Missed Opportunities: How We Keep High-Quality Teachers Out of Urban Classrooms

1. 1 Missed Opportunities:How We Keep High-Quality Teachers Out of Urban Classrooms Discussion Document National Center for Alternative Certification February 2005

2. 2 Overview What the Data Show The Causes of Late Hiring Timelines Recommendations Contents

3. 3 Key Findings from TNTP Data Urban districts can generate a large enough applicant pool to selectively fill vacancies and many of these applicants are serious about teaching in high-needs districts However, district hiring timelines cause massive applicant attrition Due to these delays, districts lose the stronger candidates and are left hiring weaker candidates HR inefficiencies contribute to the delays, but are not the driving cause. Reforms must address the three policy barriers to late hiring timelines: Vacancy notification requirements Teachers Union transfer requirements Late budget timetables and inadequate forecasting

4. 4 Research Methodology and Sources These data come from four representative urban districts, which agreed to participate on the condition of anonymity: The districts are located in the Southwest, Midwest, and Eastern regions They average just fewer than 73,0000 students each, and the largest district has more than 150,000 students Between two-thirds and three-quarters of students qualify for free or reduced-price lunch 62% to 85% of the students in these districts are non-white The data were collected through: Applicant tracking databases used during the hiring season Telephone surveys of applicants who withdrew or whose status was unknown; exit interviews with withdrawers Focus groups held with applicants and new teachers Interviews with principals and HR staff (including from surrounding districts) With the exception of the Southwestern District, the data refer to the districts� entire applicant pools The data shown for the Southwestern District refer only to a special cohort of certified teachers for placements in the district�s hardest-to-staff schools

5. 5 Overview What the Data Show The Causes of Late Hiring Timelines Recommendations Contents

6. 6 With aggressive recruitment, teachers apply to urban districts in large numbers. High-impact strategies yielded more than enough applications to meet districts� needs (slide) These districts were able to achieve this success because they implemented aggressive recruitment strategies The applicant pool was rich in high-need candidates In the Eastern District, more than 230 applicants � or 38% of those who passed the District�s initial screen and interview � were for shortage-area positions 37% of the Southwestern District�s applicants were certified to teach in a shortage area One-fifth to one-fourth of the applicants in the Midwestern Districts applied in critical needs areas High-impact strategies yielded more than enough applications to meet districts� needs (slide) These districts were able to achieve this success because they implemented aggressive recruitment strategies The applicant pool was rich in high-need candidates In the Eastern District, more than 230 applicants � or 38% of those who passed the District�s initial screen and interview � were for shortage-area positions 37% of the Southwestern District�s applicants were certified to teach in a shortage area One-fifth to one-fourth of the applicants in the Midwestern Districts applied in critical needs areas

7. 7 However, urban districts hire late. In the Eastern District, although application submissions peaked in March and a pool of 600 candidates had passed a screening by the end of May, not a single new candidate was hired until mid-August. (slide) By this time, neighboring districts had completed the majority of their hiring We saw the pattern of late timelines in other districts that we studied. In the Southwestern District, high-need certified candidates waited almost 3 months from application to contract signing In Midwestern District 1, most of the hiring took place in August. Three of its neighbors had done most of their hiring by the end of May. More than one-third of the candidates waiting for a principal interview in August had been waiting four months. In the Eastern District, although application submissions peaked in March and a pool of 600 candidates had passed a screening by the end of May, not a single new candidate was hired until mid-August. (slide) By this time, neighboring districts had completed the majority of their hiring We saw the pattern of late timelines in other districts that we studied. In the Southwestern District, high-need certified candidates waited almost 3 months from application to contract signing In Midwestern District 1, most of the hiring took place in August. Three of its neighbors had done most of their hiring by the end of May. More than one-third of the candidates waiting for a principal interview in August had been waiting four months.

