'Winner determination' presentation slideshows

Multi- item auctions & exchanges (multiple distinguishable items for sale)

Multi- item auctions & exchanges (multiple distinguishable items for sale). Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University. Read: Optimal Winner Determination Algorithms. Sandholm, T. 2006. Chapter 14 of the book Combinatorial Auctions,

596 views • 59 slides

Multi- item auctions & exchanges (multiple distinguishable items for sale)

Multi- item auctions & exchanges (multiple distinguishable items for sale). Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University. Example application: Winner determination in multi- item auctions.

565 views • 56 slides

Collaboration in Vehicle Routing (joint work with Margaretha Gansterer )

Collaboration in Vehicle Routing (joint work with Margaretha Gansterer ). Richard F. Hartl Chair of Production and Operations Management Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1 A-1090 Vienna, Austria. Outline. Collaborative Logistics - Motivation Collaborative Vehicle Routing

430 views • 41 slides

Advanced informed search

Advanced informed search. Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University. Read: Optimal Winner Determination Algorithms. Sandholm, T. 2006. Chapter 14 of the book Combinatorial Auctions, Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg, editors, MIT Press.

384 views • 38 slides

Winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations

Winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations. Andrew Gilpin 10/23/07. Solving the winner determination problem when all combinations can be bid on: Search algorithms for optimal anytime winner determination. Capitalize on sparsely populated space of bids

460 views • 33 slides

When Are Elections with Few Candidates Hard to Manipulate V. Conitzer , T. Sandholm , and J. Lang

When Are Elections with Few Candidates Hard to Manipulate V. Conitzer , T. Sandholm , and J. Lang. Subhash Arja CS 286r October 29, 2008. Motivation. Avoid coalitional manipulation by a group of weighted voters in regular voting protocols.

435 views • 25 slides

On the Sensitivity of Incremental Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions

On the Sensitivity of Incremental Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions. Ryan Kastner , Christina Hsieh, Miodrag Potkonjak, Majid Sarrafzadeh kastner@cs.ucla.edu Computer Science Department, UCLA WECWIS June 27, 2002. Outline. Basics Combinatorial Auctions (CA)

408 views • 25 slides

On the Sensitivity of Incremental Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions

On the Sensitivity of Incremental Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions. Ryan Kastner , Christina Hsieh, Miodrag Potkonjak, Majid Sarrafzadeh kastner@cs.ucla.edu Computer Science Department, UCLA WECWIS June 27, 2002. Outline. Basics Combinatorial Auctions (CA)

254 views • 25 slides

Preference Elicitation

Preference Elicitation. Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions and Eliciting Non-price Preferences in Combinatorial Auctions. Overview. Introduction to Preference Elicitation Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions

417 views • 23 slides

Combinatorial auctions in theory and practice

365 views • 23 slides

Multiagent Coordination Using a Distributed Combinatorial Auction

Multiagent Coordination Using a Distributed Combinatorial Auction. Jose M. Vidal University of South Carolina AAAI Workshop on Auction Mechanisms for Robot Coordination, 2006. Multiagent Coordination Using a Distributed Combinatorial Auction.

389 views • 22 slides

Design of Combinatorial Auctions for Allocation and Procurement Processes Michael Schwind

Design of Combinatorial Auctions for Allocation and Procurement Processes Michael Schwind JWG-University Frankfurt CEC-2005 21.7.2005 Technical University of Munich. Basics of the Combinatorial Auction Design of an Auction Framework Economic Validation of Auction Design

275 views • 16 slides

Robust Winners and Winner Determination Policies under Candidate Uncertainty

2.12k views • 15 slides

A Study of Central Auction Based Wholesale Electricity Markets S. Ceppi and N. Gatti

A Study of Central Auction Based Wholesale Electricity Markets S. Ceppi and N. Gatti. Index. 2. Problem Analysis Context: electricity market Problem: finding the market equilibria State of the Art Original Contributions Introduction of the auction mechanism

286 views • 14 slides