Title: Some Stuff I ve Learned Speaker: Robert L. Long, PhD Nuclear Stewardship, LLC Albuquerque

1. Title: Some Stuff I�ve Learned Speaker: Robert L. Long, PhD Nuclear Stewardship, LLC Albuquerque, NM

2. Outline Introduction The Early Years WSMR FBRF Indian Point 1 Three Mile Island � 2 Public Information/Education Conclusion

3. The Early Years White Sands Missile Range Fast Burst Reactor Facility

4. The WSMR FBRF

9. The WSMR FBRF Incident Purpose: Test the use of U-Mo alloy bolts Results: Verified that U-Mo is brittle and the heads of the bolts break off cleanly under stress Accidental pulse: 1.5 x 10 E17 fissions ~9 microsecond period

10. Some Stuff Learned Better learning from the operating experience of others may have prevented the accident Be Here Now! Don�t let your workers think you know it all Make certain your workers know that they are accountable for their actions

11. The Early Years Indian Point 1 Primary Piping Repair

15. Some More Stuff Learned Be willing to take on challenging assignments Assuring quality requires great attention to detail In 1970-71, I recognized that IP-2 operators in training were not being taught fundamental principles of reactor physics and thermal dynamics

16. Three Mile Island - 2

17. Was It Really So Bad? Reactor core was destroyed ~50% melted ~20 tons of material in bottom of vessel Area ~1 m x .8 m in lower vessel reached 1000 degree Celsius, i.e., white hot steel ~1,000,000 gallons of highly contaminated water in reactor & auxiliary buildings

22. Radiation ReleasedDuring TMI-2 Accident Average exposure <10 miles: 8 mrem Average exposure <50 miles: 1.5 mrem Site boundary highest reading: 83-100 mrem Iodine � 131 released: 15-30 Curies* Iodine � 133 released: 3-4 Curies Max. thyroid dose: 20 mrem Krypton � 85 released (1980): 44,000 Curies * 12-15 million curies of I-131 released into containment

23. What Were Real Consequences? No deaths, injuries, or significant releases but Plant was ruined never to operate again ~$ Billion to cleanup TMI Unit-1 shutdown for 6+ years GPU near bankruptcy (stock @ $3 3/8) $ Billions spent world wide and Fear lingers on

24. Still More Stuff Learned Operator training must include fundamental principles of reactor physics and thermodynamics Control room replica simulators must have first principle models and be kept identical to actual plant Common precursors to major accidents (TMI-2, Chernoble, Challenger�) are organizational, management, and people-related

25. Zebroski Accident Precursor Attributes Lessons learned disregarded* Safety subordinate to operations Experience not processed* Hazardous design and operating features allowed to persist Emergency planning lacking Diffuse responsibilities Mindset* Rule compliance Team player emphasis* Project and risk management techniques not used Organization with undefined responsibilities and accountabilities* *Attributes found in the WSMR FBRF incident

26. Precursors Keep Showing Up-1 10 of the 11 Zebroski accident precursor attributes are described in the Davis-Besse SOER At a recent meeting, a senior nuclear utility officer said that about two years ago his organization recognized that people are their most important resource

27. Precursors Keep Showing Up-2 Corrective action programs fail to identify and correct weaknesses in timely manner Important equipment problems linger Simulator configuration and math modeling not kept consistent with plant Engineering is weak and lacks alignment with operational priorities

28. Public Information & Education Fear lingers on Understanding the Opposition UNM Professor: �I have tried everything, without success, to get the state, the Federal Government, the Army to listen to me. Anything I say or do is justified.� CCNY Professor: �Dr. Long is mad. He volunteered to train for the first entry team into TMI-2.� PBS-1999: For the first time we want to tell the TMI-2 story from the operators� perspective�NOT!

29. And Still More Stuff Learned Recognize and accept as reality the opponents driving functions. It�s impossible to refute the number of factual errors opponents can state in their allotted time. Refute the most outrageous statements and audience generally suspects accuracy of all the others. Sometimes indignant, controlled anger may be the appropriate response. As Churchill once said, �Never, never, never give up!�

30. Conclusion Lock the images of the damaged TMI-2 core forever in your memories Nuclear really is different Public outreach and education are still vitally needed Use every opportunity to learn �stuff� from the operating experiences of others, as well as your own mistakes and successes. All the best and wonderful memories from your career in nuclear