8. 8 Fed up with waiting, applicants withdraw after months in limbo Anywhere from 31% to almost 60% of applicants dropped out of the hiring process� 58% of prescreened in candidates in the Eastern District (left-hand graph) 31% of prescreened-in candidates in Midwestern District 1 (left-hand graph) 35% of people who had accepted an offer into a special cohort program for staffing high-needs schools in the Southwestern District (We don�t have withdrawal % for Midwestern District 2) 2. And applicants consistently cited the late hiring timeline as a major reason they took a job elsewhere Right-hand graph shows percentages for all four districts Anywhere from 31% to almost 60% of applicants dropped out of the hiring process� 58% of prescreened in candidates in the Eastern District (left-hand graph) 31% of prescreened-in candidates in Midwestern District 1 (left-hand graph) 35% of people who had accepted an offer into a special cohort program for staffing high-needs schools in the Southwestern District (We don�t have withdrawal % for Midwestern District 2) 2. And applicants consistently cited the late hiring timeline as a major reason they took a job elsewhere Right-hand graph shows percentages for all four districts

9. 9 The candidates that the Districts lose are serious candidates. 1. Common wisdom assumes that the candidates who withdraw never seriously intended to teach in an urban district, but applied simply to hedge their bets 2. The data show that this is false; the withdrawers DID want to teach in an urban district Nearly half of withdrawers said they �definitely� or �probably� would have accepted a job offer from the urban district if it had come earlier Four out of five said they still wanted to be considered for a position in the urban district Roughly four out of five are teaching in another district More detail on data: Said they would have accepted a job if it had come earlier: Eastern District 44% (�Maybe�: an additional 21%), Midwest 1 48% (�Maybe�: an additional 30%) Say they still want to be considered for a job in an urban district: Eastern District 83%, Midwest 1 80% (though small sample size in latter, the data confirm the trend) Teaching in another district: Eastern 76%, Southwestern 88%, Midwest 1 81%, Midwest 2 75%1. Common wisdom assumes that the candidates who withdraw never seriously intended to teach in an urban district, but applied simply to hedge their bets 2. The data show that this is false; the withdrawers DID want to teach in an urban district Nearly half of withdrawers said they �definitely� or �probably� would have accepted a job offer from the urban district if it had come earlier Four out of five said they still wanted to be considered for a position in the urban district Roughly four out of five are teaching in another district More detail on data: Said they would have accepted a job if it had come earlier: Eastern District 44% (�Maybe�: an additional 21%), Midwest 1 48% (�Maybe�: an additional 30%) Say they still want to be considered for a job in an urban district: Eastern District 83%, Midwest 1 80% (though small sample size in latter, the data confirm the trend) Teaching in another district: Eastern 76%, Southwestern 88%, Midwest 1 81%, Midwest 2 75%

10. 10 Districts lose stronger and more sought-after candidates Why it matters 1. VACANCIES: Despite receiving plenty of applications to meet their needs, all of the districts opened school with vacancies The Eastern District, which had received over 4000 applications, had 15 outstanding vacancies on the first day of school Just five days before school began, Midwestern District 1 posted 60 vacancies Midwestern District 2 had 19 vacancies on the first day of school 2. SHORTAGE AREA: They lost high-demand, shortage area candidates (left-hand graph) 3. QUALITY IMPACT: In-depth file analysis in the Eastern District showed that, according to important criteria, withdrawers were on average stronger candidates than those who were eventually hired (left-hand graph) Withdrawers were 40% more likely to have a degree in their teaching field Withdrawers were significantly more likely to have had coursework in education (definition: having a degree in education, or coming within two classes of meeting the pedagogy coursework requirements for certification in the district�s state) Withdrawers had significantly higher GPAs than did the district�s hires �Is this really a valid way to assess quality?� These indicators stand as good proxies for the characteristics research has linked to student achievement: GPA has been correlated to verbal ability (the best-known predictor of teacher quality), having a major or minor in the field is a good proxy for content knowledge, and having significant education coursework (although the link between pedagogy coursework and student learning is debatable, it is imperative for certification in the states examined here and is therefore necessary to meet the requirements of the No Child Left Behind legislation). Why it matters 1. VACANCIES: Despite receiving plenty of applications to meet their needs, all of the districts opened school with vacancies The Eastern District, which had received over 4000 applications, had 15 outstanding vacancies on the first day of school Just five days before school began, Midwestern District 1 posted 60 vacancies Midwestern District 2 had 19 vacancies on the first day of school 2. SHORTAGE AREA: They lost high-demand, shortage area candidates (left-hand graph) 3. QUALITY IMPACT: In-depth file analysis in the Eastern District showed that, according to important criteria, withdrawers were on average stronger candidates than those who were eventually hired (left-hand graph) Withdrawers were 40% more likely to have a degree in their teaching field Withdrawers were significantly more likely to have had coursework in education (definition: having a degree in education, or coming within two classes of meeting the pedagogy coursework requirements for certification in the district�s state) Withdrawers had significantly higher GPAs than did the district�s hires �Is this really a valid way to assess quality?� These indicators stand as good proxies for the characteristics research has linked to student achievement: GPA has been correlated to verbal ability (the best-known predictor of teacher quality), having a major or minor in the field is a good proxy for content knowledge, and having significant education coursework (although the link between pedagogy coursework and student learning is debatable, it is imperative for certification in the states examined here and is therefore necessary to meet the requirements of the No Child Left Behind legislation).

