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The Ties that Bind min Governance Networks

The Ties that Bind min Governance Networks. Christopher Koliba , 2010 University of Vermont. Node B. Node A. Node C. Exchanges of Resources, Execution of Administrative Power. Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2010, p.97) Figure 2.1 Nodes and Ties. “Rules” of governance.

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The Ties that Bind min Governance Networks

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  1. The Ties that Bind minGovernance Networks Christopher Koliba, 2010 University of Vermont

  2. Node B Node A Node C Exchanges of Resources, Execution of Administrative Power Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2010, p.97)Figure 2.1 Nodes and Ties

  3. “Rules” of governance • Interdependence between organizations. Governance is broader than government, covering non-state actors… • Continuing interactions between network members, caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes. • Game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants (Rhodes,1997).

  4. Ostrom’s differentiation of rule types: (a) operational rules that govern day-to-day activities of appropriators, (b) collective choice rules concerning overall policies for governing common pool resources and how those policies are made, and (c) constitutional choice rules that establish who is eligible to determine collective choice rules. (as described in Stone and Ostrower, 2007, p.424).

  5. Levels of rules: • Macro • Meso • Micro -------- • Meta – Rules governing the creation of rules…

  6. Social Exchange Theory • Any organization is dependent upon other organizations for resources. • In order to achieve their goals, the organizations have to exchange resources. • Although decision-making within the organization is constrained by other organizations, the dominant coalition retains some discretion. The appreciative system of the dominant coalition influences which relationships are seen as a problem and which resources will be sought. • The dominant coalition employs strategies within known rules of the game to regulate the process of exchange. • Variations in the degree of discretion are a product of the goals and the relative power potential of interacting organizations. This relative power potential is a product of the resources of each organization, of the rules of the game and of the process of exchange between organizations. (Rhodes 1981; 98-99; 199; 78-79).” Rhodes, 2007, P.1245

  7. Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2010, p.100) Table 4.1: Range of Combinations of Resource Exchanges

  8. The balance… • Figure 4.2 Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2010, p.98)

  9. Formality of ties Formal Informal A formal social structure is defined as: “one in which the social positions and the relationships among [social actors] have been explicitly specified and are defined independently of the personal characteristics of the participants occupying these positions” (Scott, 1987, p.17).

  10. Strength of ties

  11. Administrative Authority and Power Table 4.2 Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2010, p.105)

  12. Competition • Competition has been observed ecologically as, “the struggle among organisms, both of the same and of different species for food, space, and other requirements for existence” (Webster, 1989, p. 300). • Competition between social actors is defined as the: “rivalry between two or more persons or groups for an object desired in common, usually resulting in a victor and a loser or losers, not necessary involving the destruction of the other” (Mintzberg, 1983).

  13. Have you found evidence of competition in the case studies analyzed thus far?

  14. Command & Control

  15. Principal – Agent Theory Principal A Preference P Agent X? or or or Can Principal B Secure Preference Q From Agent Y? or or or Principal C Preference R Agent Z?

  16. Nature of the Principal-Agent “Problem” • A principal commissions an agent to act on the principal’s behalf. In general, the agent’s interests do not entirely coincide with those of the principal; the principal does not have complete control over the agent; the principal only has partial information about the agent’s behavior. The agency relationship consists in the reliance of a principal upon the agent with an agenda of his own. The agency problem is the difficulty, in all but the simplest such relationships, of ensuring that the principals is faithfully served and that the agent is fairly compensated (Donahue, 1989, p.38). • Transaction Cost

  17. The Rules of Cooperative Behavior • What are they? • Group exercise: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

  18. Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiment

  19. Gray’s 3 phase collaborative process: • Problem setting • Direction setting • Implementation

  20. What are the rules governing effective collaboration? • Setting ground rules– see pages 75-76 of Gray • Enforcing ground rules… • Structures matter…

  21. Figure 4.4: Degrees of Collaboration (Source: Frey et al., 2006) • Coexistence LOW • Communication • Cooperation Integration and Formalization • Coalition • Coadunation HIGH • -

  22. Network Management Good management is the art of making problems so interesting and their solutions so constructive that everyone wants to get to work and deal with them. ---Paul Hawken

  23. Table 8.1: The Convergence of PA Paradigms into Governance Network Administration

  24. Classical PA contributions • Vertical authority may persist within the organizational culture of individual network actors. • Vertical authority may persist at the network-wide level.

