After the Revolution you have to govern well*

1. After the Revolution you have to govern well* *F.Castro (possibly apocryphal)

2. Structure of the talk • Structured on the four components of EA and the three dimensions of sustainability (FAO) • Make a lot of generalizations (“avoid platitudes”) • Support many with examples, some with data • Consistent themes that emerge: • We need to use what we do know better • Major failures have been due more to weak HUMAN ecology than weak MARINE ecology • Need to integrate life history theory and fisheries population dynamics • More integration ACROSS dimensions, rather than more detail within ecological dimension

3. Source of title • The “Revolution of the People” captures the situation today • The “ecosystem approach” has “taken power”. • “The People” supported it for promise of “better life” • Now we have to DELIVER on some of our promises • Otherwise “the people” become nostalgic for the old government; at least its failings were known • We need some clear benefits to balance the cases where we will disappoint. (there will be a few)

4. Why should we claim victory in the revolution? • EA in marine & fisheries policies since 1990s • Rio & Johannesburg (high level) • CCAMLR (since 1980s!) • UN resolution 61/106 and others • Annex to FAO Code of Conduct (& others) • CBD Marine & Coastal Res IX/20 (& VII, VIII) • EU MSFD and revised Common Fisheries Policy • Canada’s Oceans Act & Fish. Act renewal (draft) • Australia Sustainability Act • At least concepts in Magnusson-Stevens Reauthorisation

5. Why is this an awkward time? • Policy changes in “big” steps • Science grows incrementally POLICY SCIENCE SOLD US OUT NOW? SCIENCE FSA ~1985 “The EA Revolution” POLICY IS LIVING IN THE DARK AGES UNCLOS?

6. We may well be in over our heads

7. Activities as well as Attitudes have to adjust More research? – Sure, but not enough Ask policy to move slower? • We risk counter-revolution or another coup. • There are still sceptics and also people claiming they have all the answers. SOLVE SOME PROBLEMS • MAKE BETTER USE OF WHAT WE KNOW - • WORK ON THE PARTS THAT ARE FUNCTIONING MOST POORLY

8. FAO view of the EA • FOUR COMPONENTS • Take account of ALL main forcers on dynamics of harvested stocks • Industry is accountable for FULL footprint of the impacts of their activities • Governance should be inclusive & participatory • Management should be integrated across all users.

9. Environmental Forcing “Classic” fish population dynamics model Stockt+1 = Stockt + Recruits + Growth - NatMor - Fishing Growth, & Natural Mortality were = K Recruitment is function of SSB (Stockt-x) Model dynamics of F, SSB and R (feedback) Reality – NONE are constant or just f(SSB) All affected directly by physics (west coast) All affected directly by biotic conditions (food webs) All have INDIRECT EFFECTS & INTERACTIONS FISHING INTERACTS WITH ALL THE TERMS

10. Science could get stuck here Why a risk of getting caught here? • The problems are interesting • The problems are familiar “Over-enthusiasm brings problems • Make the question so complex we can’t solve it • Make the question more complex than the information we have to discriminate right answers from wrong ones!! WHEN DOES EACH TERM REALLY MATTER?

11. When does each term matter?Recruitment In a well-managed fishery, how much should variance in R impact yield? Sustainable F rarely > twice Natural Mortality M = f(max age) New work from WGECO merging life history and fish population dynamics Z% sustainable = 100 – (100e-Zt) [t from aging or von von Bertalanffy k and Linf] For gadoids,recruits ~20% of yield, rockfish 3%

12. SUSTAINABLE BOUNDARY NORTH SEA FISH COMMUNITY SURVEY BASED FROM LIFE HISTORY INVARIANTS

13. POPULATION TRENDS DO CORRESPOND TO OVERFISHING INDEX

14. So when does envt forcing on Recruitment really matter? If Max Age > ~8 Recruitment VARIATION accommodated with: exploitation rate matched to productivity Effective MCS giving compliance and reliable information for assessments What if productivity CHANGES? That does matter. Can be managed with Biomass reference points faster than detecting changes in productivity (LATER)

15. When does each term matter? Growth • Asymmetric consequences of unstable growth • Faster than recent average: unexpected modest drop in F (quota fisheries) –with more future yield available • Slower: much larger spike in F, esp of older fish – possibly > > 25% and depleted biomass persists • Knowing pattern to look for should encourage “don’t count your fish before they grow”. • Be particularly careful not to overestimate growth of large cohorts. • Selective effects of fishing emerging as issue

16. When does each term matter? Natural Mortality Carrying capacity effect (if real) – Biotic Driv. Top down control of system – Biotic Drivers Lots of food web modelling ….. Per capita Stress – Abiotic (+ biotic) Drivers Hardest change to detect (estimates of M confounded with estimates of F) Serious risk of overexploitation if missed How long a change persists impt to mgmt.

17. M is under-valued compared to R and G • The short-term VARIANCE in M is usually not large nor crucial to management • Species differences in M lawful (in several ways) • Size-based, **life-history based, others • Step-changes in M VERY important, (Canadian cod stocks & decline of productivity) • Community changes also changes aggregate M • THIS IS A PLACE WHERE MORE SCIENCE WOULD MATTER A LOT.

