If there is to be a science of sciences in the twenty-first century,

2. If there is to be a science of sciences in the twenty-first century, it will have to include linguistics — at least as a partner, and perhaps the leading partner, in the next round of man’s dialogue with nature. M.A.K. Halliday (1987)

3. Towards A Linguistic Science Of SciencesReconstruing Biological Sciences Through Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory Dr ChRIS CLÉiRIGh

4. Not To Bodily Go

5. Thanks to Dr Peter White for very kindly offering to present this paper and to the ISFC39 committee for not “refusing” it.

6. Towards A Linguistic Science Of SciencesReconstruing Biological Sciences Through Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory Dr ChRIS CLÉiRIGh

7. Towards A Linguistic Science Of SciencesReconstruing Biological Sciences Through Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory Dr ChRIS CLÉiRIGh Dr Peter R. R. White

8. What & Why What are we doing? We will be using a theory of experience that has evolved in language to reconstrue certain biological phenomena. Why use a theory of experience evolved in language? Scientific theories are higher-level semiotics realised in registers of language (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 605-6). ORGEL'S SECOND RULE: Evolution is cleverer than you are.

9. Main Theoretical Tool:Elaborating Figures Of Identity

10. Why Use The Figure? The key to the construal of experience is the perception of change; the grammar construes a quantum of change as a figure (typically one clause) … . Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 213) A figure embodies both analysis and synthesis of our experience of the world: an analysis into component parts, and a synthesis of these parts into a configuration. That is, process, participants and circumstances are separated out analytically and are thus given independent phenomenal statuses. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 165)

11. Why Use Figures Of Being? Figures of doing and being can be interpreted as complementary perspectives on a ‘quantum of change’. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132) Figures of being-&-having … construe the same overall range of relations as expanding sequences, and the basic subtypes also correspond to the subcategories of expansion, viz elaboration, extension, and enhancement. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 165)

12. Structure: A Two Part Invention Part 1: The Semiotic Trajectory To Sociality Part 2: The Semiotic Trajectory To Multicellularity Part 2a: Intra-Cellular Semiosis Part 2b: Exteriorised Intra-Cellular Semiosis Part 2c: Inter-Cellular Semiosis Part 1a: Intra-Organism Semiosis Part 1b: Exteriorised Intra-Organism Semiosis Part 1c: Inter-Organism Semiosis

13. Part 1 The Semiotic Trajectory To Sociality

14. The Semiotic Trajectory To Sociality Part 1a: Intra-Organism Semiosis Part 1b: Exteriorised Intra-Organism Semiosis Part 1c: Inter-Organism Semiosis

15. Part 1a Intra-Organism Semiosis

16. The Evolutionary Emergence Of Neurological Systems:Cnidarians (Anenomes, Corals & Jellyfish) & Ctenophores (Comb Jellies)

17. Neural Darwinism:A Selectionist Model Of Brain Function The Theory Of Neuronal Group Selection (Edelman) ‘Neurons that fire together, wire together’ (Hebb 1949). Perceptual categorisation involves the strengthening and weakening of synapses within neuronal groups, in two or more functionally different (but connected) maps of neuronal groups, each map independently receiving signals from sensory sheets and organs (Edelman 1992: 87, 125). Perceptual categorisation involves a correlation between the activation of sensory sheets and the co-ordinated activation of specific combinations of neuronal groups.

18. Neuronal Group Selection AsIdentity Relation

19. Categorisation-Neuronal Relation As Identity Relation

20. Identity Relations: Encoding & Decoding

21. Encoding Perceptual Categorisations The identity encodes the perceptual categorisation realised in neuronal groups by reference to the impact on sensory sheets

22. Decoding Sensory Impacts The identity decodes the impact on sensory sheets by reference to the perceptual categorisation realised in neuronal groups

23. From Identifying To Perceiving The Emergence of Consciousness

24. Encoding & Decoding: Ergative Model

25. Agent: Identifier [encoding] Medium: Identified Process: identifying Range: Identifier [decoding]

26. Impinging & Emanating: Ergative Model

27. Agent: Phenomenon [impinging] Medium: Senser Process: sensing Range: Phenomenon [emanating]

28. Identifying Sensing Agent: Identifier [encoding] Agent: Phenomenon [impinging] Medium: Identified Medium: Senser Process: sensing Medium: Identified Process: identifying Process: identifying Range: Identifier [decoding] Range: Phenomenon [emanating]

