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Strategic harvest control rules: game-theoretic insights

Strategic harvest control rules: game-theoretic insights. Marko Lindroos University of Helsinki Department of Economics and Management. Harvest control rules set by a single country. Bioeconomic models used to find optimal harvest

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Strategic harvest control rules: game-theoretic insights

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  1. Strategic harvest control rules: game-theoretic insights Marko Lindroos University of Helsinki Department of Economics and Management

  2. Harvest control rules set by a single country • Bioeconomic models used to find optimal harvest • This means static/dynamic optimisation of fishing mortality, harvest or effort • The objective is to reach bioeconomic sustainability of the fishery • Design economic incentives such that optimum is achieved

  3. Why game theory? • Whenever there is more than one interest group (country, fishermen etc.) strategic behaviour / competition may prevent optimal harvest control • International fisheries have very limited possibilities to prevent strategic behaviour / free-riding

  4. Alternative game models • Non-cooperative games • only individual benefits matter • Cooperative games • sharing of benefits • Coalitional games • how coalitions form

  5. Cooperative games • Assume Sweden, Norway and Finland can form coalitions when harvesting fish stocks • Possible coalitions {SWE}, {FIN}, {NOR}, {SWE, NOR}, {SWE, FIN}, {NOR, FIN}, {SWE, NOR, FIN}

  6. Cooperative Solutions • How should they share cooperative benefits? • The solutions search an allocation of cooperative benefits given e.g. individual & group rationality

  7. NOR SWE FIN {NOR, FIN} SWE {NOR, SWE, FIN} Coalitional games: Searching for equilibrium cooperation structures Non-Cooperation Partial Cooperation Full Cooperation

  8. How to make cooperation more attractive? • Threat (trigger) strategies • Side payments • Safe Minimum Bioeconomic Levels of fish stocks (Reference points) • Give fishermen more responsibility in harvest control

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