Agenda

1. Rationale for the Strategic Asset Allocation in the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund Presentation to The Actuarial Profession Investment Conference, 26 June 2000 by Knut N. Kjær,Norges Bank Investment Managementwww.norges-bank.no knut-n.kjaer@norges-bank.no

2. Agenda • Background - Norway, oil and fund • Strategic issues • The benchmark composition • Division of responsibilities • Strategy to achieve excess performance • Results

3. Norway at a glance • Population 4.5 mill. • GDP $ 155 bill. • GDP/person $ 34,600 • Surplus at the central government budget: $ 15.5 bill. 10% of GDP • Surplus at the current account: $ 17.8 bill.

4. The petroleum sector • Norway is the world’s second largest net exporter of oil • Value added in production of petroleum is 16 percent of GDP • Petroleum exports representis 43 percent of total exports • 10 percent of the government petroleum revenues will be spent on the central government budget in 2000

5. The Petroleum Fund • The Government Petroleum Fund was established by law in 1990 • The inflow to the Fund is the yearly surplus of the central government account • The first transfer occurred in May 1996 • The fund is not formally a pension fund but is used by the government to manage the budget surplus / deficit • The fund may become an important tool for coping with the financial challenges connected with an ageing population and declining oil revenues

6. Growth of the Petroleum Fund Estimates

7. Strategic issues • From petroleum to financial assets • Macroeconomic concerns • Pension system and expenditures

8. From petroleum to financial assets • Investments in the Petroleum Fund represent a diversification of national wealth from petroleum in the ground to financial assets • Simple efficient frontier analysis based on historical data shows that this transformation reduces risk and increases return

10. Norway’s national wealthPercentage distribution

11. Macroeconomic concerns • How much of the petroleum revenues can be used in the mainland economy? • How can one avoid turning the Petroleum Fund investments into a “second budget”, undermining the role of the parliament in the ordinary budget process?

12. Use of the Petroleum Fund • Petroleum Fund Act: • The capital of the Fund may only be used for transfers to the central government budget pursuant to a resolution by the Storting (Norwegian parliament). The capital of the Fund may not be used for any other purpose, including the provision of credit to central government or to private sector entities.

13. Why does the Fund invest abroad? • Budget concern • The Petroleum Fund should not be a second budget • Monetary policy concern • The petroleum activity yields substantial currency income • Accumulation of foreign reserves counteracts appreciation of the currency • Sector balance concern • Real appreciation would shift resources to non-competitive sectors ; avoid “Dutch disease” • Investment concern • Better return on risk abroad

14. Share of government petroleum income invested in the Petroleum Fund

15. Pension system and expenditures • The core of the Norwegian pensions are publicly financed • The public pension system is a two tier compulsory system • The public pension expenditures will almost double as a share of GDP over the next 30 years • While the petroleum revenues must be expected to decrease significantly

16. Pension expenditures Petroleum revenues

17. The benchmark composition • Following from the strategic background:The Fund shall only invest in financial assets abroad • Important issues in deciding the investment strategy-Asset classes and asset allocation-Regional allocation-Risk tolerance

18. Strategic asset allocation • Purpose of the Fund • “In terms of the Petroleum Fund, it is natural to apply a long investment horizon and to recognize the importance of preserving the Fund's international purchasing power" (Revised National Budget 1997) • Two implications • should not focus on short-term fluctuations in return • should not measure return in Norwegian kroner • The strategy was changed in January 1998 to include equities

19. Asset classes • Fixed income: At least 90 per cent of the bond portfolio shall be securities with a government guarantee and the last 10 per cent must be of investment grade quality • Private equities and properties are not yet considered

21. Determining the equity portion • “Using these historical returns (1926-1990), it would take 139 years of investing in Treasury bills to double one’s real wealth while it would take only 11 years of stock investment” Siegel (1992) • In 1997, Norges Bank advised the Ministry of Finance to invest in equities • The benchmark weight of 40 per cent can be viewed as the owners’ return-to-risk preference

22. Country allocation • As always: A trade-off between return and risk • Return • assume that expected returns in the long run are equal in all (industrial) countries • Risk - a compromise between • Hedge for currency risk of imports • Diversification of market risk • Diversification of national wealth • Size of the markets could be a restriction

23. Regional weights mainly determined by GDP-weights: Americas Europe Asia Old guidelines 18 75 7 Import weights 10 81 9 GDP weights 42 38 20 Market weights - bonds 33 47 20 Market weights - equities 55 32 13 New guidelines 30 50 20

24. Country weights within regions • Equities: Market capitalisation weightsFTSE index • Fixed Income: GDP weightsSalomon Smith Barney Government Bond index • Emerging markets included in the investment universe from 1 January, 2000. Not in the benchmark yet.