29. From Identifier To Phenomenon Agent of perceptive sensing as exterior and material Range of perceptive sensing as interior and mental

30. Part 1b Exteriorised Intra-Organism Semiosis

31. Sensing-Brain As Identity Relation

32. Sensing-Doing As Identity Relation

33. Encoding ‘Senser-Sensing’ The identity encodes the ‘senser-sensing’ realised in neurological system-&-process by reference to the ‘body-doing’

34. Decoding ‘Body-Doing’ The identity decodes the ‘body-doing’ by reference to the ‘senser-sensing’ realised in neurological system-&-process

35. Behavioural Process Topology mental processes of consciousness represented as forms of behaviour: look, watch, stare, listen, think, worry, dream physiological processes manifesting states of consciousness: cry, laugh, smile, frown, sigh, sob, snarl, hiss, whine, nod body postures and pastimes: sing, dance, lie down, sit up, sit down material

36. Group Dynamics Examples: Flocking, Schooling, Mexican Waves

37. Part 1c Inter-Organism Semiosis

38. ProtolanguageIntegrating The Inner & Outer Domains Of Experience There is a basic difference, that we become aware of at a very early age (three to four months), between inner and outer experience: between what we experience as going on ‘out there’, in the world around us, and what we experience as going on inside ourselves, in the world of consciousness (including perception, emotion and imagination). Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 170 ) … as they become aware of themselves and their environment, children feel a tension building up between two facets of their experience: between what they perceive as happening “out there” and what is happening “in here”, within their own borders so to speak. … meaning arises out of the impact between the material and the conscious as two facets of a child’s ongoing experience. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 612)

39. Inner ‘Modes Of Consciousness’ Domain:Sensing Topology doing-&-happening perception cognition desideration emotion being-&-having

40. Outer ‘Material Experience’ Domain:Identifying The Intersubjective By Decoding Tokens Of Sensing The identity decodes the ‘body-doing’ by reference to the ‘senser-sensing’ realised in neurological system-&-process

41. Protolanguage: Microfunctions(Inner Dimension As Modes Of Projection)

42. Protolanguage: Microfunctions(Inner Dimension As Types Of Modality)

43. From ‘Senser-Doing’ To ‘Sayer-Saying’ The grammar separates out consciousness from the rest of our experience in the form of mental processes, capable of projecting ideas; but in addition, consciousness can be ‘externalised’ in the form of verbal processes, capable of projecting locutions. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 584) An act of saying is not simply externalising inner events; it is actively transforming them, into an event of a different kind. It then resembles other semiotic events, many of which do not require a conscious information source … . Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 514)

44. Creating Social Order These [microfunctions] already foreshadow the semantic motifs of the adult language, the experiential and interpersonal metafunctions, although they are not in any direct correspondence with them … Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 612) Interpersonally, the grammar is not a theory but a way of doing; it is our construction of social relationships, both those that define society and our own place in it, and those that pertain to the immediate dialogic situation. This constitutes the “interpersonal” metafunction, whereby language constructs our social collective and, thereby, our personal being. The word “construct” is used to suggest a form of enactment — though something on which we inevitably build a theory, of ourself and the various “others” to whom we relate. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 511) If the ideational component is language as a mode of reflection [cognition, modalisation], the interpersonal component is language as a mode of action [desideration, modulation] …If the ideational metafunction is language in its “third person” [objective] guise, the interpersonal is language in its “first and second person” [intersubjective] guise. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 523, 525) … the interactional signs are the ones whereby a child enacts social relationships with caregivers and others who are close. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 612)

45. Social Dynamics Example

46. Part 2 The Semiotic Trajectory To Multicellularity

47. The Semiotic Trajectory To Multicellularity Part 2a: Intra-Cellular Semiosis Part 2b: Exteriorised Intra-Cellular Semiosis Part 2c: Inter-Cellular Semiosis

48. Part 2a Intra-Cellular Semiosis

49. The Evolutionary Emergence Of Biological Systems

50. DNA As Coded Environmental Description If nerves carry information about the world as it is now, genes are a coded description of the distant past. […]The genes that survive down the generations add up, in effect, to a description of what it took to survive back then, and that is tantamount to saying that modern DNA is a coded description of the environments in which ancestors survived. Dawkins (1999: 3) A species […] builds up, over the generations, a statistical description of the worlds in which the ancestors of today’s species members lived and reproduced. That description is written in the language of DNA. It lies not in the DNA of any one individual but collectively in the DNA […] of the whole breeding population. Dawkins (1998: 239)