Conflict in South African Cities: An Analysis of Service-Related Unrest

1. Conflict in South African Cities: An Analysis of Service-Related Unrest Lucius Botes; Molefi Lenka Lochner Marais; Zacheus Matebesi; Kholisa Sigenu Centre for Development Support, UFS Presented by: Zacheus Matebesi Portfolio Committee on Provincial and Local Government 20 November 2007

2. OUTLINE • Background • Methodology • Reasons for the protests • Impacts of the protests • Lessons learned • Recommendations

3. AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE… “Social control is a continuing function of every social system. When the mechanisms of control [both formal and informal] weaken, people may lose confidence in the existing system and try to reform it through collective behaviour… Social control can breakdown when the formalagents of control fail to perform their roles adequately.” Turner & Kilian, 1987)

4. BACKGROUND (1) • Protests in SA more acute in Free State and North West • First manifestations in September 2004 - Harrismith • Report based on four case studies conducted by CDS (UFS) and funded by CAGE • Phumelela & Khutsong • conducted on behalf of Centre for Development Enterprise (May-June 2006) • Phomolong & Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality conducted in 2007 • Khutsong case study differs - demarcation

5. BACKGROUND (2)Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE) • CAGE: primarily a grant-making project set up through a Financing Agreement between Government of SA & EU’s Programme for Reconstruction and Development. • Implementing Agency: National Treasury, SA • Overall objective: To improve national policy, decision-making and implementation on issues related to foreign and domestic policy that either mitigate or cause conflict, thus contributing to good governance and the deepening of democracy in South and Southern Africa

6. METHODOLOGY • Media scan – more than 100 newspaper reports • Secondary analysis –i.e. census figures • Individual interviews with (+-100): • current and previous councillors • current and previous officials • business owners • security services personnel • provincial officials • community leaders • Focus Groups (+-300 community members): • Protestors and non-protestors

7. REASONS FOR PROTESTSTrail of Governance Decisions - Khutsong • First 2 gov. notices – NW • Submissions to Demarcation Board – GP • Gauteng Local Gov. Portfolio Committee – GP • Gauteng Legislature – NW • Municipal Demarcation Board – NW • Municipal Demarcation Board - GP • Parliament Portfolio Committee – GP • National Council of Provinces & Minister of Loc. Government - NW

8. SOCIAL UNREST CROSS-BORDER MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS REASONS FOR UNREST: Khutsong Inadequate community engagement Lack of appropriate inter-governmental relations Political opportunism HISTORY OF UNCERTAIN HUMAN SETTLEMENT POOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

9. REASONS FOR PROTESTS:Poor Governance • Phumelela • no council meetings took place for a long time • Led to lack of basic decision-making and direction • Nelson Mandela Metro • It took many years for its Integrated Development Plan to be accepted

10. REASONS FOR PROTESTS:Individual political struggles • Political infighting in most case studies • Struggles between local factions (e.g. Phomolong) • No compelling evidence of corruption against a certain Councillor – but he was forced to resign • Struggles emanating from provincial level (e.g. Phumelela) • Media points to provincial divisions between factions in the ruling party & between council and management • In Khutsong and Nelson Mandela Metro local leaders found refuge in the SACP • Most upheavals took place 12 months before elections – evidence of political jockeying for positions

11. REASONS FOR PROTESTS:Poor Communication • Institutional lack of transparency single most important reason for the protests • Most ward committees were not functional • Some functioned as mechanisms of exclusion • One respondent indicated: “Ward committee meetings are held with only a select few. If you are not in the good books of ward councillors, you will not be given the opportunity to speak at public meetings”

12. REASONS FOR PROTESTS:Ineffective Client Interface • Lack of appropriate client interface by councillors or officials – labelled as arrogant • Lack of effective complaints management • No coherent systems in place to measure service delivery or the quality of the client interface • An interviewee in Phumelela sums this up: “If I had to rate the municipality by means of the guidelines used to rate the hospitality industry, I would give it ½ a star for water and electricity, and a 0 star for sanitation before the unrest. With the slight improvements since then, I can give it 1½ for water and electricity, and a ‘minus 5’ star, whatever that means, for sanitation.”