25. Benchmark for the Petroleum Fund • Benchmark • Bonds 60 % • Equities 40 % • Asia and Oceania • 20 % • Asia and Oceania • 20 % • America • 30 % • Europe • 50 % • America • 30 % • Europe • 50 %

26. The risk tolerance given in the Fund Management Mandate • Direct restrictions on asset allocation • Limits on expected deviations from the benchmark portfolio • Bond duration between 3 and 7 • Maximum 3 per cent ownership of any one company • Limits on credit risk • General clause: Norges Bank shall ensure that satisfactory risk systems and control routines exist for those instruments to be used in the management of the Fund

27. Expected tracking error • Tracking error as a risk measure is used to limit the difference in expected return between the actual portfolio and benchmark • An upper limit of tracking error implies that the actual return with a certain probability will vary within a band around the return of the benchmark • Maxium expected tracking error is 1.5 per cent • Expected tracking error is calculated based on historical fluctuations in the price of individual securities and on the correlation in price changes between individual securities

28. Division of responsibilities

29. Owner: Ministry of Finance Strategic asset allocation and investment universe Benchmarks Risk limits Evaluates manager (uses consultant) Reports to Stortinget Manager: Norges Bank Achieve as high return as possible given investment mandate and restrictions Risk control Reports to MOF Petroleum Fund - Division of responsibilities Adviser: Norges Bank

30. Properties of the fund management model • Accountability • Transparency • Focus on the contribution to value added in the operational management

31. Organisation within Norges Bank • Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) was established as a separate investment management unit in 1998 - with “Chinese walls” to the ordinary central bank functions • NBIM manages the Petroleum Fund, the Petroleum Insurance Fund and the long- term portfolio of the foreign exchange reserves (more than NOK 400 bn in all)

32. Strategy to achieve excess performance

33. Ambition: Outperform the benchmark portfolio • Excess return should be higher than extra costs associated with active management • Outperformance must be achieved at lowest possible risk

34. Excess return at lowest possible extra cost • Distinguish between index management and active management • The core of the portfolios is index-managed Low management and transaction costs Forms a basis for focused active management • Active managers are to take advantage of competitive edges and take risks - performance-based fees • Continuous monitoring of transaction costs

35. Highest possible return at lowest possible risk • Many small positions rather than a few large ones • Greatest possible independence in position-taking • Specialisation of expertise • Reasonably safe revenues receive highest priority

36. Independence in position-taking • Division into three management units • Each of these are involved in both external and internal management • In choosing external managers, great emphasis is placed on diversification

37. The basic investment decision is allocation of risk units

38. Organisation of management (1) Internal management • Lending/repos - fixed income instruments • Futures overlay - risk management • Active funding of managers and investing of new capital into the market (transition) • Enhanced index management (equities and fixed-income instruments) • Active management in selected areas

39. Organisation of management (2) External management • External index management of equities (internal capacity for index management of fixed-income instruments) • External active management to achieve increased breadth in focused position-taking • External lending arrangement for equities

40. Manager selection: 4 main groups of criteria • Managementability Organisation Assets/clients Track record Inv.controls • Expected performance Research Pf construction Pf implementation

41. External managers today • 2 global index equity managers • 7 active equity managers, 9 mandates - one manager is a sector specialist • Trend in equity management: sector focus • 3 global fixed income managers • 2 - 3 tactical asset allocation mandates from third quarter

42. Monitoring external managers • Daily transfer of data on transactions and holdings via our global custodian to Norges Bank's Investment Management data records • Programme for continuous monitoring:- Compliance with guidelines- Analysis of results (attribution)- Valuation analysis- Risk analysis- Monitoring of transactions/costs

43. Information flows External management Internal management Market feeds Fixed data DATA WAREHOUSE Manager 1 Manager 1 Custody Norges Bank Back Office Manager 2 Manager 2 Performance Risk models Other uses Manager n Manager n

44. Real Time Attribution

45. Results

46. The Government Petroleum Fund 1997-99

48. Expected tracking error • Maximum expected tracking error is 1.5 per cent

49. Management costs 1999 1998 Equity management 0.l45 0.082 Fixed income man. 0.048 0.039 Total 0.087 0.052 Measured as a percentage of the average portfolio

50. The Fund’s Equity Assets 31 December 1999 • Number of companies 2025of which included in the FTSE index 1880 (93%) • Average holding 46 mill. (NOK) • Largest single holding Nokia, 1,445 mill. (ownership 0.086%) • Largest ownership share Buhrmann NV, 0.67% (holdings 62 mill. ) • Share of total market capitalisation 0.039%