding international relations. Most states view each other as members of an emerging “international community,” not as potential military rivals. Opportunities for cooperation are abundant in this new world, and the result is likely to be increased prosperity and peace for almost all the states in the system.” 参考文献:Mearsheimer, “Realism, the Real World, and the Academy,” in Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey (eds.), Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002).

  46. Chapter 3: Realism 症结:the causality between the world hegemony and the stability of the international system, which implies: • On the one hand, hegemonic powers should intentionally maintain the hegemonic structure to keep the world peace and stability; interstate cooperation is the corollary of such structure. • On the other hand, there is a positive correlation between the hegemonic power and the world stability. Stability varies according to the rise and fall of the hegemonic power, so the hegemons should always increase their capabilities to increase the stability of the international system. 反例:US hegemonic power —— world conflicts (correlation?)

  47. Chapter 3: Realism 例①: During the 60s-80s, the US share of world GDP (US+EEC+Japan) fell from 60% to 40%, while the international system is dynamic rather than static; it has been in transition. 例 ②: It is proved invalid that the stronger the hegemonic power is, the more stable the international system will be. The decline of the hegemonic power will drag the whole system into instability.

  48. 参考文献: • Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. • Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,”World Politics, Vol.28, No.3 (April 1976). • Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,”World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978). • Robert Axelrod, “The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists,”The American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (June 1981). • Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,”International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Autumn 1985). • Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,”The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991). • Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975). • Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). • Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). • Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001). • John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (NY. and London: W.W.Norton & Company, 2001). • 夏安凌、黄真:《论新现实主义的国际合作理论》,载《教学与研究》2006年第11期, 第43-49页。

  49. Q & A

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