11. 11 Overview What the Data Show The Causes of Late Hiring Timelines Recommendations Contents

12. 12 HR inefficiencies contribute to delays, but they are not the sole cause. Many people blame HR departments for hiring delays In our work with HR departments across the country, we have seen that many HR inefficiencies do contribute to hiring delays. Some of the most common problems are: A lack of clear hiring goals and accountability Insufficient systems to track applicants and vacancies Poor customer service and insufficient communication Less than optimal HR staffing

13. 13 We noted three policy barriers that directly inhibit timely hiring. Vacancy Notification Requirements Many districts cannot determine their vacancies in a timely way because departing teachers need not declare their plans until summer or the new school year These requirements are typically governed by teachers union contracts, city code, or state law 2. Teachers Union Transfer Requirements Collective bargaining agreements typically give teachers the right to transfer to another school before any teacher from outside the system can be hired In large urban districts, transfers take too long and end too late, often not until mid-summer Forcing transferring teachers on schools makes principals reluctant to post vacancies and interview 3. Budget Timelines and Enrollment Uncertainties Districts receive their state budgets late: in 46 states, the fiscal year does not end until June 30th, and states may not need to pass a budget even then if they seek an extension Enrollment fluctuations compound budget uncertainty Districts often respond to uncertainty counterproductively, by delaying the release of school-level budgets and staffing plans or implementing an across-the-board hiring freeze Vacancy Notification Requirements Many districts cannot determine their vacancies in a timely way because departing teachers need not declare their plans until summer or the new school year These requirements are typically governed by teachers union contracts, city code, or state law 2. Teachers Union Transfer Requirements Collective bargaining agreements typically give teachers the right to transfer to another school before any teacher from outside the system can be hired In large urban districts, transfers take too long and end too late, often not until mid-summer Forcing transferring teachers on schools makes principals reluctant to post vacancies and interview 3. Budget Timelines and Enrollment Uncertainties Districts receive their state budgets late: in 46 states, the fiscal year does not end until June 30th, and states may not need to pass a budget even then if they seek an extension Enrollment fluctuations compound budget uncertainty Districts often respond to uncertainty counterproductively, by delaying the release of school-level budgets and staffing plans or implementing an across-the-board hiring freeze

14. 14 Overview What the Data Show The Causes of Late Hiring Timelines Recommendations Contents