18. Newfoundland Cod - MORATORIUM PERIOD Different figures because different gears and different analysis methods

19. Southern Scotian Shelf cod Relative F Catch / Surv. Biom. Survey Z

20. Using what we know: Impact of environment on stock dynamics • Growing vogue to put environmental term in one or more Population Dynamics equations. • WRONG idea – envt. not a consistent factor Consider: DN/N = r (1 – N/K) When N is large, only terms that affect K matter When N is small, only terms that affect r matter DIFFERENT MECHANISM AT WORK IN STOCK-ENVT INTERACTIONS AT LARGE AND SMALL N SINGLE MODEL TERM FOR “EFFECT” IS SILLY. ANALYTICAL ALTERNATIVES EXIST.

21. And use what we already know For 14 Mgmt Strategy Evaluations in 2005: Ecosystem Consideration In Objectives: 0 Envt Factors in Harvest Control Rules: 1 Environmental Forcing Explicit In Operating Model: 3 Environment Effects Explicit in Robustness Testing: 1 Reference in 2005 WG Reports to guidance from SGPRISM (recr) or GROMAT (growth): 0 of 12 assessment reports Narrative discussion in 9 of 12

22. Accountability for full footprint • Gear impacts on “habitat” (direct) • Bycatches of other fish, invertebrates, seabirds, mammals, turtles, etc (direct) • Trophic impacts (direct & indirect)

23. It’s Just Second Hand News ….. Exploitation rate of forage stocks (1980s) ICNAF & NAFO aggregate quota rule (1970) ICES WG ECO 1990 OSPAR IMPACT I and II – 1994, 1997. 1977 2009

24. Questions about footprint of activity • Single factor question: What level of impact is unsustainable? • Existing tools can be generalized • Data poor assessment methods (Bayesian, etc) helping provide even more progress, • Cross-factor questions: • How do we calibrate sustainability of impacts across features? MUCH earlier stage of work. • How do we choose equitable degree of risk aversion across ecosystems components (and interest groups)? (visit later)

25. “CLASSICAL” THREE-STAGE PA MODEL CAUTIOUS HEALTHY CRITICAL HARVESTRATE CONVENTIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ENDANGERED SPECIES TOOLS MORATORIUM REBUILDING Risk Mgmt RP LIMIT RP EN TH BIOMASS

26. “Within feature” challenge: What is sustainable impact Generalization of B and F framework • Three stage model widespread for B & F • 6 assumptions generalize to ANY pair of ecosystem State and Pressure indicators • Locating limit requires estimate of productivity OR “replace-ability” OR “ecosystem function served”. • Feasible in data-moderate situations

27. Assumptions of 3 stage model in fisheries • A state of the stock exists that is considered healthy, or within safe biological limits • When the index of stock status is in the “healthy” or “safe” zone, an exploitation rate exists that is sustainable in the long term. • A biologically based LIMIT exists, below which the stock is at unacceptable risk of “serious or irreversible harm”. • When the index of stock status <= the limit, exploitation is to be as close to zero as is possible to achieve • There is uncertainty about the position of the limit, the annual estimates of stock status, and inertia and uncertainty about the ability of management to reduce exploitation as the limit is approached. (PRECAUTIONARY Reference Points) • When the index of stock status < the precautionary reference point, exploitation is to be reduced.

28. A - convex C – Linearly proportional Recruitment B - flat Spawning stock biomass Tasks to undertake for generalization of framework • Position Limit RP on Biodiversity Axes • Limits are the anchor for all the framework • In Fisheries advice - from stock-recruit relationship

29. Questions to estimate reference point for ANY state/pressure mix • Is there a slope at all? • Is the origin a reasonable starting point, or is there depensation? • Is there curvature beyond the starting point, and if so is it convex or concave? • Position of maximum rate of change in slope? THOSE ARE REASONABLE SCIENCE QUESTIONS. (Not easy but reasonable). WE CAN BUILD THIS FRAMEWORK

30. *

31. The “cross-factor” challenge • How to bring consistent management of impacts to very different TYPES of impacts (EQUITY of governance) • Generalization of 3 stage model is PART of the solution • WGECO 2009 discussion of what pressure level on different properties causes an EQUAL: • Likelihood of percent perturbation? • Loss of ability to replace itself? • Loss of ecosystem functionality • Loss of ecosystem goods and services?