  25. New Public Management • A strong focus on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of government performance. • A strong focus on ideas and techniques that have proven their value in the private sector. • A strong focus on the use of privatization and contracting out of governmental services, or (parts of) governmental bodies to improve effectiveness and efficiency. • A strong focus on the creation or use of markets or semi-markets mechanisms, or at least on increasing competition in service provision and realizing public policy. • A strong interest in the use of performance indicators or other mechanisms to specify • the desired output of the privatized or automised part of the government or service that has been contracted out (Klijn & Snellen, 2009, 33).

  26. New PM contributions to Network Management • The role of market forces and competition within governance networks needs to be accounted for. • Interest in monitoring network performance is a critical feature of sound network management.

  27. Collaborative Public Management • “A concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multiorganizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organizations. Collaboration is a purposive relationship designed to solve a problem by creating or discovering a solution within a given set of constraints…” (Agranoff and McGurie, 2003, p.4).

  28. Collaborative Activities  Vertical Collaboration Activities Information seeking • General funding of programs and projects • New funding of programs and projects Interpretation of standards and rules General program guidance Technical assistance Adjustment seeking • Regulatory relief, flexibility or waiver • Statutory relief or flexibility • Change in policy • Funding innovation for program • Model program involvement • Performance-based discretion Horizontal Collaborative Activities Policymaking and strategy making • Gain policymaking assistance • Engage in formal partnerships • Engage in joint policymaking • Consolidate policy effort Resource exchange • Seek financial resources • Employ joint financial incentives • Contracted planning and implementation Project-based work • Partnership for a particular project • Seek technical resources Source: Agranoff and McGuire, 2003, p.70-71

  29. Governance Network Administration • From the interdependence perspective, network administration is aimed at, “coordinating strategies of actors with different goals and preferences with regard to a certain problem or policy measure within an existing network of inter-organizational relations” • Network administration may also be seen as promoting the mutual adjustment of the behaviour of actors with diverse objectives and ambitions with regard to tackling problems within a given framework of interorganizational relationships” (Kickert and Koopenjan, 1997, p.10, 44).

  30. The complex nature of network conflict (O’Leary and Bingham, 2007): • There are multiple members • Members bring both different and common missions • Network organizations have different cultures • Network organizations have different methods of operation • Members have different stakeholder groups and different funders • Members of different degrees of power

  31. There are often multiple issues • There are multiple forums for decision-making • Networks are both interorganizational and interpersonal • There are a variety of governance structures available to networks • Networks may encounter conflict with the public (10-11)

  32. Table 8.4 Network Administration Coordinating Strategies

  33. Characteristics of Negotiations • Sensitivity to early interactions: the beginning of negotiations set the tone for future interactions. • Irreversibility: Sometimes negotiators “walk through doors that lock behind them.” • Threshold effects: small incremental moves resulting in large changes in the situation. • Feedback loops: Established patterns of interactions among actors readily become self-reinforcing (Watkins, 1999, p.255).

  34. Facilitative managers… • emphasize the possibility of leadership as facilitation rather than the giving of orders, and authority as accountable expertise rather than as chain of command. Ultimately, working within such a perspective, we should be able to ground administrative legitimacy in accountability that not only is exercised in the privacy of the individual conscience or in the internal process of a particular agency, but also tangibly enacted in substantive collaboration with affected others, including members of the general public (Stivers, 2004, p.486).

  35. Participatory governance • Participatory governance includes a number of strategies within quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial administrative tools employed by public administrators to leverage greater citizen control and involvement. • Quasi-legislative processes… include deliberative democracy, e-democracy, public conversations, participatory budgeting, citizen juries, study circles, collaborative policy making, and other forms of deliberation and dialogue among groups of stakeholders or citizens. • Quasi-judicial processes include alternative dispute resolution such as mediation, facilitation, early neutral assessment, and arbitration [and include] … minitrials, summary jury trials, fact finding...” (Bingham, Nabatchi and O'Leary, 2005, p.547, 552)

  36. Brokering relationships “Brokers are able to make new connections across [organizations] and communities of practice, enable coordination.” He goes on to add that, “if they are good brokers [their efforts lead to] opening new possibilities for meaning (Wenger, 1998, p.109). (Wenger, 1998)

  37. Systems analysis

  38. Table 8.7 Multi Social Scale Approaches to Decision-Making (adapted from Koopenjan and Klijn, 2004, p.44)

  39. Table 8.8 Group Decision-Making Process

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