15. 15 Guiding principles for reform Hire by May 1st to be competitive Move towards the goal of completing the vast majority of new teacher hiring by May 1 During a likely phase-in of these goals, commit to hiring at least 30-40% of new teachers by May 1 and the remainder by June 1 2. Provide school-level placements, not just open contracts Our data show that a general statement of intent or commitment � often called an open offer or open contract � will not keep candidates in the hiring process if they lack specific school placements Two of the districts we studied (Eastern, Southwestern) made open offers, but still experienced large attrition rates In focus groups, certified teaching candidates told us that they were wary of offers that did not specify a school or classroom. In fact, many told us that they would base their decision on where to teach entirely on rapport with a principal �How do neighboring districts pull off earlier hiring timelines? After all, they face many of the same constraints (e.g. state notification deadlines)� When our researchers interviewed HR directors in districts that bordered on our focus districts, it became clear that neighboring districts could hire much earlier because they had dealt effectively with the policy barriers mentioned here: Early vacancy notifications were encouraged by implementing incentives to notify earlier (e.g. $300 bonus) and publicizing the fact that summer benefits and summer teaching opportunities would not be affected Transfers were handled creatively. For example, Midwestern District 1�s neighbors all had different strategies: (1) new vacancies were opened to transfers for five days before being opened to external candidates; (2) transfers lasted through mid-summer, but schools could consider external candidates for the positions at the same time; (3) the transfer process ends in mid-March They projected budgets early and started hiring before the final state budget had been passed In general, the neighboring districts were smaller in size, which meant that the union was likely to be less powerful, and the administrative complications of transfers and notifications were reduced Hire by May 1st to be competitive Move towards the goal of completing the vast majority of new teacher hiring by May 1 During a likely phase-in of these goals, commit to hiring at least 30-40% of new teachers by May 1 and the remainder by June 1 2. Provide school-level placements, not just open contracts Our data show that a general statement of intent or commitment � often called an open offer or open contract � will not keep candidates in the hiring process if they lack specific school placements Two of the districts we studied (Eastern, Southwestern) made open offers, but still experienced large attrition rates In focus groups, certified teaching candidates told us that they were wary of offers that did not specify a school or classroom. In fact, many told us that they would base their decision on where to teach entirely on rapport with a principal �How do neighboring districts pull off earlier hiring timelines? After all, they face many of the same constraints (e.g. state notification deadlines)� When our researchers interviewed HR directors in districts that bordered on our focus districts, it became clear that neighboring districts could hire much earlier because they had dealt effectively with the policy barriers mentioned here: Early vacancy notifications were encouraged by implementing incentives to notify earlier (e.g. $300 bonus) and publicizing the fact that summer benefits and summer teaching opportunities would not be affected Transfers were handled creatively. For example, Midwestern District 1�s neighbors all had different strategies: (1) new vacancies were opened to transfers for five days before being opened to external candidates; (2) transfers lasted through mid-summer, but schools could consider external candidates for the positions at the same time; (3) the transfer process ends in mid-March They projected budgets early and started hiring before the final state budget had been passed In general, the neighboring districts were smaller in size, which meant that the union was likely to be less powerful, and the administrative complications of transfers and notifications were reduced

16. 16 Recommendation 1: Vacancy Notifications Require earlier notification: Collective bargaining contracts and, where necessary, state law must be changed to mandate earlier notification. Remove notification penalties: Teachers must not be threatened with the loss of health benefits or summer teaching opportunities if they give early notice. �Can we really pull this off?� We know that the policy changes will take time. However, districts should be able to take action right away by: Eliminating notification penalties and publicizing that they do not exist. Strangely enough, we have found that some HR departments are reluctant to publicize changes in the policies for fear that more people will resign! Instituting incentives for early notification. By offering a $1000 incentive to notify by March 1, Midwestern District 1 succeeded in identifying 150 vacancies a full three months before the legal notification date. A neighboring district had a $300 incentive to notify by November 1. Rochester Public Schools have also seen success with incentives for voluntary notification.�Can we really pull this off?� We know that the policy changes will take time. However, districts should be able to take action right away by: Eliminating notification penalties and publicizing that they do not exist. Strangely enough, we have found that some HR departments are reluctant to publicize changes in the policies for fear that more people will resign! Instituting incentives for early notification. By offering a $1000 incentive to notify by March 1, Midwestern District 1 succeeded in identifying 150 vacancies a full three months before the legal notification date. A neighboring district had a $300 incentive to notify by November 1. Rochester Public Schools have also seen success with incentives for voluntary notification.