13. REASONS FOR PROTESTS:Ineffective Management • Ineffective financial control – billing procedures, credit control & budgeting for expenditure • Phumelela: lost credit record due to poor cash flow levels • Both the Municipal Manager & Financial Manager were not competent to do their jobs • Evidence of poor human resource management • NMBM: ability to provide adequate service hampered by lack of technical skills • Had 50 qualified technicians in the past, number is down to 3 for the greater metro

14. REASONS FOR PROTESTS:Housing Administration and Management (1) • Shoddy construction; incomplete housing units, and subsidy application forms which get lost in the system • NMBN: R160 million was set aside to address construction problems • Mismanagement of housing waiting list and allocation of subsidies - prevalent in NMBM & Phomolong • “The housing waiting list is not properly managed. We do not know how the officials decide on the people who should receive the houses. Some of the people in our area have been staying in these bad conditions for 17 years, but those who arrived afterwards have already received sites…”NMBM Resident

15. REASONS FOR PROTESTS:Housing Administration and Management (2) • Moratorium on the allocation of housing subsidies to NMBM led to major conflicts with residents • A former councillor stated: “…the provincial government only communicated with the local Department of Housing. Not all politicians are informed about the complex issues around the allocation and building of houses… For example, the provincial Department of Housing will only inform us on a certain day about amendments made to policies that we have been sharing for months with the community. How do you go back to the people and say ‘SORRY, ALL THE INFORMATION THAT WE HAVE BEEN SHARING WITH YOU FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS HAS CHANGED?”

16. OTHER REASONS FOR THE PROTESTS • Affordability issues – residents were unhappy with the amounts charged for services • Difficulty to administer indigent subsidy systems • Regional identifies at local municipal level • Intergovernmental relations • Local governments face the consequences of unfunded mandates • Lack of appropriate youth development

17. IMPACTS OF THE PROTESTS • Damage to public infrastructure • Khutsong unrest have cost an estimated R70 million by April 2006 • Damage to private property was estimated at R5 million • Declining service payments and decrease in service delivery • Payment levels in Khutsong dropped from 50% to 20% • Payment levels to ESKOM decreased from 87% to 43%

18. IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY • End of 2005, ESKOM provided power to 126 SMMEs in Khutsong • Provision decreased to only 35 enterprises by June 2006 • Hennenman • businesses estimated a daily loss to the economy of R250 000. • protests degenerated into looting of ‘foreign-owned shops’

19. IMPACTS ON THE EDUCATION SYSTEM • Education in Khutsong; Phomolong and Nelson Mandela Bay was seriously disrupted • School attendance has been disrupted in Khutsong in 2006 & 2007 • Phomolong: matric pass rate dropped from 65% in 2004 to 59% in 2005

20. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS • Improve intergovernmental policy environment for housing delivery • Strengthen the management of housing delivery at local level • Enhance financial management systems • Improve technical operations and maintenance • Boost youth development programmes • Implement efficient client interface and complaints management systems • Strengthen and monitor the functioning of ward committees • Improve mechanisms to communicate budget allocations to various stakeholders

21. EARLY WARNING SIGNS • Councillors and ward committees are in a better position to detect early warning signs • Difficult to be picked up by intelligence systems of local police • Some early warnings included… • High levels of non-payment and municipal cash flow problems • Absence of regular ward committee meetings – record keeping is essential • Continuous complaints about general service delivery and housing issues • Ongoing gripes about certain individuals within a specific community

22. IN CONCLUSION… • Community Development Workers can serve as alternative channel of warning signals • Institutionalize mediation to defuse tension • Role of the media should be noted • Political or legal coercion does not minimise conflict • Understand local in-migration patterns; and finally • Rethink development approaches in small towns

23. THANK YOU!