32. Risk aversion particular complication • Battlefield of the eco-advocates vs incrementally business-as-usual. • Most opportunity and greatest difficulties so far. • NOT data limitation problems – different interpretations of policy requirements • NAFO VME identification case history • (Fish mgmt reference points later)

33. NAFO VMEs • Policy framework complete • UNGA 61/105 – avoid Serious Adverse Impacts to Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems – or state does NOT AUTHORIZE FISHERY • FAO Technical Guidelines on Deep Sea Fisheries on the High Seas Criteria for SAI and VME • NAFO efforts 2007 (fall) to 2009 (spring) • Science Working Group TO WG of Fisheries Managers and Scientists TO Council TO WGFMS TO Council again …

34. SCIENTISTS WG - MAY 2008 Don’t want major Misses

35. Don’t want major False Alarms MARCH 2009

36. Trophic relations

37. Trophic Impacts • Lots of fun for science. This is what we are good at. However – • Management will (and should) not chase every trophic fluctuation • “Consensus” that we cannot engineer ecosystems into pre-selected configurations. • Relevance is in selecting management strategy • FREQUENTLY done for PREY since ICNAF / CCAMLR • RARELY done for PREDATORS re aggregate F for sufficient top down control on system • DIVISIVE when gets to “excess predators” (seals)

38. Trophic Impacts - 2 • Role of fisheries “trophic cascades” • Viewed in “Top-down / bottom up frameworks • Release from top predators • Depletion of prey base for system. • Can system recover if F is released? • Models generally capable of exploring issues • “Middle out” impacts may be special case • “Wasp-waist” systems not rare • Envt & fishery impacts on “waist” stock common • WHAT strategy is sustainable? (forage species work)

39. Other issues with accountability for impacts • Industry often much better than government at solving problems, if they are motivated to do so • BC Trawl fishery and Boccacio. Catch reduced 60% in 40 months given incentive • Effective economic tools / incentives don’t work when the benefits are ecosystem properties not in trade by the fishery!

40. INCLUSIVE GOVERANCE COME TOGETHER

41. INCLUSIVE GOVERNANCE • Legitimized for fishing industry decades ago • Problems in EA are: • How many more interest groups are “stakeholders” • Whose forum to use to reach the decision • Necessary to re-engineer roles and processes • Core Concepts: • The Assessment of Assessment framework of “Credibility Legitimacy, Relevance”. • 3 Dimensions of Sustainability – Environmental, Economic AND Social

42. Credibility Legitimacy Relevance These are harder to achieve in EA • More types of specialists pass judgement on credibility • More types of stakeholders pass judgement on legitimacy • More dimensions to a decision so more decision-makers looking for relevance LITTLE SERIOUS DISCUSSION ON THIS YET FAILURE ON ANY GIVE ADVICE LOW IMPACT

43. Dimensions of Sustainability NO POLICY MAKERS WANT TO MESS UP • Ecologists risk averse on environmental dimension • Users risk averse on economic & social • Governments especially risk averse on SOCIAL dimension (on-going test) • How does one have an informed dialogue with communities having different risk tolerances (IUCN decline criterion debate)

44. Weights given to different indicator properties (Rochet & Rice 2005) Science, Management, Policy and User Community are seeking different things in an “informed decision”.

45. Signal Detection Theory framework Around since 1940 in psychometrics 2 x 2 matrix of reality ( +/-) & criterion (+/-) Hit (+/+) – Event is really happening and indicator says problem is present True Negative (-/-) – All is quiet in the world and indicator says all is well Miss (-/+) Problem is occurring, indicator says all clear False Alarm (+/-) All is well but the indicator says problem is present and management action needed. NO DECISION FRAMEWORK PERFECT – What is cost & tolerance of Miss vs False Alarm?

46. Science to support inclusiveness in governance Science to inform inclusive dialogue • Retrospectively North Sea Fisheries advisory framework right > 2/3 of applications • When advice is in error; more Misses than False Alarms (Piet & Rice 2005). • Assessments lag behind declines. • Rely on annual assessment cycle to correct • If roles also have different tolerances for Misses vs False Alarms, then at least we know what the different error rates are for various options. • (Rice & Legace 2007 for IUCN decline criterion)

47. Governance challenge under EA Where and how to resolve risk tolerance differences? (See IM portion) • Conflicting agency mandates • Agencies with mandates to MANAGE • Agencies with mandates to PROTECT • At international, national, and sub-national levels • COHERENCE OF THEIR POLICIES IS CENTRAL TO PROGRESS ON EA • Often seem on course to train-wreck

48. Are we making progress? MANY causes for pessimism • NAFO example – slow at best • IUCN & CBD – many fishery-hostile meetings under their aegis (IMCC); “eject Shell” initiative • IPBES vs Regular Process • Different timetables, different experts, distrust • Fish Mgmt and Biodiversity clients classify each other as “partisan threats” • No INSTITUTIONAL settings to explore these issues.

49. Some hints of hope VME (FAO) and EBSA (CBD) initiatives • Slightly Different policy motivators • FAO UN 61/105; CBD WSSD to COP • Both used same expert document as start • Each invited experts from other community to key meetings. • Regular calls and some coordination of short and longer-term planning. Are we seeing détente among the experts?

50. FAO (VME): Uniqueness / rarity Functional significance of habitat Fragility Life history attributes of species Structural Complexity CBD (EBSA) Uniqueness / rarity (1) Special importance for life history stages (2, 4) Fragility/slow recovery (3) Biological productivity / diversity (2, 5) Special importance to EN/TH species (1) Naturalness Commonality of FAO and CBD criteria MAY lead to cohernence