17. 17 Recommendation 2: Teachers Union Transfer Requirements In the short-term, develop an earlier, shorter transfer process: Transfer processes must end by April 1 to enable a May 1 hiring timeline. School reconstitutions that will lead to transfers must occur on the same timeline. In the longer-term, enable schools to consider all candidates equally: Schools must be able to consider internal and external candidates at the same time so that they can get the best person for the job, hire external candidates earlier, and be less likely to hide vacancies from HR. �Realistically, how can we expect unions to yield on one of the cornerstones of their contracts?� Some possible interim strategies that would dramatically improve timelines include: The role of seniority could be reduced in transfer considerations A contract could maintain priority for involuntary transfer but create parity between voluntary transfers and new hires An identified subset of schools � e.g. the hardest-to-staff schools � could be given the ability to choose equally between transfers and external candidates Each vacancy could be opened to internal transfer requests for five days after it is announced In San Diego, which has three transfer periods known as �post and bids,� the HR department encourages high-needs schools to post their vacancies during the first �post and bid� so that, if no teachers want to transfer there (which is usually the case), the position is open to external hires by the end of January. �Realistically, how can we expect unions to yield on one of the cornerstones of their contracts?� Some possible interim strategies that would dramatically improve timelines include: The role of seniority could be reduced in transfer considerations A contract could maintain priority for involuntary transfer but create parity between voluntary transfers and new hires An identified subset of schools � e.g. the hardest-to-staff schools � could be given the ability to choose equally between transfers and external candidates Each vacancy could be opened to internal transfer requests for five days after it is announced In San Diego, which has three transfer periods known as �post and bids,� the HR department encourages high-needs schools to post their vacancies during the first �post and bid� so that, if no teachers want to transfer there (which is usually the case), the position is open to external hires by the end of January.

18. 18 Recommendation 3: Budget Timetable and Forecasting Develop and pass budgets earlier: Where possible, move up the timetable in which state and local budgets are completed. Become better budget and enrollment forecasters: Work with state and city budget officials to better forecast upcoming budgets, so that hiring can begin earlier. Even in the face of uncertainty, begin hiring the high-quality candidates in greatest demand. Protect against overhiring: Shield hard-to-staff schools from overhiring fears by creating a monetary protection fund or a small teacher reserve pool. �How can we take risks with our budgets?� We believe that better forecasting can reduce the risk, but it will still exist. In the face of budget uncertainties, districts can still focus on hiring the applicants that it knows it will need (e.g. shortage areas and high-achieving applicants). They can also shield the hardest-to-staff schools by giving them permission to hire early and removing the risks of overhiring. A monetary protection fund or a reserve pool (similar to airline overbooking) could allow principals to hire early without going out on a limb with their budgets.�How can we take risks with our budgets?� We believe that better forecasting can reduce the risk, but it will still exist. In the face of budget uncertainties, districts can still focus on hiring the applicants that it knows it will need (e.g. shortage areas and high-achieving applicants). They can also shield the hardest-to-staff schools by giving them permission to hire early and removing the risks of overhiring. A monetary protection fund or a reserve pool (similar to airline overbooking) could allow principals to hire early without going out on a limb with their budgets.

19. 19 Recommendation 4: HR Practices Give schools an earlier and greater role in hiring: Union reforms will allow central HR to devolve some hiring to schools, creating multiple avenues of entry. Establish effective and efficient HR systems and processes: Create clear hiring goals and accountability Engage in strategic recruitment Develop an effective, efficient hiring process flow Prioritize applicant tracking and data collection Create an optimal staffing structure �But how can we trust principals to do their own hiring?� With increased independence in hiring, principals should have to demonstrate that they are choosing highly-qualified candidates. In addition, we believe that HR will continue to serve an important function as a quality check and clearing house. Economies of scale alone require this. �But how can we trust principals to do their own hiring?� With increased independence in hiring, principals should have to demonstrate that they are choosing highly-qualified candidates. In addition, we believe that HR will continue to serve an important function as a quality check and clearing house. Economies of scale alone require this.